Belgium/EU, 2006 - Revision history

HCargill at 21:10, 14 August 2008

2008-08-14T21:10:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:10, 14 August 2008
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	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
	\| Merger Notification		\| Merger Notification<ref>The National Competition Authority will assess mergers under the National Competition Act. If the concentration affects trade between the Member States, the European Commission will assess the merger under Regulation 139/2004. See the coding for the European Commission for those provisions.</ref>
	\| Voluntary		\| Voluntary
	\| 0		\| 0

MShapiro at 20:19, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T20:19:01Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:19, 8 August 2008
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	'''Score =		'''Score = 26

	''Governed by:' <b>Belgian Law: </b> Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC) consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref> and <b>EU Law: </b>Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty), Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 <ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref>		''Governed by:' <b>Belgian Law: </b> Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC) consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref> and <b>EU Law: </b>Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty), Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 <ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref>

MShapiro at 20:17, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T20:17:15Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:17, 8 August 2008
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	\| Private Enforcement		\| Private Enforcement
	\| 3rd Party Initiation		\| 3rd Party Initiation
	\|1		\| 1
	\| Art 44 §1 (2) states that prosecutors shall investigate complaints from interested third parties. \|		\| Art 44 §1 (2) states that prosecutors shall investigate complaints from interested third parties.

	\|-		\|-

MShapiro at 20:02, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T20:02:21Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:02, 8 August 2008
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	'''Score =		'''Score =

	Governed by:		''Governed by:' <b>Belgian Law: </b> Belgian Act on the Protection of Economic Competition (APEC) consolidated on the 15th of September 2006 ("the statute").<ref>Available online at http://www.mineco.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/pdf/law_competition_001_en.pdf</ref> and <b>EU Law: </b>Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty), Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 <ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref>

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"

MShapiro at 19:58, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T19:58:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:58, 8 August 2008
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	\|		\|
	\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties		\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
	\| 0		\| 1
	\|		\| Articles 81 and 82 of the Rome Treaty mandate private enforcement, encouraged by the European Commission<ref>Green Paper: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexiUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0672:FIN:EN:PDF</ref>

	\|-		\|-

MShapiro at 19:35, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T19:35:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:35, 8 August 2008
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	\| Extraterritoriality		\| Extraterritoriality
	\| 1		\| 1
	\|		\| EU Law (Rome Treater) governs whether conduct has effects on trade between Member States, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"

MShapiro at 19:33, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T19:33:43Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:33, 8 August 2008
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	\| Extraterritoriality		\| Extraterritoriality
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2 §1 of the statute applies to practices that affect the Belgian market.~~		\|

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"

MShapiro at 19:26, 8 August 2008

2008-08-08T19:26:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:26, 8 August 2008
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	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.		\| Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.

			\|- class="categorydivision"
			\| Dominance
			\| Limits Access
			\| 1
			\| Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Abusive Acts
			\| 1
			\| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Price Setting
			\| 1
			\| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Discriminatory Pricing
			\| 1
			\| Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Resale Price Maintenance
			\| 1
			\| Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Obstacles to Entry
			\| 1
			\| Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Efficiency Defense
			\| 0
			\|

			\|- class="categorydivision"
			\| Restrictive Trade Practices
			\| Price Fixing
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Tying
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Market Division
			\| 1
			\| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Output Restraint
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Market Sharing
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Eliminating Competitors
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
			\| 1
			\| Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.<ref>http://www.eujapan.com/europe/seminar_tokyo_mehta1_april08.pdf</ref>

			\|-
			\|
			\| Supply Refusal
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

			\|-
			\|
			\| Efficiency Defense
			\| 1
			\| Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

			\|}

			== References ==
			<references />

MShapiro: New page: '''Score = Governed by: {| class="wikitable" |- ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment |- class="categorydivision" | Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 §1 of the statu...

2008-08-08T19:25:52Z

New page: '''Score = Governed by: {| class="wikitable" |- ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment |- class="categorydivision" | Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 §1 of the statu...

New page

'''Score =

Governed by:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| Article 2 §1 of the statute applies to practices that affect the Belgian market.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Articles 63 provides for fines for competition violations, and additional fines for violations that persist after the violators are ordered to stop.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 0
|
|-
|
| