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	<updated>2026-04-22T16:37:45Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=User:JWSchneider&amp;diff=3650</id>
		<title>User:JWSchneider</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=User:JWSchneider&amp;diff=3650"/>
		<updated>2010-08-03T11:06:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Jacob W. Schneider&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Research Assistant to Professor Hylton, Summer 2007&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
jacobws [at] alum.bu.edu&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
J.D. (2009), [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law]&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
B.S. (2004), Computer Science, [http://www.trincoll.edu/ Trinity College (Hartford, CT)]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Go [http://www.redsox.com Red Sox]!&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
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		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=2212"/>
		<updated>2008-05-15T22:22:56Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.  [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html View full faculty profile.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Research Assistants&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[Sean Miller]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to their own research, the authors have relied on translations and additional research by Boston University graduate and law students, especially Dena Milligan and Andrea Tkacikova.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Special thanks to Matt Grayson for designing the site logo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law] and [http://www.microsoft.com Microsoft Corporation] for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Publications Based on this Database ==&lt;br /&gt;
*  Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, &#039;&#039;[http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-journal/abstracts/vol74-02.html Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects]&#039;&#039;, 74 Antitrust L.J. 2 (2007).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on Scoring]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
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|}&lt;br /&gt;
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{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
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|}&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=2030</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=2030"/>
		<updated>2007-12-08T03:19:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.  [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html View full faculty profile.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Research Assistants&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[Sean Miller]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to their own research, the authors have relied on translations and additional research by Boston University graduate and law students, especially Dena Milligan and Andrea Tkacikova.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law] and [http://www.microsoft.com Microsoft Corporation] for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Publications Based on this Database ==&lt;br /&gt;
*  Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, &#039;&#039;[http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-journal/abstracts/vol74-02.html Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects]&#039;&#039;, 74 Antitrust L.J. 2 (2007).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on Scoring]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2011</id>
		<title>Sean Miller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2011"/>
		<updated>2007-11-02T17:54:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Research Assistant to Professor Hylton, Summer 2006&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
J.D. Candidate 2008, [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law]&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
B.A. in Economics with Departmental Honors June 2005; Physics Minor, [http://www.Dartmouth.edu/ Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Fastest Rubik&#039;s Cube Solve: 1&#039;32&amp;quot;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2010</id>
		<title>Sean Miller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2010"/>
		<updated>2007-11-02T17:54:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;Research Assistant to Professor Hylton, Summer 2006&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
J.D. Candidate 2008, [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law]&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
B.A. in Economics with Departmental Honors June 2005; Physics Minor, [http://www.Dartmouth.edu/ Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Fastest Rubik&#039;s Cube Solve: 1&#039;32&amp;quot;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2009</id>
		<title>Sean Miller</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Sean_Miller&amp;diff=2009"/>
		<updated>2007-11-02T17:54:12Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: New page: J.D. Candidate 2008, [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law]&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt; B.A. in Economics with Departmental Honors June 2005; Physics Minor, [http://www.Dartmouth.edu/ Dartmouth ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;J.D. Candidate 2008, [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law]&amp;lt;BR&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
B.A. in Economics with Departmental Honors June 2005; Physics Minor, [http://www.Dartmouth.edu/ Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* Fastest Rubik&#039;s Cube Solve: 1&#039;32&amp;quot;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=2008</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=2008"/>
		<updated>2007-11-02T17:51:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.  [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html View full faculty profile.]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Research Assistants&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[Sean Miller]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to their own research, the authors have relied on translations and additional research by Boston University graduate and law students, especially Dena Milligan and Andrea Tkacikova.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank [http://www.bu.edu/law/ Boston University School of Law] and [http://www.microsoft.com Microsoft Corporation] for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on Scoring]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1961</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1961"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T20:14:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.[http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Research Assistants&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
:*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
:*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
:*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank Boston University and Microsoft Corporation for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1960</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1960"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T20:12:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.[http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank Boston University and Microsoft Corporation for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1959</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1959"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T20:11:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.[http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank Boston University and Microsoft Corporation for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1958</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1958"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T20:10:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{|style=&amp;quot;border-spacing:8px; margin:0px -8px;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|border:1px solid #cef2e0; background:#f5fffa; vertical-align:top; color:#000;&amp;quot;|&lt;br /&gt;
{|width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;vertical-align:top; background:#f5fffa;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
! &amp;lt;h1 style=&amp;quot;margin:0; background:#cef2e0; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; text-align:left; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton&amp;lt;/h1&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&amp;lt;!--&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#cef2e0&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.[http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank Boston University and Microsoft Corporation for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1957</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1957"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T19:59:51Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Authors */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AntitrustWorldWiki.com is a collaborative database covering antitrust laws around the world.  Its purpose is to provide information on the key provisions of antitrust laws in a manner that enables users of this wiki to compare antitrust enforcement regimes around the world.  We will expand the site to include new information and to enable users to post comments and observations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Authors ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Keith N. Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039;, a professor of law at Boston University, has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His antitrust textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.[http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Research Support ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors thank Boston University and Microsoft Corporation for research support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1953</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1953"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T16:40:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Notice on Accuracy of Data */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. The authors readily welcome and encourage any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law or the extent of its enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1952</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1952"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T16:36:26Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Notice on Accuracy of Data */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. Any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law, or extent of enforcement, is readily welcomed and encouraged by the authors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1951</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1951"/>
		<updated>2007-10-12T16:34:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Notice on Accuracy of Data ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;AntitrustWorldWiki.com&#039;&#039;&#039; is a unique research tool. It is designed not for formal publication, but as a means to methodically draw-out factual information regarding the ever-changing body of international competition law. The authors assert only that the data on these pages is accurate to the best of their knowledge. Any outside expertise on a particular jurisdiction&#039;s formal law, or extent of enforcement, is readily welcomed and encouraged by the authors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1874</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1874"/>
		<updated>2007-10-10T20:29:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Suggested Citation Format */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1873</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1873"/>
		<updated>2007-10-10T20:15:41Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Suggested Citation Format */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Signal] Keith N. Hylton et al., [article/page/report name], AntitrustWorldWiki.com, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; [URL location] [(optional other parenthetical)] (as of [date], [time] GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Examples&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
* Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Country Report: Romania (December 10, 2003)&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Romania_%28December_10%2C_2003%29&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (noting Romania&#039;s ban on tying) (as of October 10, 2007, 05:30 PM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;See&#039;&#039; Keith N. Hylton et al., &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Predatory Pricing Report&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;, Antitrust World Reports, &#039;&#039;available at&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; (as of September 5, 2007, 12:30 AM GMT).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1872</id>
		<title>Notes on Scoring</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1872"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:42:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Steps ==&lt;br /&gt;
#Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value.&lt;br /&gt;
#Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude any defenses from this calculation.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Defenses include all efficiency defenses, as well as the efficiency and public interest (pro D) defenses under Merger Assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Include Other as a defense.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Public interest (pro authority) is not a defense, and should count positively towards the overall Scope Index.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1871</id>
		<title>Notes on Scoring</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1871"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:40:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Steps ==&lt;br /&gt;
#Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value.&lt;br /&gt;
#Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude any defenses from this calculation.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Defenses include all efficiency defenses, as well as the efficiency, public interest (pro D), and public interest (pro authority) defenses under Merger Assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Include Other as a defense.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1870</id>
		<title>Notes on Scoring</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1870"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:38:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Steps ==&lt;br /&gt;
#Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value.&lt;br /&gt;
#Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude any defenses from this calculation.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Defenses include all efficiency defenses, as well as the efficiency, public interest (pro D), and public interest (pro authority) defenses under Merger Assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Do not include Other as a defense.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1869</id>
		<title>Notes on Scoring</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1869"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:33:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Steps ==&lt;br /&gt;
#Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value.&lt;br /&gt;
#Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude any defenses from this calculation.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Defenses include all efficiency defenses, as well as the public interest (pro D) and public interest (pro authority) defenses under Merger Assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Do not include Other as a defense.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1868</id>
		<title>Notes on Scoring</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Notes_on_Scoring&amp;diff=1868"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:32:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: New page: == Steps == #Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value. #Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Steps ==&lt;br /&gt;
#Start with the Merger Notification cells. If this value is greater than 0, subtract 1 from it. -1 is not an acceptable value.&lt;br /&gt;
