Belgium/EU, 2006

2008-08-08T19:25:52Z

MShapiro: New page: '''Score = Governed by: {| class="wikitable" |- ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment |- class="categorydivision" | Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 §1 of the statu...

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-08T16:07:46Z

MShapiro:

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| EU Law (Rome Treater) governs whether conduct has effects on trade between Member States, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 of the Dutch Competition Act require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) of the Dutch Competition Act states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) of the Dutch Competition Act considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|
|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.<ref>http://www.eujapan.com/europe/seminar_tokyo_mehta1_april08.pdf</ref>

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

|}

== References ==
<references />

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-08T15:59:52Z

MShapiro:

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| EU Law (Rome Treater) governs whether conduct has effects on trade between Member States, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.<ref>http://www.eujapan.com/europe/seminar_tokyo_mehta1_april08.pdf</ref>

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

|}

== References ==
<references />

Belgium

2008-08-06T22:28:01Z

MShapiro:

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-06T17:34:59Z

MShapiro:

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.<ref>Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in Competition Law in the EU 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.<ref>http://www.eujapan.com/europe/seminar_tokyo_mehta1_april08.pdf</ref>

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

|}

== References ==
<references />

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-06T17:34:43Z

MShapiro:

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>.

'''Score = 22'''

''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).
<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.<ref>Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in Competition Law in the EU 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.<ref>http://www.eujapan.com/europe/seminar_tokyo_mehta1_april08.pdf</ref>

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

|}

== References ==
<references />

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-06T17:33:41Z

MShapiro:

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>.

'''Score = 22'''

''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).
<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.<ref>Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in Competition Law in the EU 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Case law has shown this to be disallowed.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 24 says that undertakings are prohibited from abusing a dominant position.<ref>Case 650, ''Hydro Energy BV v. SEP'', 26.8 1999 (concerning the refusal of third party access to the electricity network).</ref>

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Case Law and an adoption of the Article 82 EC has shown this to be impermissible.<ref>NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998)(involving excessive prices charged for PO boxes); Case C-26-86, ''Akzo v. Commission'', [1991] ECR I-3359 (involving predatory pricing).</ref>

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Discriminatory pricing and conditions are prohibited as per Article 82 EC.<ref>''See'' NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998).</ref>

|-
|
| Predatory Pricing
| 1
| "Prices are regarded as abusive if they are below average variable costs"<ref>Competition Law in the EU at 454</ref>

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Adopts the EC position and per se bans r.p.m.<ref>''See'' Michaela Drahos, ''Convergence of the Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community'', 146 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); see NMa decision re complaint 146/''Gemeente Dinxperlo v. IBM'' (1999) and NMa decision re exemption 524/''Postkantoren'' (1999); Competition Law in the EU at 445.</ref>

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Adopted Article 8(2)(a) EC which has shown this to be impermissible.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Tying is impermissible in accordance with the EC and case law.<ref>NMa decision re administrative appeal 1092/I.T. ''Holland v. Microsoft''.</ref>

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Adopted the EC position banning closed exclusive distribution agreements.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 0
|

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 0
|

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 0
|

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
|

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Supply refusal is sometimes illegal, particularly in cases involving “essential facilities”.<ref>''See'' Competition Law in the EU at 455; NMa decision re exemption 1/''De Telegraaf v. NOS en HMG'' (1998); NMa decision complaint 650/''Hydro Energy v. Sep'' (1999)</ref>

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref>

|}

== References ==
<references />

Netherlands/EU, 2007

2008-08-06T16:48:20Z

MShapiro: New page: Score = Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legisla...

Netherlands

2008-08-06T16:09:01Z

MShapiro:

Netherlands 2007

2008-08-06T15:54:49Z

MShapiro: New page: '''Score = 22''' ''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). <ref>''Competition Law in the EU'',...

