Belgium, 2006 - Revision history

MShapiro at 15:47, 6 August 2008

2008-08-06T15:47:59Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:47, 6 August 2008
Line 76:		Line 76:
	\| Dominance		\| Dominance
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 8 ~~§3 and 4 state~~ that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.		\| Article 8 §2(2) states that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

	\|-		\|-
Line 82:		Line 82:
	\| Restriction of Competition		\| Restriction of Competition
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 8 ~~§3 and 4~~ state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.		\| Article 8 §2(1) state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.


Line 89:		Line 89:
	\| Public Interest (Pro D)		\| Public Interest (Pro D)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 8 Article 8 ~~§2(2)~~ and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.		\| Article 8 Article 8 §6 and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.

	\|-		\|-

HCargill at 14:06, 23 July 2008

2008-07-23T14:06:03Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:06, 23 July 2008
Line 1:		Line 1:
	'''Score = 20'''		'''Score = 20'''

	''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC)consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>		''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC) consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"

HCargill at 14:05, 23 July 2008

2008-07-23T14:05:50Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:05, 23 July 2008
Line 1:		Line 1:
	'''Score = 20'''		'''Score = 20'''

	''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC)consolidated on the 15th of September 2006("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>		''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC)consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"

HCargill: coded '06

2008-07-23T14:05:34Z

coded '06

New page

'''Score = 20'''

''Governed by:'' Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC)consolidated on the 15th of September 2006("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| Article 2 §1 of the statute applies to practices that affect the Belgian market.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 63 provides for fines for competition violations, and additional fines for violations that persist after the violators are ordered to stop.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|
|-
|
| Divestitures
| 1
| Article 59 §7 of the statute states that anticompetitive mergers may be dissolved.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
|1
| Art 44 §1 (2) states that prosecutors shall investigate complaints from interested third parties. |

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 0
|

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| Article 48 §5 says that the Council shall hear the complainant's testimony for competition violations, if the complainant wishes to testify. Article 57 §2 allows interested third parties to be heard in merger hearings.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 8 §1 says the concentrations involving large companies shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Articles 8 §1 and 9 §1 says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 8 §3 and 4 state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 8 §3 and 4 state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 8 Article 8 §2(2) and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 1
| Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 1
| Article 3(2) prohibits dominant parties from limiting production.

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 3 states that the abuse of a dominant position is prohibited, then provides a nonexhaustive list of offenses.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 3(1) bans price setting by dominant firms.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 3(3) prohibits applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 0
|

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 2 §1(1) of the statute prohibits price fixing agreements.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 2 §1(5) and Article 3(4) prohibit tying.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 2 §1(2) prohibits limiting or controlling production, markets or investment.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 2 §1(2) prohibits agreements limiting production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 2 §1(3) prohibits market sharing.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 0
|

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
|

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 2 §3(3) allows some anticompetitive agreements if they promote efficiency, return a portion of the efficiency gains to consumers, and do not allow the undertakings to eliminate a substantial portion of their competitors.

|}

== References ==
<references />