#Next, add-up all of the other cells, but exclude any defenses from this calculation.&lt;br /&gt;
:*Defenses include all efficiency defenses, as well as the public interest (pro D) and public interest (pro authority) defenses under Merger Assessment. Do not include Other as a defense.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1867</id>
		<title>Main Page</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&amp;diff=1867"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:28:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Databases Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Antitrust World Reports by Professor Keith N. Hylton ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Widely recognized in the areas of law and economics, &#039;&#039;&#039;Keith Hylton&#039;&#039;&#039; has published numerous articles in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. His textbook, [http://www.amazon.com/Antitrust-Law-Economic-Theory-Evolution/dp/0521793785/ref=sr_1_1/002-8545403-9069605?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;s=books&amp;amp;qid=1185315361&amp;amp;sr=8-1 &#039;&#039;Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution&#039;&#039;], was published by Cambridge University Press in 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor Hylton joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. At BU Law, he teaches courses in antitrust, torts and labor law [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/profiles/bios/full-time/hylton_k.html (view full faculty profile)].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Research Assistants ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Sean Miller&lt;br /&gt;
*Nicola Leiter&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:AchalOza|Achal Oza]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:Kajrozga|Kaj Rozga]]&lt;br /&gt;
*[[User:JWSchneider|Jacob Schneider]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suggested Citation Format ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Databases Notes ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Author&#039;s Notes]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Index Definitions]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Requiring Further Research]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Country Assignments]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Countries Included in the Database|Listing of Included and Excluded Nations]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on EU Nations and the EC Treaty]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Notes on how to calculate Scope Index scores for Nation Templates]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Special Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Predatory Pricing Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Competition Enforcement Budgets]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Penalties Report]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Country Reports ==&lt;br /&gt;
The following data represents a comprehensive survey of current antitrust regimes throughout the world.  The original texts of individual statutes in each country were examined for the presence of various elements.  Each included country receives an individual report here that indicates the presence or absence of these various elements in the country’s statutes.  The presence of an element is accompanied by a short explanation and/or citation to the applicable statute.  The elements themselves are defined [[Index Definitions|here]].  Some definitions are broad and could be divided into subcategories, in these cases, detailed comments are provided.  Each report also includes a numerical score for comparison across countries and regions, or for empirical analysis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Austria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belgium]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cyprus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Czech Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Denmark]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Finland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[France]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Germany]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greece]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Greenland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hungary]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ireland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Italy]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Luxembourg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malta]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Netherlands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Poland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Portugal]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovak Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Slovenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Spain]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United Kingdom]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Cornflowerblue; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Europe: Non-European Union&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Croatia]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Faroe Island]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iceland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jersey, Channel Islands]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Macedonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Norway]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Serbia-Montenegro]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Switzerland]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Yugoslavia/Serbia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Benin]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Burkina Faso]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cameroon]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cote d&#039;Ivoire]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kenya]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Malawi]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mali]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mauritius]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Namibia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nigeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Senegal]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Africa]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tanzania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zambia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Zimbabwe]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Turquoise; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Middle East and Northern Africa&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Algeria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Egypt]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Iran]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Israel]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jordan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Morocco]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Qatar]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Saudi Arabia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Syria]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tunisia]]&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;South America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Argentina]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bolivia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Brazil]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Chile]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Colombia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Ecuador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guyana]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Paraguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Peru]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uruguay]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Venezuela]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Orange; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Central America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Costa Rica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[El Salvador]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Guatemala]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Honduras]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mexico]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Nicaragua]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Panama]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;North America&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Canada]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#FFFF66; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Caribbean&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Barbados]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Dominican Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Jamaica]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Trinidad and Tobago]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:#33CC00; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Bangladesh]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Cambodia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[China]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Hong Kong]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[India]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Indonesia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Japan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[South Korea|Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Lao PDR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Mongolia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Pakistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Philippines]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Singapore]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Sri Lanka]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Taiwan]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Thailand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:Red; color=white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- style=&amp;quot;color=white&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;&#039;Oceania&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| style=&amp;quot;background:white&amp;quot; border=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; cellpadding=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot; cellspacing=&amp;quot;0&amp;quot; align=&amp;quot;left&amp;quot; width=&amp;quot;100%&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|- align=&amp;quot;center&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Australia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Fiji]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[New Zealand]]&lt;br /&gt;
| [[Papua New Guinea]]&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
__NOTOC__&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1866</id>
		<title>Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1866"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:20:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- &lt;br /&gt;
! Country&lt;br /&gt;
! Predatory Pricing Prohibition&lt;br /&gt;
! Comment&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Albania&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Art. 9(2)(d) of Law No. 9121, dated July 28, 2003 on Competition Protection prohibits &amp;quot;the undercutting of prices or other conditions which have as their object or effect the prevention of entry or the expulsion from the market for specific competitor(s) or one of their products . . . .&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Algeria&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 3(16) of the OECD report on Competition Law and Policy in Algeria indicates they prohibit predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/50/26369606.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Angola&lt;br /&gt;
|0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Argentina&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Armenia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Australia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;quot;Predatory pricing is unlawful under s. 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission web site, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322986/fromItemId/3669&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Austria&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| §31(1)(5) of the Federal Act of 19 October 1988 on Cartels and other Restrictive Trade Practices prohibits the sale of goods below cost price when it cannot be justified on material grounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bangladesh&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;Bangladesh has no competition law in force.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Barbados&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 16(3)(d) of the Fair Competition Act (2002) prohibits enterprise actions which &amp;quot;directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices that are excessive, unreasonable, discriminatory or &#039;&#039;&#039;predatory&#039;&#039;&#039; ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Belarus&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5 prohibits &amp;quot;fixing or maintaining prices &amp;lt;b&amp;gt;(underpinning the market)&amp;lt;/b&amp;gt; for deriving monopolistic high profit or removal of competitors ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://law.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf/6e1a652fbefce34ac2256d910056d559/4dd2237ccbd3b4e6c2256dc1002932c6?OpenDocument&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;World Bank, Competition Law Database, http://go.worldbank.org/SMDO288DV0&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Belgium&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 40-41 of The Commercial Practices Act of July 14, 1991 forbid reselling products at a loss.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-518)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bolivia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bosnia-Herzegovina&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;Act on Competition of 2005&#039;&#039; is supplemented by the &#039;&#039;&#039;Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006&#039;&#039;&#039;. Article 9(c) of this by-law prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Brazil&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 21(18) of Law # 8884 OF JUNE 11, 1994 prohibits a dominant from to unreasonably sell products below cost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bulgaria&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Burkina Faso&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Canada&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 50(1)(c) of Competition Act of August 23, 2000 prohibits engaging in &amp;quot;a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cambodia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cameroon&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Chile&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Antitrust Commission has fined firms for engaging in predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Competition Law and Policy in Chile, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/53/24955980.pdf and Global Competition Review website, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ara/chile.cfm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| China&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Law of the People’s Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition of September 2, 1993 states that &amp;quot;an operator shall not sell its or his goods at a price that is below the cost for the purpose of excluding its or his competitors.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Colombia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- &lt;br /&gt;