'''Score = 22'''

''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).
<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.<ref>Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in Competition Law in the EU 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref> See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.</ref>

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Case law has shown this to be disallowed.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 24 says that undertakings are prohibited from abusing a dominant position.<ref>Case 650, ''Hydro Energy BV v. SEP'', 26.8 1999 (concerning the refusal of third party access to the electricity network).</ref>

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Case Law and an adoption of the Article 82 EC has shown this to be impermissible.<ref>NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998)(involving excessive prices charged for PO boxes); Case C-26-86, ''Akzo v. Commission'', [1991] ECR I-3359 (involving predatory pricing).</ref>

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Discriminatory pricing and conditions are prohibited as per Article 82 EC.<ref>''See'' NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998).</ref>

|-
|
| Predatory Pricing
| 1
| "Prices are regarded as abusive if they are below average variable costs"<ref>Competition Law in the EU at 454</ref>

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Adopts the EC position and per se bans r.p.m.<ref>''See'' Michaela Drahos, ''Convergence of the Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community'', 146 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); see NMa decision re complaint 146/''Gemeente Dinxperlo v. IBM'' (1999) and NMa decision re exemption 524/''Postkantoren'' (1999); Competition Law in the EU at 445.</ref>

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Adopted Article 8(2)(a) EC which has shown this to be impermissible.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Tying is impermissible in accordance with the EC and case law.<ref>NMa decision re administrative appeal 1092/I.T. ''Holland v. Microsoft''.</ref>

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Adopted the EC position banning closed exclusive distribution agreements.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 0
|

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 0
|

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 0
|

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
|

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Supply refusal is sometimes illegal, particularly in cases involving “essential facilities”.<ref>''See'' Competition Law in the EU at 455; NMa decision re exemption 1/''De Telegraaf v. NOS en HMG'' (1998); NMa decision complaint 650/''Hydro Energy v. Sep'' (1999)</ref>

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref>

|}

== References ==
<references />

Belgium, 2006

2008-08-06T15:47:59Z

MShapiro:

'''Score = 20'''

''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC) consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| Article 2 §1 of the statute applies to practices that affect the Belgian market.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 63 provides for fines for competition violations, and additional fines for violations that persist after the violators are ordered to stop.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|
|-
|
| Divestitures
| 1
| Article 59 §7 of the statute states that anticompetitive mergers may be dissolved.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
|1
| Art 44 §1 (2) states that prosecutors shall investigate complaints from interested third parties. |

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 0
|

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| Article 48 §5 says that the Council shall hear the complainant's testimony for competition violations, if the complainant wishes to testify. Article 57 §2 allows interested third parties to be heard in merger hearings.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 8 §1 says the concentrations involving large companies shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Articles 8 §1 and 9 §1 says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 8 §2(2) states that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 8 §2(1) state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 8 Article 8 §6 and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 1
| Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 3(2) prohibits dominant parties from limiting production.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 3 states that the abuse of a dominant position is prohibited, then provides a nonexhaustive list of offenses.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 3(1) bans price setting by dominant firms.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 3(3) prohibits applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 0
|

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 2 §1(1) of the statute prohibits price fixing agreements.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 2 §1(5) and Article 3(4) prohibit tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 2 §1(2) prohibits limiting or controlling production, markets or investment.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 2 §1(2) prohibits agreements limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 2 §1(3) prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 0
|

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
|

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 2 §3(3) allows some anticompetitive agreements if they promote efficiency, return a portion of the efficiency gains to consumers, and do not allow the undertakings to eliminate a substantial portion of their competitors.

|}

== References ==
<references />

Netherlands

2008-08-05T17:07:32Z

MShapiro:

2008-07-07T16:52:06Z

MShapiro:

Colombia (May 3, 2006)

2008-07-07T16:50:34Z

MShapiro:

Colombia (May 3, 2006)

2008-07-07T16:19:32Z

MShapiro:

Colombia (May 3, 2006)

2008-07-07T16:18:37Z

MShapiro:

Predatory Pricing Report

2008-07-07T15:25:19Z

MShapiro: Added new Colombian law

{| class="wikitable"

|-
! Country
! Predatory Pricing Prohibition
! Comment

|-
| Albania
| 1
| Art. 9(2)(d) of Law No. 9121, dated July 28, 2003 on Competition Protection prohibits "the undercutting of prices or other conditions which have as their object or effect the prevention of entry or the expulsion from the market for specific competitor(s) or one of their products . . . ."