| Costa Rica&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cote d&#039;Ivoire&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 24 of Law No. 91-999 of December 27, 1991 on Competition prohibits loss leader selling, but not predatory pricing. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Report on United Nations Conference on Trade and development of 24 November 1997, available at, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Croatia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No evidence was found of a predatory pricing provision in the Competition Act of July 15, 2003.  The Croatian Law on the Protection of Market Competition of July 14, 1995 did prohibit predatory pricing, however. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt; USAID Croatia Commercial Law Assessment Report, March 2002, http://www.bizlawreform.com/country_assess/Croatia%20Assessment.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cyprus&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Czech Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| §11(1)(e) of the Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition prohibits by a Dominant firm &amp;quot;consistent offer and sale of goods for unfairly low prices, which results or may result in distortion of competition.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp50_en.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Denmark&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Danish Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Supervision Act of 1955 forbids predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/54/2375661.pdf (p. 33)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominican Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Ecuador&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Egypt&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 8(h) of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices prohibits selling products below their marginal cost or average variable cost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| El Salvador&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30(c) - &amp;quot;The systematic reduction of prices, below the cost price, with the purpose of eliminating one or several competitors, or impeding the entry or expansion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.minec.gob.sv/leyes/LeydeCompetencia_english_.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Estonia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| EU Generally&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Information for this section has been gleaned from &#039;&#039;&#039;The EC law of Competition&#039;&#039;&#039; (eds. Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 82 (formerly Article 86) of the EC Treaty prohibits predatory pricing. The Commission began prosecuting predatory pricing in 1985, in the &#039;&#039;AKZO&#039;&#039; case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;AKZO&#039;&#039; [1985] OJ L374/1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This case led to the establishment of a two-pronged test for predatory pricing. A firm was guilty of the offense if it either:&lt;br /&gt;
# Sets the price at below average variable cost. This amounts to a per se assumption of abusive behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
# Sets the price at below average total cost, but above average variable cost. This is also assumed to be predatory, but requires a specific plan by the firm to eliminate competitors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Faroe Island&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Fiji&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Commerce Commission &amp;quot;reserves its right to investigate any predatory pricing in breach&lt;br /&gt;
of section 37 of the Fair Trading Decree 1992.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Official government sources: http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_7074.shtml;  http://www.commcomm.gov.fj/docs/061001-postFijiDetermination.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Finland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(4) of the Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) makes, &amp;quot;a pricing practice which is unreasonable or obviously aimed at restricting competition&amp;quot; an abuse of a dominant position.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. II-363-64)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| France&lt;br /&gt;
|1&lt;br /&gt;
| French Competition Act (Ordinance no. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986 (amended July 9, 1999)&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Article 10-1: Price offers or price practices with respect to consumer sales prices that are abusively low in relation to the costs of production, transformation, and marketing are prohibited, since these offers or practices have as their purpose, or may have as their effect, to eliminate from a market or to prevent access to a market by an enterprise or one of its products.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Note: This Article has been used only rarely by enforcement agencies.) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-190)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 20(4) of Act Against Restraints of Competition states that dominant firms cannot use their market power to hinder competitors in an &amp;quot;unfair manner,&amp;quot; which occurs when a firm &amp;quot;offers goods or services not merely occasionally below its cost price . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Germany/Act%20Against%20Restrainst%20of%20Competition.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Georgia&lt;br /&gt;
|0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Greece&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Courts have interpreted predatory pricing as an abuse of a dominant position. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, p. 605 (citing Competition Commission Decisions 232/95 P.Lambropoulos&amp;amp;Co. Priv. Partn.; 264/95 Protoporia Publications Litd.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Guatemala&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 341 of the Criminal Code, Decree No. 17-73, prohibits &amp;quot;the sale of goods of any kind at a price below their cost, in order to prevent free competition in the domestic market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;FTAA report, Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere, March 22, 2002, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws_e.asp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Guyana&lt;br /&gt;
|0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Honduras&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file731_7472.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Hong Kong&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(a) of The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 lists predatory pricing as an example of an abuse of a dominant position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Hungary&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 21(h) of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as amended, effective November 1, 2005 makes it prohibited to &amp;quot;set extremely low prices which are not based on greater efficiency in comparison with that of competitors and which are likely to drive out competitors from the relevant market or to hinder their market entry[.]&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Iceland&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing was found in the statute.  Moreover, predatory pricing has been reported as an ongoing practice by certain firms.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.icelandexpress.com/about_us/press/2004/ice_wars_icelandairs_dirty_trick_campaign_takes_a_different_turn/&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| India&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 4(2)(ii) of the The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003 prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Indonesia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 21 of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 5 of 1999 has been interpreted to forbid dominant firms from imposing predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;East Asia Competition Policy Forum reports, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/01/indonesia_progress_sutrisno.030503.pdf, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/01/pprs.pdf; Also see United Nation Conference on Trade and Development report of January 29 2002, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp25.en.pdf &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  Article 7 explicitly prohibits predatory pricing agreements between firms. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Ireland&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| The enforcement agency has investigated an alleged abuse of predatory pricing, but found it did not constitute an abuse and was instead, &amp;quot;intense competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/37028481.pdf, 12&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Iran&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Israel&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Restrictive Trade Practices Law 5748 of 1988 prohibits &amp;quot;excessive or predatory pricing of the product under&lt;br /&gt;
a monopoly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/guide_israel.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Italy&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Italy has no prohibition on predatory pricing. However, &amp;quot;it is foreseeable that the same principles set forth in EC law to prohibit predatory price cutting by a dominant undertaking may be applied.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 384.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jamaica&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Japan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jersey, Channel Islands&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jordan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Kazakhstan&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 16(4) of Law No. 144 of 19th January 2001 of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities prohibits excessively low price setting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Kenya&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 10(3)(a) of The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act of 1990 prohibits selling below average variable cost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Kyrgystan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Lao PDR&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Latvia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0 &lt;br /&gt;
| Latvia has no explicit prohibition on predatory pricing. However, &amp;quot;[p]redatory pricing by definition as a practice aimed at hindrance, restriction or distortion of competition would qualify as an abuse of dominant position.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dace Silava-Tomsone, Getting the Deal Through – Dominance 2006, http://www.lt-v.lv/pdf/Latvia_dace.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Lithuania&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Lithuania&#039;s competition authority includes predatory pricing in its definition of an abuse of a dominant position. This definition is found in an intra-agency bylaw,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation_resoliution_52.htm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a supplement to their more general competition legislation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation.htm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Luxembourg&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Below cost selling of goods and services is prohibited under the Act on Commercial Practices, Unfair Competition and Comparative Advertising (July 2002).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.entemp.ie/publications/commerce/2005/groceriesorder/chapter9.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Malawi&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 32(2)(a) of the Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998 prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mali&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 17 of Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992 prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Malta&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 9(2)(b) of Chapter 379 Competition Act of Malta forbids &amp;quot;charg[ing] prices which are below the average variable cost price of a product in order to drive rival competitors out of the market[.]&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mauritius&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 11(2)(a) of The Competition Bill N° VI of 2003 prohibits below-cost selling by a dominant firm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Macedonia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mexico&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7 of the Regulations of the Federal Law on Economic Competition of March 4, 1998 prohibits price setting below market price.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Moldova&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mongolia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 4(3) of the Law of Mongolia on Prohibiting Unfair Competition prohibits a firm from selling own goods at a price lower than the cost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Morocco&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7 of Dahir no. 1-00-225 of 2 rabil I 1421 promulgating law no. 06-99, concerning freedom of prices and competition, prohibits pricing offers or abusive practices in pricing sales to consumers that are low compared to production costs, distribution costs, and promotion costs, when these offers or practices are meant to or may have the effect of eliminating a market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Namibia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Netherlands&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Dutch law does not forbid resale at a loss, either. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 445.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| New Zealand&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates that New Zealand&#039;s general test for predatory pricing is similar to the US, in that they ask, &amp;quot;is there below-cost price cutting with a view to recouping losses without loss of market share by raising prices without fear of reprisals afterwards?&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/pdfs/berry_nz_summary.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Nicaragua&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 19(h) prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.dgpsa.gob.ni/biblioteca/biblioteca_archivos/449/Ley%20601.%20Ley%20%20de%20promocion%20de%20la%20competencia..pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Nigeria&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Norway&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Though unclear which specific provision it uses, the Norwegin Competition Authority has recently held numerous proceedings for predatory pricing violations.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://sec.edgar-online.com/2005/04/15/0001156973-05-000475/Section4.asp; http://competition.practicallaw.com/7-201-3648; http://ld.practicallaw.com/4-208-8975&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Pakistan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Panama&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;quot;Any predatory action taken unilaterally . . . when said action cannot reasonably be expected to generate or increase earnings, but rather to encourage the competitor or potential competitor to stop competing . . . leaving the agent with substantial power or in a monopolistic position . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;FTAA - Negotiating Group on Competition Policy Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere, March 22 2002, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws_e.asp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Papua and New Guinea&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Paraguay&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Philippines&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Peru&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Competition Policy Commission initiated proceedings for predatory pricing in &#039;&#039;Tabacalera Nacional S.A. against British American Tabacco (South America) Limited – Perú&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;OECD Global Forum on Competition CONTRIBUTION FROM PERU, October 4 2001, http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Poland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 8(2)(1) of The Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers prohibits &amp;quot;direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including predatory prices or prices glaringly low.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konsument.gov.pl/files/ccp_act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Portugal&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Decree-Law 370/93 of October 29, 1993 (as amended by Decree-Law 140/98) forbids selling goods at a price below the actual price of purchase (plus taxes and transportation costs).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-326)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Romania&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(f) of The Parliament of Romania Competition Law of 1996 explicitly prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Russia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7 of Law no. 135 on the Protection of Competition prohibits a dominant firm from setting a price that is lower than the sum of expenses necessary for production and sale of the commodity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Saudi Arabia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(1) of the Competition Law of 2004 prohibits &amp;quot;selling a commodity or service at a price below cost, with the intention of forcing competitors out of the market.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Senegal&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Serbia-Montenegro&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Singapore&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Singapore authorities have clarified that Article 47(2)(a) of No. 46 Competition Act of 2004 includes prohibition ofpredatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=148&amp;amp;articleID=107; http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN025141.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Slovak Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Slovak Republic forbids abusive acts by a dominant firm seeking to exclude competition.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;136/2001 Coll. ACT of 27 February 2001 on Protection of Competition and on Amendments and Supplements to Act of the Slovak National Council No. 347/1990 Coll. (Article 8(2)(e))&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (their enforcement agency) has used this provision to prosecute temporary predatory pricing of fuels,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Decision No. 2001/DZ/P/2/283 issued by Chairman of the Office on September 26, 2001 (http://www.antimon.gov.sk/eng/article.aspx?c=395&amp;amp;a=2139&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; but the decision was never given effect, as the defendant discontinued its pricing scheme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Slovenia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No predatory pricing provision found.  Office for Protection of Competition received one complaint of predatory pricing against Produkcija Plus d.o.o. - RTV Slovenia d.o.o. on 2/20/01.  However, the complaint was dismissed (Office did not rule on the merits).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.uvk.gov.si/fileadmin/uvk.gov.si/pageuploads/Enforcement_Record_2001.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| South Africa&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 8(d)(iv) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits predatory pricing. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| South Korea&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates that predatory pricing is prohibited.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[http://books.google.com/books?id=9aSrAg57v-oC&amp;amp;pg=PA362&amp;amp;lpg=PA362&amp;amp;dq=korea+predatory+pricing&amp;amp;source=web&amp;amp;ots=Ha4I_DL5gr&amp;amp;sig=uPTcGF0DqgytzhKgN4wMY9_J0KcDeregulation Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region by Anne O. Krueger, Takatoshi Itō]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Spain&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| There are two cases where the courts have issued fines for predatory pricing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. General Electric Espana[20] - GE&#039;s local affiliate was fined Pta 15 million (~90,000 euros)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;TDC Dec. 295/91, or December 30, 1991&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Arbora/Ausonia&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;TDC Dec. 291/90, January 7, 1992&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Predatory pricing, presumably, is covered by common law because there is no mention of it in the Spanish competition laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note: More recently, Telefónica, a Spanish firm, was fined by £102.6m (€152m) by the EU competition agency.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/legislation/news/index.cfm?newsid=3865&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sri Lanka&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Anti-competitive practices prohibited by the Fair Trading Commission Act No. 1 of 1987 includes predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/articles/sri_lankan/HTML/CV39.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;In Ceylon Oxygen Co. Ltd. V. Fair Trading Commission And Another, the Commission considered a predatory pricing complaint.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/case_law/slr/HTML/1997SLR2V372.htm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sweden&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No predatory pricing provision found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(2) of the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of October 6, 1995 prohibits &amp;quot;the under-cutting of prices or other conditions directed against a specific competitor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates that competition law in Taiwan stipulates that enterprises in dominant market positions should not improperly fix, maintain or change the price of the goods and services, and that &#039;&#039;predatory pricing definitely belongs to improperly fixing price&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.jurist.org.cn/doc/uclaw200512/uclaw20051206.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Tajikistan&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 4 prohibits a dominant firm from setting low prices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Tanzania&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Thailand&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates that predatory pricing is an unfair practice under Thai Guidelines.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgramDecember2004/Kalampakorn_Thai.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Tunisia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Turkey&lt;br /&gt;
| 0 &lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Ukraine&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| United Kingdom&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Chapter II of the Fair Trading Act of 1973 prohibits predatory pricing. The OFT has published the following guidelines to assess whether pricing schemes are predatory:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. II-63)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- &lt;br /&gt;
| Price below average variable cost&lt;br /&gt;
| Predation can be assumed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Price below average variable cost but below average total cost &lt;br /&gt;
| Evidence on costs may indicate predation but evidence required of intention to eliminate a competitor before predation could be found&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Price above average total costs&lt;br /&gt;
| Evidence on costs does not indicate predation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Competition Act of 1980 is also at the disposal of the Director General of the Office of Free Trade (OFT) for the prohibition of predatory pricing. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| United States&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Though predatory pricing is formally prohibited, the law in the United States is riddled with exceptions that effectively eliminate the predatory pricing prohibition. The &amp;quot;recoupment test&amp;quot; is a notable example.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &amp;amp; Williamson Tobacco Corp.&#039;&#039;, 509 U.S. 209 (1993)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Uruguay&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 3(2)(c) of the Law of the Defense of the Competition prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Law of the Defense of the Competition, http://www.sice.oas.org/compol/natleg/Uruguay/dec1503.asp#DECRETO&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Uzbekistan&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5 prohibits a firm from setting a monopolistic low price, which is defined as the price of a good consciously set by the undertaking, with dominant position in the market as a seller, at a level bringing the losses from sale of a given good, result of which is or may be the restriction of competition by means of driving the competitors out of the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Venezuela&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.  Moreover, a secondary source suggests that no such prohibition exists.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://books.google.com/books?id=2tsyQFzaj0UC&amp;amp;pg=RA1-PA349&amp;amp;lpg=RA1-PA349&amp;amp;dq=venezuela+predatory+pricing&amp;amp;source=web&amp;amp;ots=lrCQHugr38&amp;amp;sig=gol1a-LNF_pcCwR3vuIkFTIj1Rw&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Vietnam&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates Vietnam prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.freshfields.com/practice/comptrade/publications/pdf/10388.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Zambia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(2)(a) of The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994) prohibits &amp;quot;predatory behaviour towards competition including the use of cost pricing to eliminate competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/COMPETITION%20anDFAIR%20TRADING%20ACT.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Zimbabwe&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Amendment 14 of 2001 to the The Competition Act of 1996 prohibits &amp;quot;[s]elling at very low prices or at below production costs as a deliberate strategy of driving competitors off the market.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References == &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1865</id>
		<title>Talk:Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1865"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T18:17:26Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Jake&amp;#039;s Questions */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Organization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How should we organize this page?  Currently, the main table is titled as &amp;quot;European Union&amp;quot;, however it includes non-European countries (the United States, Zimbabwe, etc).  Should we put all nations in this tables or separate tables for each region of the world?  I prefer the latter.  --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:57, 11 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Jake&#039;s Questions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Brazil ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 21 sec. XVIII - prohibits &amp;quot;to unreasonably sell products below cost;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 00:05, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hylton: This counts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ukraine (2001) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art. 13(1) - &amp;quot;the setting of such prices or other conditions for the purchase or sale of a product that would be impossible in case of the existence of substantial competition on the market ...&amp;quot; --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 23:04, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hylton: Nope.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uzbekistan (1996) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 5 - &amp;quot;Establishment of the monopolistic high or &#039;&#039;&#039;low prices&#039;&#039;&#039;;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Achal took care of this one. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 14:17, 9 October 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===El Salvador (2004) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 30(c) - &amp;quot;The systematic reduction of prices, below the cost price, with the purpose of eliminating one or several competitors, or impeding the entry or expansion of the same.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 14:04, 8 October 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hylton: Yes.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1836</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1836"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T00:16:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Public Interest (Pro Authority) */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The Commission may prohibit otherwise acceptable mergers if it is determined that prohibition is in the interests of national security.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms are prohibited from engaging] in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South African Competition Act No. 89 of 30 November 1998 last amended in Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000, Article 8, http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Fix the prices of products, services or conditions of sale, and the like.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ... Tying the sale of a product or the provision of a service to the purchase of another or others or the purchase of a limited amount or a request for the provision of another service.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 6(G), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Share the market on the basis of geographical regions or quantities of sales or purchases or customers or any other basis that negatively affects competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(3), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms cannot agree to] limit or control the production, markets, technical development or investment.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005, Article 4(1)(b), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms cannot agree to] share markets or sources of supply.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005, Article 4(1)(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Set barriers to entry of Enterprises into the market or eliminate them therefrom.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(4), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Collusion in tenders or bids is prohibited.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The Council of Ministers may, by way of a regulation, exempt from the prohibition stipulated in Article 5 [Restrictive Trade Practices], agreements which contribute to improvement of the production, distribution of products or to technical or economic progress and ensure to the buyer or user fair share of benefits resulting thereof ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Poland Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (2000), Article 7, http://www.konsument.gov.pl/files/ccp_act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1835</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1835"/>