|-
| Algeria
| 1
| Section 3(16) of the OECD report on Competition Law and Policy in Algeria indicates they prohibit predatory pricing.<ref>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/50/26369606.pdf</ref>

|-
| Angola
|0
|

|-
| Argentina
| 0
|

|-
| Armenia
| 0
|

|-
| Australia
| 1
| "Predatory pricing is unlawful under s. 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act." <ref> Australian Competition and Consumer Commission web site, http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322986/fromItemId/3669</ref>

|-
| Austria
| 1
| §31(1)(5) of the Federal Act of 19 October 1988 on Cartels and other Restrictive Trade Practices prohibits the sale of goods below cost price when it cannot be justified on material grounds.

|-
| Azerbaijan
| 0
|

|-
| Bangladesh
| 0
| ''Bangladesh has no competition law in force.''

|-
| Barbados
| 1
| Article 16(3)(d) of the Fair Competition Act (2002) prohibits enterprise actions which "directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices that are excessive, unreasonable, discriminatory or '''predatory''' ..."<ref>http://www.commerce.gov.bb/Legislation/Documents/Fair%20Competition%20Act,%20Cap%20326C.pdf</ref>

|-
| Belarus
| 1
| Article 5 prohibits "fixing or maintaining prices (underpinning the market) for deriving monopolistic high profit or removal of competitors ..."<ref>http://law.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf/6e1a652fbefce34ac2256d910056d559/4dd2237ccbd3b4e6c2256dc1002932c6?OpenDocument</ref><ref>World Bank, Competition Law Database, http://go.worldbank.org/SMDO288DV0</ref>

|-
| Belgium
| 1
| Articles 40-41 of The Commercial Practices Act of July 14, 1991 forbid reselling products at a loss.<ref>Competition Law in the EU (p. I-518)</ref>

|-
| Bolivia
| 0
|

|-
| Bosnia-Herzegovina
| 1
| ''Act on Competition of 2005'' is supplemented by the '''Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006'''. Article 9(c) of this by-law prohibits "fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors."<ref>http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf</ref>

|-
| Brazil
| 1
| Article 21(18) of Law # 8884 OF JUNE 11, 1994 prohibits a dominant from to unreasonably sell products below cost.

|-
| Bulgaria
| 0
|

|-
| Burkina Faso
| 0
|

|-
| Canada
| 1
| Section 50(1)(c) of Competition Act of August 23, 2000 prohibits engaging in "a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor."

|-
| Cambodia
| 0
|

|-
| Cameroon
| 0
|

|-
| Chile
| 1
| The Antitrust Commission has fined firms for engaging in predatory pricing.<ref>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Competition Law and Policy in Chile, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/53/24955980.pdf and Global Competition Review website, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ara/chile.cfm</ref>

|-
| China
| 1
| Law of the People’s Republic of China for Countering Unfair Competition of September 2, 1993 states that "an operator shall not sell its or his goods at a price that is below the cost for the purpose of excluding its or his competitors."

|-
| Colombia
| 1
| Prohibited by article 67 of Law no. 108/05 of May 3, 2006.<ref>http://go.worldbank.org/7P3DRBYZI0</ref>

|-
| Costa Rica
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Cote d'Ivoire
| 0
| Article 24 of Law No. 91-999 of December 27, 1991 on Competition prohibits loss leader selling, but not predatory pricing. <ref>Report on United Nations Conference on Trade and development of 24 November 1997, available at, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf</ref>

|-
| Croatia
| 0
| No evidence was found of a predatory pricing provision in the Competition Act of July 15, 2003. The Croatian Law on the Protection of Market Competition of July 14, 1995 did prohibit predatory pricing, however. <ref> USAID Croatia Commercial Law Assessment Report, March 2002, http://www.bizlawreform.com/country_assess/Croatia%20Assessment.pdf.</ref>