		<updated>2007-10-09T00:10:41Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Restrictive Trade Practices */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms are prohibited from engaging] in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South African Competition Act No. 89 of 30 November 1998 last amended in Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000, Article 8, http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Fix the prices of products, services or conditions of sale, and the like.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ... Tying the sale of a product or the provision of a service to the purchase of another or others or the purchase of a limited amount or a request for the provision of another service.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 6(G), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Share the market on the basis of geographical regions or quantities of sales or purchases or customers or any other basis that negatively affects competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(3), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms cannot agree to] limit or control the production, markets, technical development or investment.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005, Article 4(1)(b), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms cannot agree to] share markets or sources of supply.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005, Article 4(1)(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Set barriers to entry of Enterprises into the market or eliminate them therefrom.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(4), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Collusion in tenders or bids is prohibited.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The Council of Ministers may, by way of a regulation, exempt from the prohibition stipulated in Article 5 [Restrictive Trade Practices], agreements which contribute to improvement of the production, distribution of products or to technical or economic progress and ensure to the buyer or user fair share of benefits resulting thereof ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Poland Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (2000), Article 7, http://www.konsument.gov.pl/files/ccp_act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1811</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1811"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:58:38Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Price Fixing */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms are prohibited from engaging] in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South African Competition Act No. 89 of 30 November 1998 last amended in Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000, Article 8, http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Fix the prices of products, services or conditions of sale, and the like.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ... Tying the sale of a product or the provision of a service to the purchase of another or others or the purchase of a limited amount or a request for the provision of another service.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 6(G), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Share the market on the basis of geographical regions or quantities of sales or purchases or customers or any other basis that negatively affects competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(3), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Set barriers to entry of Enterprises into the market or eliminate them therefrom.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(4), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1810</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1810"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:57:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Restrictive Trade Practices */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms are prohibited from engaging] in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South African Competition Act No. 89 of 30 November 1998 last amended in Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000, Article 8, http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
* &amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Fix the prices of products, services or conditions of sale, and the like.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ... Tying the sale of a product or the provision of a service to the purchase of another or others or the purchase of a limited amount or a request for the provision of another service.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 6(G), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Share the market on the basis of geographical regions or quantities of sales or purchases or customers or any other basis that negatively affects competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(3), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Practices, alliances and agreements, explicit or implicit, that prejudice, contravene, limit or prevent competition, shall be prohibited, especially those whose subject or aim is to ... Set barriers to entry of Enterprises into the market or eliminate them therefrom.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 5(A)(4), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Jordan_2004&amp;diff=1809</id>
		<title>Jordan 2004</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Jordan_2004&amp;diff=1809"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:51:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Score = 24&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Governed by:&#039;&#039; The Competition Law of the year 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Law”). &lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Scope&lt;br /&gt;
| Extraterritoriality&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 3 extends the scope of the Law to all activities that have an effect in Jordan.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies&lt;br /&gt;
| Fines&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 20-26 allows the Minister to impose fines for violations of the Law.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Prison Sentences&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Divestitures&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Private Enforcement&lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Initiation&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 17 allows for 3rd party initiation of proceedings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 17 allows affected 3rd parties to be parties to the case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Notification&lt;br /&gt;
| Voluntary&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Mandatory&lt;br /&gt;
| 3&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 10 requires merging companies to submit an application for the approval of the proposed merger.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Pre-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| 2&lt;br /&gt;
| The approval must come before the merger can occur.&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Post-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Assessment&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 9(B) and 10(A) both consider whether the firm&#039;s market share is substantial.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Restriction of Competition&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 11 allows the Minister to deny a merger application if it negatively impacts competition.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro D)&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article (11)(A)(1).&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Other&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 11(A)(1) says the minister can allow an otherwise impermissible merger which has positive economic benefits such as lowering prices or providing employment.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| Limits Access&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(E) and (F) prohibit various methods of limiting access to the market such as supply refusal and control over purchasing.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Abusive Acts&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Price Setting&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(A) prohibits price setting.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Discriminatory Pricing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(C) prohibits price discrimination.&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Resale Price Maintenance&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 8 prohibits resale price maintenance.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Obstacles to Entry&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(B) prohibits activities that lead to barriers to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(B) and (C).&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Restrictive Trade Practices&lt;br /&gt;
| Price Fixing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(1) prohibits price fixing.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Tying&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(G) prohibits tying.&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Division&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(3) prohibits market division.&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Output Restraint&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(2) prohibits output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Sharing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(3) prohibits market sharing.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Eliminating Competitors&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(4) prohibits agreements to eliminate other enterprises.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(A)(5) prohibits collusive tendering.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Supply Refusal&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(B) and (C).&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=El_Salvador_(December,_2004)&amp;diff=1808</id>
		<title>El Salvador (December, 2004)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=El_Salvador_(December,_2004)&amp;diff=1808"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:17:41Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Score = 18&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Governed by:&#039;&#039; Competition Law of December 2004.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.minec.gob.sv/leyes/LeydeCompetencia_english_.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Scope&lt;br /&gt;
| Extraterritoriality&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies&lt;br /&gt;
| Fines&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 38 provides for fines if prohibitions in the statute are violated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Prison Sentences&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Divestitures&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Private Enforcement&lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Initiation&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 40-42 say that a 3rd party can compel the enforcement agency to begin an investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Notification&lt;br /&gt;
| Voluntary&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Mandatory&lt;br /&gt;
| 3&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33 says firms of a certain size must request authorization.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Pre-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| 2&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Post-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Assessment&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33 considers the size of the resulting firm.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Restriction of Competition&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro D)&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 34 talks about consumer benefits as well as market efficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Other&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 34&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| Limits Access&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Abusive Acts&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30 leaves other possible abusive acts open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Price Setting&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Discriminatory Pricing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30(d)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Resale Price Maintenance&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Obstacles to Entry&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30(a)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Restrictive Trade Practices&lt;br /&gt;
| Price Fixing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(a)&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Tying&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 26(a) &amp;amp; (b)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Division&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(d) prohibits &amp;quot;Division of the market, either by territory, volume of sales or purchases, by type of good sold, customer or seller , or by any other means.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Output Restraint&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(b) prohibits &amp;quot;Fixing or limiting quantity output.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Sharing&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Eliminating Competitors&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(c)&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Supply Refusal&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=El_Salvador_(December,_2004)&amp;diff=1807</id>
		<title>El Salvador (December, 2004)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=El_Salvador_(December,_2004)&amp;diff=1807"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:17:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Score = ???&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Governed by:&#039;&#039; Competition Law of December 2004.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.minec.gob.sv/leyes/LeydeCompetencia_english_.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Scope&lt;br /&gt;
| Extraterritoriality&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies&lt;br /&gt;
| Fines&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 38 provides for fines if prohibitions in the statute are violated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Prison Sentences&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Divestitures&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Private Enforcement&lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Initiation&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 40-42 say that a 3rd party can compel the enforcement agency to begin an investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Notification&lt;br /&gt;
| Voluntary&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Mandatory&lt;br /&gt;
| 3&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33 says firms of a certain size must request authorization.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Pre-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| 2&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Post-merger&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Merger Assessment&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 33 considers the size of the resulting firm.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Restriction of Competition&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro D)&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 34 talks about consumer benefits as well as market efficiency.&lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Other&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 34&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominance&lt;br /&gt;
| Limits Access&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Abusive Acts&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30 leaves other possible abusive acts open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Price Setting&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Discriminatory Pricing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30(d)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Resale Price Maintenance&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Obstacles to Entry&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 30(a)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|- class=&amp;quot;categorydivision&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
| Restrictive Trade Practices&lt;br /&gt;
| Price Fixing&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(a)&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Tying&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 26(a) &amp;amp; (b)&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Division&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(d) prohibits &amp;quot;Division of the market, either by territory, volume of sales or purchases, by type of good sold, customer or seller , or by any other means.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Output Restraint&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(b) prohibits &amp;quot;Fixing or limiting quantity output.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Market Sharing&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Eliminating Competitors&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
			&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 25(c)&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Supply Refusal&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| Efficiency Defense&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
		&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1806</id>
		<title>Talk:Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1806"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T18:04:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Jake&amp;#039;s Questions */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Organization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How should we organize this page?  Currently, the main table is titled as &amp;quot;European Union&amp;quot;, however it includes non-European countries (the United States, Zimbabwe, etc).  Should we put all nations in this tables or separate tables for each region of the world?  I prefer the latter.  --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:57, 11 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Jake&#039;s Questions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Brazil ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 21 sec. XVIII - prohibits &amp;quot;to unreasonably sell products below cost;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 00:05, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ukraine (2001) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art. 13(1) - &amp;quot;the setting of such prices or other conditions for the purchase or sale of a product that would be impossible in case of the existence of substantial competition on the market ...&amp;quot; --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 23:04, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uzbekistan (1996) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 5 - &amp;quot;Establishment of the monopolistic high or &#039;&#039;&#039;low prices&#039;&#039;&#039;;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===El Salvador (2004) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 30(c) - &amp;quot;The systematic reduction of prices, below the cost price, with the purpose of eliminating one or several competitors, or impeding the entry or expansion of the same.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 14:04, 8 October 2007 (EDT)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1805</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1805"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:52:59Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Efficiency Defense */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[Firms are prohibited from engaging] in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;South African Competition Act No. 89 of 30 November 1998 last amended in Competition Second Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2000, Article 8, http://www.compcom.co.za/thelaw/ConsolidatedAct.doc&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1804</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1804"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:39:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Dominance */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] An activity or action which leads to setting barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market, or their elimination therefrom, or their exposure to gross losses including loss selling.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 5(4), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1803</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1803"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:18:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Abusive Acts */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1802</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1802"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:17:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Dominance */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Discrimination between customers in similar contracts with regard to price of products or services or conditions of sale or purchase.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(C), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The statute prohibits firms from lowering prices to eliminate competitors, only to raise prices to recoup after achieving a dominant position in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
*This activity requires that second step in the process. In other words, the newly dominant firm must raise prices in order to recoup its losses from previous price-cuts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statute prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bosnia-Herzegovina, Act on Competition of 2005 as supplemented by the Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006, Article 9(c), http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A producer, importer, wholesaler or service provider may not ... Set a minimum resale price for a product or service whether directly or indirectly.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 8(A)(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1801</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1801"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:08:28Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Price Setting */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1800</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1800"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:08:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Price Setting */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The following abusive acts are prohibited:] Fixing or setting prices or conditions of resale of products or&lt;br /&gt;
services.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6(A), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1799</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1799"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:06:39Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Abusive Acts */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:This statute implies that it is not presenting an exhaustive listing of abusive acts, and therefore counts: &amp;quot;An Enterprise with a Dominant Position in the local market or a significant part thereof is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to prevent, limit or weaken competition including the following ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jordan&#039;s Competition Law of 2004, Article 6, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Nicaragua&amp;diff=1798</id>
		<title>Nicaragua</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Nicaragua&amp;diff=1798"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:03:12Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Competition Laws ==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Nicaragua 2006|Law No. 601 - Promotion of Competition]]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.dgpsa.gob.ni/biblioteca/biblioteca_archivos/449/Ley%20601.%20Ley%20%20de%20promocion%20de%20la%20competencia..pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
----&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1797</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1797"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:02:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Limits Access */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1796</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1796"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T17:02:04Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Limits Access */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... Limit access to a market or free competition among enterprises ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1795</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
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		<updated>2007-10-08T16:49:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Post-Merger */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*This provision grants the merging firm the right to notify &#039;&#039;after&#039;&#039; the merger: &amp;quot;The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE — duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation — in advance or no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Brazilian Antitrust Statute, Article 54(4), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s_america/Brazil/Legisla%E7%E3o%20Antitruste%20em%20ingl%EAs.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1794</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1794"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T16:43:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Mandatory */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Where an enterprise ... is desirous of effecting a merger, it shall apply to the Commission for permission to effect the merger.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Barbados Fair Competition Act, Article 20(2), http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1793</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1793"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T16:39:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Pre-Merger */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1792</id>
		<title>Index Definitions</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Index_Definitions&amp;diff=1792"/>
		<updated>2007-10-08T16:38:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Pre-Merger */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;==Total Index Score==&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not contribute to the scores within each category, and likewise do not contribute to the total index score.  The minimum possible total index score is 0 and the maximum is 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Scope==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Scope has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 1.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Extraterritoriality=== &lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the particular country.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The language of the statute must be very specific.  Text extending scope merely to &amp;quot;all economic entities&amp;quot; is insufficient for the purposes of this report.  Instead the text must be closer to, &amp;quot;foreign economic entities whose effects reach this country.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Act on Competition of March, 2005, available online at http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/doc/low_on_competition_new.pdf. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Remedies==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Fines===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow fines:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where fines are clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing fines.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“A violator of the provisions of Article 8 of this Law shall be punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred (200) Dinars and not exceeding twenty thousand (20000) Dinars.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §22 of Jordan&#039;s Competition Law (2004), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Prison Sentences===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by imprisonment.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations where statutes may allow imprisonment:&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating prohibitions of the law;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating an order of the commission to stop a prohibited activity;&lt;br /&gt;
:#For violating rules of procedure (i.e. defendant doesn&#039;t cooperate with proceedings, doesn&#039;t hand-over evidence, perjures self, etc.).&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1) is the easy case where imprisonment is clearly allowed for violations of the applicable Act.  Situation (2) represents a gray area, however for the purposes of this report, such a prohibition is sufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.  Situation (3) is insufficient to receive a coding of allowing imprisonment.&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): &amp;quot;Any person who [in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade] shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than three years . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §89 of the Japanese Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade: Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended in 2005), available online at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Divestitures===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response to certain violations, or the law allows divestiture specifically in the merger context. In the latter case, the law must allow a merger to be conditioned on certain acts and must allow the agency to force those acts to occur if the firm does not.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Two situations&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture for some particular violation. This is the purest version of divestiture and is counted.&lt;br /&gt;
:#Divestiture in the merger context is a harder issue. There must be some language in the law that gives the commission the power to unwind or split-up a firm that fails to satisfy conditions set-out by a merger authorization. This power must be more than just a power to fine or imprison, it must be the power to compel the selling of assets or the structural break-up of a firm.&lt;br /&gt;
:*When the divestiture only exists in the merger context, a coder should include a comment to this effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (1): “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 31 of Hungary Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as of 2005, available online at http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Private Enforcement==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Private enforcement has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Initiation===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or Council.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*The statute must allow for more than merely a &amp;quot;tip-line&amp;quot; to the competition commission.  Instead, there must be a formal process for 3rd parties to initiate a compulsory investigation or hearing, even if the commission retains the discretion to proceed with the investigation or hearing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*“Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §6 of Ireland Competition Act, 2002, available online at http://www.tca.ie/.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Remedies Available to Third Parties===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Remedies for damaged third parties are provided for in the Act.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Remedies may include either money damages or injunctions&lt;br /&gt;
:*This also includes situations where the statute says a 3rd party may seek compensation from a party in violation of the statute&lt;br /&gt;
:*This counts even if the private compensation suit comes after a formal government suit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See §21 of Latvia Competition Law of 4.10.2001 as amended, available online at http://www.competition.lv/uploaded_files/ENG/E_likumK.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Third Party Rights in Proceedings===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Third parties have access to evidence and/or can testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*There are three situations dealing with third party rights:&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings, but no right to participate in it. This would not count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has a right to initiate proceedings and has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
:#A third party has no right to initiate proceedings, but once it starts, has a right to participate in it. This would count in our coding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Situation (2) or (3): “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . . .”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Article 39-40 of the Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, available online at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
:* Situation (2) or (3): &amp;quot;7(2) The Commission may hear orally &#039;&#039;&#039;any person who&#039;&#039;&#039;, in its opinion, will be affected by an investigation under this Act, and shall so hear the person if the person has made a written request for a hearing, showing that he is an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the investigation or that there are particular reasons why he should be heard orally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jamaican Competition Statute (2001), http://jftc.com/TheFCA/theact/PDFACT/Fair%20Competition%20Act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Merger Notification==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger notification has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 5.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:; Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that makes no mention of a time requirement receives a 1, and a regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Voluntary===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable Commission or Council of an intended merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If notification is voluntary, then post-merger is automatically marked by a coder.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*Statutes will generally exclude firm deadlines for filing, or will state that notification be made after the merger occurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Mandatory===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a voluntary scheme.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Pre-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