|-
| Cyprus
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Czech Republic
| 1
| Article 11(1)(e) of the Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition, ACT No. 143/2001 Coll. of April 4 2001 last amended by Act No. 484/2004 Coll. of 5 August 2004, prohibits by a Dominant firm "consistent offer and sale of goods for unfairly low prices, which results or may result in distortion of competition." <ref>http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp50_en.pdf; http://www.compet.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Legislativa/legislativa_EN/Act_143_2004.doc</ref>

|-
| Denmark
| 1
| The Danish Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Supervision Act of 1955 forbids predatory pricing.<ref>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/54/2375661.pdf (p. 33)</ref>

|-
| Dominican Republic
| 0
|

|-
| Ecuador
| 0
|

|-
| Egypt
| 1
| Article 8(h) of the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices prohibits selling products below their marginal cost or average variable cost.

|-
| El Salvador
| 1
| Article 30(c) - "The systematic reduction of prices, below the cost price, with the purpose of eliminating one or several competitors, or impeding the entry or expansion of the same."<ref>http://www.minec.gob.sv/leyes/LeydeCompetencia_english_.pdf</ref>

|-
| Estonia
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| EU Generally<ref>Information for this section has been gleaned from '''The EC law of Competition''' (eds. Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay)</ref>
| 1
| Article 82 (formerly Article 86) of the EC Treaty prohibits predatory pricing. The Commission began prosecuting predatory pricing in 1985, in the ''AKZO'' case.<ref>''AKZO'' [1985] OJ L374/1.</ref> This case led to the establishment of a two-pronged test for predatory pricing. A firm was guilty of the offense if it either:
# Sets the price at below average variable cost. This amounts to a per se assumption of abusive behavior.
# Sets the price at below average total cost, but above average variable cost. This is also assumed to be predatory, but requires a specific plan by the firm to eliminate competitors.

|-
| Faroe Island
| 0
|

|-
| Fiji
| 1
| The Commerce Commission "reserves its right to investigate any predatory pricing in breach
of section 37 of the Fair Trading Decree 1992." <ref>Official government sources: http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_7074.shtml; http://www.commcomm.gov.fj/docs/061001-postFijiDetermination.pdf.</ref>

|-
| Finland
| 1
| Article 7(4) of the Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) makes, "a pricing practice which is unreasonable or obviously aimed at restricting competition" an abuse of a dominant position.<ref>Competition Law in the EU (p. II-363-64)</ref>

|-
| France
|1
| French Competition Act (Ordinance no. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986 (amended July 9, 1999)
"Article 10-1: Price offers or price practices with respect to consumer sales prices that are abusively low in relation to the costs of production, transformation, and marketing are prohibited, since these offers or practices have as their purpose, or may have as their effect, to eliminate from a market or to prevent access to a market by an enterprise or one of its products."

(Note: This Article has been used only rarely by enforcement agencies.) <ref>Competition Law in the EU (p. I-190)</ref>

|-
| Germany
|1
| Section 20(4) of Act Against Restraints of Competition, as amended August 26 1998, states that dominant firms cannot use their market power to hinder competitors in an "unfair manner," which occurs when a firm "offers goods or services not merely occasionally below its cost price . . . ."<ref>http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Germany/Act%20Against%20Restrainst%20of%20Competition.pdf</ref>

|-
| Georgia
|0
|

|-
| Greece
| 1
| As of August 3, 2000, Courts have interpreted predatory pricing as an abuse of a dominant position.<ref>Competition Law in the EU, p. 605 (citing Competition Commission Decisions 232/95 P.Lambropoulos&Co. Priv. Partn.; 264/95 Protoporia Publications Litd.</ref>

|-
| Greenland
|0
|

|-
| Guatemala
| 1
| Article 341 of the Criminal Code, Decree No. 17-73, prohibits "the sale of goods of any kind at a price below their cost, in order to prevent free competition in the domestic market."<ref>FTAA report, Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere, March 22, 2002, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws_e.asp</ref>

|-
| Guyana
|0
|

|-
| Honduras
| 0
| <ref>http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file731_7472.pdf</ref>

|-
| Hong Kong
| 1
| Article 7(a) of The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 lists predatory pricing as an example of an abuse of a dominant position.

|-
| Hungary
| 1
| Article 21(h) of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices as amended, effective November 1, 2005 makes it prohibited to "set extremely low prices which are not based on greater efficiency in comparison with that of competitors and which are likely to drive out competitors from the relevant market or to hinder their market entry[.]" The prohibition on predatory pricing, however, can be traced back to the original draft of the Act, as entered into force January 1 1997.<ref>ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY at p. 5, published by the Hungarian Comeptition Authority, 1998. Viewable at www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/pdf/GVH_OGy_beszamolo_1997_a.pdf</ref>

|-
| Iceland
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing was found in the statute. Moreover, predatory pricing has been reported as an ongoing practice by certain firms.<ref>http://www.icelandexpress.com/about_us/press/2004/ice_wars_icelandairs_dirty_trick_campaign_takes_a_different_turn/</ref>

|-
| India
| 1
| Section 4(2)(ii) of the The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003 prohibits predatory pricing.

|-
| Indonesia
| 1
| Article 21 of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 5 of 1999 has been interpreted to forbid dominant firms from imposing predatory pricing.<ref>East Asia Competition Policy Forum reports, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/01/indonesia_progress_sutrisno.030503.pdf, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/01/pprs.pdf; Also see United Nation Conference on Trade and Development report of January 29 2002, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp25.en.pdf </ref> Article 7 explicitly prohibits predatory pricing agreements between firms.

|-
| Ireland
| 0
| The enforcement agency has investigated an alleged abuse of predatory pricing, but found it did not constitute an abuse and was instead, "intense competition."<ref>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/37028481.pdf, 12</ref>

|-
| Iran
| 0
|

|-
| Israel
| 1
| The Restrictive Trade Practices Law 5748 of 1988 prohibits "excessive or predatory pricing of the product under
a monopoly."<ref>http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/guide_israel.pdf</ref>

|-
| Italy
| 0
| Italy has no prohibition on predatory pricing. However, "it is foreseeable that the same principles set forth in EC law to prohibit predatory price cutting by a dominant undertaking may be applied."<ref>Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 384.</ref>

|-
| Jamaica
| 0
|

|-
| Japan
| 0
|

|-
| Jersey, Channel Islands
| 0
|

|-
| Jordan
| 0
|

|-
| Kazakhstan
| 1
| Article 10(1)of the 2006 Law of the Republic of Kazahkstan on Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities<ref>Statute provided from the World Bank at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCOMPLEGALDB/Resources/CompetitivenesandMonopolyRestrictionLaw20060707_eng.pdf</ref> prohibits excessively low price setting.

|-
| Kenya
| 1
| Article 10(3)(a) of The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act of 1990 prohibits selling below average variable cost.

|-
| Kyrgystan
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Lao PDR
| 0
|

|-
| Latvia
| 0
| Latvia has no explicit prohibition on predatory pricing. However, "[p]redatory pricing by definition as a practice aimed at hindrance, restriction or distortion of competition would qualify as an abuse of dominant position.<ref>Dace Silava-Tomsone, Getting the Deal Through – Dominance 2006, http://www.lt-v.lv/pdf/Latvia_dace.pdf</ref>

|-
| Lithuania
| 1
| Lithuania's competition authority includes predatory pricing in its definition of an abuse of a dominant position. This definition is found in a May 17 2000 intra-agency bylaw,<ref>http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation_resoliution_52.htm</ref> a supplement to their more general competition legislation.<ref>http://www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legislation.htm</ref>

|-
| Luxembourg
| 1
| Below cost selling of goods and services is prohibited under the Act on Commercial Practices, Unfair Competition and Comparative Advertising (July 2002).<ref>http://www.entemp.ie/publications/commerce/2005/groceriesorder/chapter9.pdf</ref>

|-
| Malawi
| 1
| Article 32(2)(a) of the Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill of 1998 prohibits predatory pricing.

|-
| Mali
| 1
| Article 17 of Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992 prohibits predatory pricing.