*&amp;quot;Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary rights, usufructs or shares, which causes them to be in a dominating position, shall notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Saudi Arabia Competition Statute (2004), Article 6, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Post-Merger===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission is notified after the merger.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*If the firm has the option of not notifying the competition authority at all (i.e. notification is voluntary), then code this as a 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Merger Assessment==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Merger assessment has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 4.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Dominance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, &#039;&#039;&#039;if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market&#039;&#039;&#039;.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Restriction of Competition===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is an umbrella term and its definition is intentionally general.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This would include any barrier to entry.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* The following would likely count: In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro D)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This definition covers benefits to the public or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.&lt;br /&gt;
:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.&lt;br /&gt;
:**These are externalities that are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits, improves the environment, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Environmental benefits count here as well.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.&lt;br /&gt;
:* National security concerns are a good example of this.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Other===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council considers other issues.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Though business failure is a type of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of each other.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This category is open for suggestions as to what else should go under the &amp;quot;Other&amp;quot; heading.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ...&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes anything that will increase product supply, lower prices, increases the value of a product, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This includes benefits to the market, not to people or overall welfare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Dominance==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Dominance has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Limits Access===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or purchasers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Abusive Acts===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is not to be marked as a &amp;quot;1&amp;quot; when any abuse is enumerated. Rather, it is to be marked when the statute ...&lt;br /&gt;
:** says that its list of abuses is not exhaustive&lt;br /&gt;
:** OR, uses the phrase &amp;quot;abusive acts&amp;quot; (or something similar) as an umbrella term for actions not explicitly listed in the text&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Setting===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* These are cases where the price is being set too high. This is to distinguish price setting from predatory pricing, in which a firm will lower its prices to eliminate competitors, become a dominant firm, and then raise prices to recoup previous losses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Discriminatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the same goods or services for different customers.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Predatory Pricing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Insert definition from a statute&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Resale Price Maintenance===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers (retailers).&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a firm that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Restrictive Trade Practices==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Restrictive trade practices has a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 8.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Price Fixing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for their product in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Tying===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:*Prohibitions against tying by a dominant firm are coded as a restrictive trade practice prohibition against tying.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Division===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is the scenario where there is rigid division of a market.&lt;br /&gt;
:* The division must be exhaustive (i.e. when new customers enter the market, they will not be competed over)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:*&amp;quot;Firm A will take the East side, Firm B will take the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Output Restraint===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products made available to the market.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* This covers output quotas.&lt;br /&gt;
:* Firms cannot agree to stop selling to a single market.&lt;br /&gt;
:** Example: &amp;quot;We aren&#039;t going to sell to the West side.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Market Sharing===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not competing with each other for business or customers.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
* An agreement between firms not to compete with each other in a certain market.&lt;br /&gt;
* Distinguished from &amp;quot;Market Division&amp;quot; because no formal division takes place, however firms just agree not to compete with each other in the market.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* &amp;quot;Two firms agree to stay in the same market, but just not compete with each other.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Obstacles to Entry / Eliminating Competitors===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or increase their market share.  This category also includes prohibitions against a dominant firm from eliminating competitors: the law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that product.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supply Refusal===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* Boycotts are the most common type of supply refusals.&lt;br /&gt;
:* This is exclusive of output restraint.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
:* Common case: Your rival needs a component you produce to make their own product and you refuse to sell to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Efficiency Defense===&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes significantly to economic efficiency or to the public good.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Comments&lt;br /&gt;
:* We are looking for benefits to the people or overall welfare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
:;Examples&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1744</id>
		<title>Talk:Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1744"/>
		<updated>2007-09-25T18:15:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Jake&amp;#039;s Questions */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Organization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How should we organize this page?  Currently, the main table is titled as &amp;quot;European Union&amp;quot;, however it includes non-European countries (the United States, Zimbabwe, etc).  Should we put all nations in this tables or separate tables for each region of the world?  I prefer the latter.  --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:57, 11 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Jake&#039;s Questions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Brazil ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 21 sec. XVIII - prohibits &amp;quot;to unreasonably sell products below cost;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 00:05, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ukraine (2001) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art. 13(1) - &amp;quot;the setting of such prices or other conditions for the purchase or sale of a product that would be impossible in case of the existence of substantial competition on the market ...&amp;quot; --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 23:04, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uzbekistan (1996) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 5 - &amp;quot;Establishment of the monopolistic high or &#039;&#039;&#039;low prices&#039;&#039;&#039;;&amp;quot;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1715</id>
		<title>Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1715"/>
		<updated>2007-09-25T03:09:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- &lt;br /&gt;
! Country&lt;br /&gt;
! Predatory Pricing Prohibition&lt;br /&gt;
! Comment&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Albania&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Algeria&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Angola&lt;br /&gt;
|0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Argentina&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Armenia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Australia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;quot;Predatory pricing is unlawful under s. 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission web site, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322986/fromItemId/3669&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Austria&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| §31(1)(5) of the Federal Act of 19 October 1988 on Cartels and other Restrictive Trade Practices prohibits the sale of goods below cost price when it cannot be justified on material grounds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Azerbaijan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bangladesh&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;Bangladesh has no competition law in force.&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Barbados&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 16(3)(d) of the Fair Competition Act (2002) prohibits enterprise actions which &amp;quot;directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices that are excessive, unreasonable, discriminatory or &#039;&#039;&#039;predatory&#039;&#039;&#039; ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Belarus&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5 prohibits &amp;quot;fixing or maintaining prices &amp;lt;b&amp;gt;(underpinning the market)&amp;lt;/b&amp;gt; for deriving monopolistic high profit or removal of competitors ...&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://law.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf/6e1a652fbefce34ac2256d910056d559/4dd2237ccbd3b4e6c2256dc1002932c6?OpenDocument&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;World Bank, Competition Law Database, http://go.worldbank.org/SMDO288DV0&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Belgium&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Articles 40-41 of The Commercial Practices Act of July 14, 1991 forbid reselling products at a loss.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-518)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bolivia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bosnia-Herzegovina&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| &#039;&#039;Act on Competition of 2005&#039;&#039; is supplemented by the &#039;&#039;&#039;Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006&#039;&#039;&#039;. Article 9(c) of this by-law prohibits &amp;quot;fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Bulgaria&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Burkina Faso&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Canada&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 50(1)(c) of Competition Act of August 23, 2000 prohibits engaging in &amp;quot;a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cambodia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cameroon&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Chile&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Antitrust Commission has fined firms for engaging in predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Competition Law and Policy in Chile, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/53/24955980.pdf and Global Competition Review website, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ara/chile.cfm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| China&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Law of the People’s Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition of September 2, 1993 states that &amp;quot;an operator shall not sell its or his goods at a price that is below the cost for the purpose of excluding its or his competitors.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Colombia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cote d&#039;Ivoire&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 24 of Law No. 91-999 of December 27, 1991 on Competition prohibits loss leader selling, but not predatory pricing. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Report on United Nations Conference on Trade and development of 24 November 1997, available at, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Croatia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No evidence was found of a predatory pricing provision in the Competition Act of July 15, 2003.  The Croatian Law on the Protection of Market Competition of July 14, 1995 did prohibit predatory pricing, however. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt; USAID Croatia Commercial Law Assessment Report, March 2002, http://www.bizlawreform.com/country_assess/Croatia%20Assessment.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Cyprus&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Czech Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| §11(1)(e) of the Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition prohibits by a Dominant firm &amp;quot;consistent offer and sale of goods for unfairly low prices, which results or may result in distortion of competition.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp50_en.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Denmark&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Danish Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Supervision Act of 1955 forbids predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/54/2375661.pdf (p. 33)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Dominican Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Ecuador&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| El Salvador&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://commercecan.ic.gc.ca/scdt/bizmap/interface2.nsf/vDownload/CCG_7665/$file/X_3471861.DOC&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Estonia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| EU Generally&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Information for this section has been gleaned from &#039;&#039;&#039;The EC law of Competition&#039;&#039;&#039; (eds. Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 82 (formerly Article 86) of the EC Treaty prohibits predatory pricing. The Commission began prosecuting predatory pricing in 1985, in the &#039;&#039;AKZO&#039;&#039; case.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;AKZO&#039;&#039; [1985] OJ L374/1.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This case led to the establishment of a two-pronged test for predatory pricing. A firm was guilty of the offense if it either:&lt;br /&gt;