|-
| Malta
| 1
| Article 9(2)(b) of Chapter 379 Competition Act of February 1 1995 forbids "charg[ing] prices which are below the average variable cost price of a product in order to drive rival competitors out of the market[.]"

|-
| Mauritius
| 1
| Article 11(2)(a) of The Competition Bill N° VI of 2003 prohibits below-cost selling by a dominant firm.

|-
| Macedonia
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Mexico
| 1
| Article 7 of the Regulations of the Federal Law on Economic Competition of March 4, 1998 prohibits price setting below market price.

|-
| Moldova
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Mongolia
| 1
| Article 4(3) of the Law of Mongolia on Prohibiting Unfair Competition prohibits a firm from selling own goods at a price lower than the cost.

|-
| Morocco
| 1
| Article 7 of Dahir no. 1-00-225 of 2 rabil I 1421 promulgating law no. 06-99, concerning freedom of prices and competition, prohibits pricing offers or abusive practices in pricing sales to consumers that are low compared to production costs, distribution costs, and promotion costs, when these offers or practices are meant to or may have the effect of eliminating a market.

|-
| Namibia
| 0
|

|-
| Netherlands
| 0
| Dutch law does not forbid resale at a loss, either. <ref>Competition Law in the EU, Vol. 1, 445.</ref>

|-
| New Zealand
| 1
| Secondary source indicates that New Zealand's general test for predatory pricing is similar to the US, in that they ask, "is there below-cost price cutting with a view to recouping losses without loss of market share by raising prices without fear of reprisals afterwards?"<ref>http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/pdfs/berry_nz_summary.pdf</ref>

|-
| Nicaragua
| 1
| Article 19(h) prohibits predatory pricing.<ref>http://www.dgpsa.gob.ni/biblioteca/biblioteca_archivos/449/Ley%20601.%20Ley%20%20de%20promocion%20de%20la%20competencia..pdf</ref>

|-
| Nigeria
| 0
|

|-
| Norway
| 1
| Though unclear which specific provision it uses, the Norwegin Competition Authority has recently held numerous proceedings for predatory pricing violations.<ref>http://sec.edgar-online.com/2005/04/15/0001156973-05-000475/Section4.asp; http://competition.practicallaw.com/7-201-3648; http://ld.practicallaw.com/4-208-8975</ref>.

|-
| Pakistan
| 0
|

|-
| Panama
| 1
| "Any predatory action taken unilaterally . . . when said action cannot reasonably be expected to generate or increase earnings, but rather to encourage the competitor or potential competitor to stop competing . . . leaving the agent with substantial power or in a monopolistic position . . ."<ref>FTAA - Negotiating Group on Competition Policy Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations relating to Competition Policy in the Western Hemisphere, March 22 2002, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws_e.asp</ref>

|-
| Papua and New Guinea
| 0
|

|-
| Paraguay
| 0
|

|-
| Philippines
| 0
|

|-
| Peru
| 1
| The Competition Policy Commission initiated proceedings for predatory pricing in ''Tabacalera Nacional S.A. against British American Tabacco (South America) Limited – Perú''.<ref>OECD Global Forum on Competition CONTRIBUTION FROM PERU, October 4 2001, http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Predatory_Pricing_Report&action=edit</ref>

|-
| Poland
| 1
| Article 15.1(1) of the The Act on Combating Unfair Competition of April 16 1993 prohibits "the sale of goods or services below their purchase cost in order to eliminate other entrepreneurs."<ref>http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download/Z2Z4L3Vva2lrL2VuL2RlZmF1bHRfb3Bpc3kudjAvNTIvMS8xLzIwMDdfMDFfMTZfdXpua19fZW5nbGlzaF92ZXJzaW9uLnBkZg</ref> Article 8(2)(1) of The Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers of December 15 2000 prohibits "direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices, including predatory prices or prices glaringly low."<ref>http://www.konsument.gov.pl/files/ccp_act.pdf</ref>

|-
| Portugal
| 1
| Decree-Law 370/93 of October 29, 1993 (as amended by Decree-Law 140/98 on May 16 1998) forbids selling goods at a price below the actual price of purchase (plus taxes and transportation costs).<ref>Competition Law in the EU (p. I-326)</ref>

|-
| Romania
| 1
| Article 6(f) of The Parliament of Romania Competition Law of 1996 explicitly prohibits predatory pricing.

|-
| Russia
| 1
| Article 7 of Law no. 135 on the Protection of Competition prohibits a dominant firm from setting a price that is lower than the sum of expenses necessary for production and sale of the commodity.

|-
| Saudi Arabia
| 1
| Article 5(1) of the Competition Law of 2004 prohibits "selling a commodity or service at a price below cost, with the intention of forcing competitors out of the market."

|-
| Senegal
| 0
|

|-
| Serbia-Montenegro
| 0
|

|-
| Singapore
| 1
| Singapore authorities have clarified that Article 47(2)(a) of No. 46 Competition Act of 2004 includes prohibition ofpredatory pricing.<ref>http://app.mti.gov.sg/default.asp?id=148&articleID=107; http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN025141.pdf</ref>

|-
| Slovak Republic
| 1
| The Slovak Republic forbids abusive acts by a dominant firm seeking to exclude competition.<ref>136/2001 Coll. ACT of 27 February 2001 on Protection of Competition and on Amendments and Supplements to Act of the Slovak National Council No. 347/1990 Coll. (Article 8(2)(e))</ref> The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (their enforcement agency) has used this provision to prosecute temporary predatory pricing of fuels as early as September 26 2001,<ref>Decision No. 2001/DZ/P/2/283 issued by Chairman of the Office on September 26, 2001 (http://www.antimon.gov.sk/eng/article.aspx?c=395&a=2139</ref> but the decision was never given effect, as the defendant discontinued its pricing scheme.

|-
| Slovenia
| 0
| No predatory pricing provision found. Office for Protection of Competition received one complaint of predatory pricing against Produkcija Plus d.o.o. - RTV Slovenia d.o.o. on 2/20/01. However, the complaint was dismissed (Office did not rule on the merits).<ref>http://www.uvk.gov.si/fileadmin/uvk.gov.si/pageuploads/Enforcement_Record_2001.pdf</ref>

|-
| South Africa
| 1
| Section 8(d)(iv) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits predatory pricing.

|-
| South Korea
| 1
| Secondary source indicates that predatory pricing is prohibited.<ref>[http://books.google.com/books?id=9aSrAg57v-oC&pg=PA362&lpg=PA362&dq=korea+predatory+pricing&source=web&ots=Ha4I_DL5gr&sig=uPTcGF0DqgytzhKgN4wMY9_J0KcDeregulation Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region by Anne O. Krueger, Takatoshi Itō]</ref>

|-
| Spain
| 1
| There are two cases where the courts have issued fines for predatory pricing:

1. General Electric Espana[20], December 30 1991, - GE's local affiliate was fined Pta 15 million (~90,000 euros)<ref>TDC Dec. 295/91, or December 30, 1991</ref>

2. Arbora/Ausonia, January 7 1992<ref>TDC Dec. 291/90, January 7, 1992</ref>

Predatory pricing, presumably, is covered by common law because there is no mention of it in the Spanish competition laws.

Note: More recently, Telefónica, a Spanish firm, was fined by £102.6m (€152m) by the EU competition agency.<ref>http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/legislation/news/index.cfm?newsid=3865</ref>

|-
| Sri Lanka
| 1
| Anti-competitive practices prohibited by the Fair Trading Commission Act No. 1 of 1987 includes predatory pricing.<ref>http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/articles/sri_lankan/HTML/CV39.html</ref>In Ceylon Oxygen Co. Ltd. V. Fair Trading Commission And Another, the Commission considered a predatory pricing complaint.<ref>http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/case_law/slr/HTML/1997SLR2V372.htm</ref>

|-
| Sweden
| 0
| No predatory pricing provision found.

|-
| Switzerland
| 1
| Article 7(2) of the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of October 6, 1995 prohibits "the under-cutting of prices or other conditions directed against a specific competitor."