# Sets the price at below average variable cost. This amounts to a per se assumption of abusive behavior.&lt;br /&gt;
# Sets the price at below average total cost, but above average variable cost. This is also assumed to be predatory, but requires a specific plan by the firm to eliminate competitors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Faroe Island&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Fiji&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Commerce Commission &amp;quot;reserves its right to investigate any predatory pricing in breach&lt;br /&gt;
of section 37 of the Fair Trading Decree 1992.&amp;quot; &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Official government sources: http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_7074.shtml;  http://www.commcomm.gov.fj/docs/061001-postFijiDetermination.pdf.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Finland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(4) of the Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) makes, &amp;quot;a pricing practice which is unreasonable or obviously aimed at restricting competition&amp;quot; an abuse of a dominant position.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. II-363-64)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| France&lt;br /&gt;
|1&lt;br /&gt;
| French Competition Act (Ordinance no. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986 (amended July 9, 1999)&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Article 10-1: Price offers or price practices with respect to consumer sales prices that are abusively low in relation to the costs of production, transformation, and marketing are prohibited, since these offers or practices have as their purpose, or may have as their effect, to eliminate from a market or to prevent access to a market by an enterprise or one of its products.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(Note: This Article has been used only rarely by enforcement agencies.) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-190)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|1&lt;br /&gt;
| Section 20(4) of Act Against Restraints of Competition states that dominant firms cannot use their market power to hinder competitors in an &amp;quot;unfair manner,&amp;quot; which occurs when a firm &amp;quot;offers goods or services not merely occasionally below its cost price . . . .&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Germany/Act%20Against%20Restrainst%20of%20Competition.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Greece&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Courts have interpreted predatory pricing as an abuse of a dominant position. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, p. 605 (citing Competition Commission Decisions 232/95 P.Lambropoulos&amp;amp;Co. Priv. Partn.; 264/95 Protoporia Publications Litd.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Guatemala&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 341 of the Criminal Code, Decree No. 17-73, prohibits &amp;quot;the sale of goods of any kind at a price below their cost, in order to prevent free competition in the domestic market.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;FTAA report, Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere, March 22, 2002, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws_e.asp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Honduras&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:NaLCn4Wxe5gJ:www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file731_7472.pdf+dominican+republic+%2B+%22predatory+pricing%22&amp;amp;hl=en&amp;amp;ct=clnk&amp;amp;cd=6&amp;amp;gl=us&amp;amp;client=firefox-a&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Hong Kong&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(a) of The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 lists predatory pricing as an example of an abuse of a dominant position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Hungary&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 21(h) of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as amended, effective November 1, 2005 makes it prohibited to &amp;quot;set extremely low prices which are not based on greater efficiency in comparison with that of competitors and which are likely to drive out competitors from the relevant market or to hinder their market entry[.]&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Ireland&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| The enforcement agency has investigated an alleged abuse of predatory pricing, but found it did not constitute an abuse and was instead, &amp;quot;intense competition.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/37028481.pdf, 12&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Italy&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Italy has no prohibition on predatory pricing. However, &amp;quot;it is foreseeable that the same principles set forth in EC law to prohibit predatory price cutting by a dominant undertaking may be applied.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 384.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jamaica&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Japan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jersey, Channel Islands&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Jordan&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Latvia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0 &lt;br /&gt;
| Latvia has no explicit prohibition on predatory pricing. However, &amp;quot;[p]redatory pricing by definition as a practice aimed at hindrance, restriction or distortion of competition would qualify as an abuse of dominant position.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Dace Silava-Tomsone, Getting the Deal Through – Dominance 2006, http://www.lt-v.lv/pdf/Latvia_dace.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Lithuania&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Lithuania&#039;s competition authority includes predatory pricing in its definition of an abuse of a dominant position. This definition is found in an intra-agency bylaw,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation_resoliution_52.htm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a supplement to their more general competition legislation.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation.htm&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Luxembourg&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Below cost selling of goods and services is prohibited under the Act on Commercial Practices, Unfair Competition and Comparative Advertising (July 2002).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.entemp.ie/publications/commerce/2005/groceriesorder/chapter9.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Malawi&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 32(2)(a) of the Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998 prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mali&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 17 of Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992 prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Malta&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 9(2)(b) of Chapter 379 Competition Act of Malta forbids &amp;quot;charg[ing] prices which are below the average variable cost price of a product in order to drive rival competitors out of the market[.]&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Mauritius&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 11(2)(a) of The Competition Bill N° VI of 2003 prohibits below-cost selling by a dominant firm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Namibia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Netherlands&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Dutch law does not forbid resale at a loss, either. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 445.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Nicaragua&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 19(h) prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.dgpsa.gob.ni/biblioteca/biblioteca_archivos/449/Ley%20601.%20Ley%20%20de%20promocion%20de%20la%20competencia..pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Nigeria&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Norway&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Poland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 8(2)(1) of The Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers prohibits &amp;quot;direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including predatory prices or prices glaringly low.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.konsument.gov.pl/files/ccp_act.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Portugal&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Decree-Law 370/93 of October 29, 1993 (as amended by Decree-Law 140/98) forbids selling goods at a price below the actual price of purchase (plus taxes and transportation costs).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. I-326)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Romania&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 6(f) of The Parliament of Romania Competition Law of 1996 explicitly prohibits predatory pricing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Saudi Arabia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 5(1) of the Competition Law of 2004 prohibits &amp;quot;selling a commodity or service at a price below cost, with the intention of forcing competitors out of the market.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Slovak Republic&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| The Slovak Republic forbids abusive acts by a dominant firm seeking to exclude competition.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;136/2001 Coll. ACT of 27 February 2001 on Protection of Competition and on Amendments and Supplements to Act of the Slovak National Council No. 347/1990 Coll. (Article 8(2)(e))&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (their enforcement agency) has used this provision to prosecute temporary predatory pricing of fuels,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Decision No. 2001/DZ/P/2/283 issued by Chairman of the Office on September 26, 2001 (http://www.antimon.gov.sk/eng/article.aspx?c=395&amp;amp;a=2139&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; but the decision was never given effect, as the defendant discontinued its pricing scheme.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Slovenia&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No predatory pricing provision found.  Office for Protection of Competition received one complaint of predatory pricing against Produkcija Plus d.o.o. - RTV Slovenia d.o.o. on 2/20/01.  However, the complaint was dismissed (Office did not rule on the merits).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.uvk.gov.si/fileadmin/uvk.gov.si/pageuploads/Enforcement_Record_2001.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Spain&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| There are two cases where the courts have issued fines for predatory pricing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. General Electric Espana[20] - GE&#039;s local affiliate was fined Pta 15 million (~90,000 euros)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;TDC Dec. 295/91, or December 30, 1991&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Arbora/Ausonia&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;TDC Dec. 291/90, January 7, 1992&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Predatory pricing, presumably, is covered by common law because there is no mention of it in the Spanish competition laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note: More recently, Telefónica, a Spanish firm, was fined by £102.6m (€152m) by the EU competition agency.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/legislation/news/index.cfm?newsid=3865&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Sweden&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| No predatory pricing provision found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(2) of the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of October 6, 1995 prohibits &amp;quot;the under-cutting of prices or other conditions directed against a specific competitor.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| United Kingdom&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Chapter II of the Fair Trading Act of 1973 prohibits predatory pricing. The OFT has published the following guidelines to assess whether pricing schemes are predatory:&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Competition Law in the EU (p. II-63)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|- &lt;br /&gt;
| Price below average variable cost&lt;br /&gt;
| Predation can be assumed&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Price below average variable cost but below average total cost &lt;br /&gt;
| Evidence on costs may indicate predation but evidence required of intention to eliminate a competitor before predation could be found&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Price above average total costs&lt;br /&gt;
| Evidence on costs does not indicate predation&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Competition Act of 1980 is also at the disposal of the Director General of the Office of Free Trade (OFT) for the prohibition of predatory pricing. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| United States&lt;br /&gt;
| 0&lt;br /&gt;
| Though predatory pricing is formally prohibited, the law in the United States is riddled with exceptions that effectively eliminate the predatory pricing prohibition. The &amp;quot;recoupment test&amp;quot; is a notable example.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See &#039;&#039;Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &amp;amp; Williamson Tobacco Corp.&#039;&#039;, 509 U.S. 209 (1993)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Uruguay&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 3(2)(c) of the Law of the Defense of the Competition prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;See Law of the Defense of the Competition, http://www.sice.oas.org/compol/natleg/Uruguay/dec1503.asp#DECRETO&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Vietnam&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Secondary source indicates Vietnam prohibits predatory pricing.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;http://www.freshfields.com/practice/comptrade/publications/pdf/10388.pdf&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Zambia&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Article 7(2)(a) of The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994) prohibits &amp;quot;predatory behaviour towards competition including the use of cost pricing to eliminate competitors.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/COMPETITION%20anDFAIR%20TRADING%20ACT.PDF&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| Zimbabwe&lt;br /&gt;
| 1&lt;br /&gt;
| Amendment 14 of 2001 to the The Competition Act of 1996 prohibits &amp;quot;[s]elling at very low prices or at below production costs as a deliberate strategy of driving competitors off the market.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References == &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1714</id>
		<title>Talk:Predatory Pricing Report</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Talk:Predatory_Pricing_Report&amp;diff=1714"/>
		<updated>2007-09-25T03:06:21Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;JWSchneider: /* Jake&amp;#039;s Questions */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Organization ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How should we organize this page?  Currently, the main table is titled as &amp;quot;European Union&amp;quot;, however it includes non-European countries (the United States, Zimbabwe, etc).  Should we put all nations in this tables or separate tables for each region of the world?  I prefer the latter.  --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:57, 11 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Jake&#039;s Questions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Brazil ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 21 sec. XVIII - prohibits &amp;quot;to unreasonably sell products below cost;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
--[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 00:05, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Note to self ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Still need to do the U countries ... --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 01:12, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ukraine (2001) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Art. 13(1) - &amp;quot;the setting of such prices or other conditions for the purchase or sale of a product that would be impossible in case of the existence of substantial competition on the market ...&amp;quot; --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 23:04, 24 September 2007 (EDT)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Uzbekistan (1996) ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 5 - &amp;quot;Establishment of the monopolistic high or &#039;&#039;&#039;low prices&#039;&#039;&#039;;&amp;quot;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>JWSchneider</name></author>
	</entry>
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