|-
| Taiwan
| 1
| Secondary source indicates that competition law in Taiwan stipulates that enterprises in dominant market positions should not improperly fix, maintain or change the price of the goods and services, and that ''predatory pricing definitely belongs to improperly fixing price''.<ref>http://www.jurist.org.cn/doc/uclaw200512/uclaw20051206.pdf</ref>

|-
| Tajikistan
| 1
| Article 4 prohibits a dominant firm from setting low prices.

|-
| Tanzania
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Thailand
| 1
| Secondary source indicates that predatory pricing is an unfair practice under Thai Guidelines.<ref>http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgramDecember2004/Kalampakorn_Thai.pdf</ref>

|-
| Tunisia
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Turkey
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| Ukraine
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found.

|-
| United Kingdom
| 1
| Chapter II of the Fair Trading Act of 1973 prohibits predatory pricing. The OFT has published the following guidelines to assess whether pricing schemes are predatory:<ref>Competition Law in the EU (p. II-63)</ref>

{| class="wikitable"

|-
| Price below average variable cost
| Predation can be assumed

|-
| Price below average variable cost but below average total cost
| Evidence on costs may indicate predation but evidence required of intention to eliminate a competitor before predation could be found

|-
| Price above average total costs
| Evidence on costs does not indicate predation

|}

The Competition Act of 1980 is also at the disposal of the Director General of the Office of Free Trade (OFT) for the prohibition of predatory pricing.

|-
| United States
| 0
| Though predatory pricing is formally prohibited, the law in the United States is riddled with exceptions that effectively eliminate the predatory pricing prohibition. The "recoupment test" is a notable example.<ref>See ''Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.'', 509 U.S. 209 (1993)</ref>

|-
| Uruguay
| 1
| Article 3(2)(c) of the Law of the Defense of the Competition prohibits predatory pricing.<ref>See Law of the Defense of the Competition, http://www.sice.oas.org/compol/natleg/Uruguay/dec1503.asp#DECRETO</ref>

|-
| Uzbekistan
| 1
| Article 5 prohibits a firm from setting a monopolistic low price, which is defined as the price of a good consciously set by the undertaking, with dominant position in the market as a seller, at a level bringing the losses from sale of a given good, result of which is or may be the restriction of competition by means of driving the competitors out of the market.

|-
| Venezuela
| 0
| No prohibition on predatory pricing found. Moreover, a secondary source suggests that no such prohibition exists.<ref>http://books.google.com/books?id=2tsyQFzaj0UC&pg=RA1-PA349&lpg=RA1-PA349&dq=venezuela+predatory+pricing&source=web&ots=lrCQHugr38&sig=gol1a-LNF_pcCwR3vuIkFTIj1Rw</ref>

|-
| Vietnam
| 1
| Secondary source indicates Vietnam prohibits predatory pricing.<ref>http://www.freshfields.com/practice/comptrade/publications/pdf/10388.pdf</ref>

|-
| Zambia
| 1
| Article 7(2)(a) of The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994) prohibits "predatory behaviour towards competition including the use of cost pricing to eliminate competitors."<ref>The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1994), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/COMPETITION%20anDFAIR%20TRADING%20ACT.PDF</ref>

|-
| Zimbabwe
| 1
| Amendment 14 of 2001 to the The Competition Act of 1996 prohibits "[s]elling at very low prices or at below production costs as a deliberate strategy of driving competitors off the market."

|}

== References ==

<references />

Colombia (May 3, 2006)

2008-07-07T15:20:57Z

MShapiro:

2008-06-30T23:04:18Z

MShapiro:

Colombia (May 3, 2006)

2008-06-30T23:03:33Z

MShapiro: New page: '''Score = _''' ''Governed by'': Articles 333 and 334 of the Colombian Constitution (hereinafter referred to as "Constitution"<ref>Global Competition Review website, http://www.globalcomp...

Colombia

2008-06-30T22:57:37Z

MShapiro:

* [[Colombia (December 30, 1992)]]
* [[Colombia (May 3, 2006)]]

Colombia

2008-06-30T22:56:49Z

MShapiro:

[[Colombia (December 30, 1992)]]
[[Colombia (May 3, 2006)]]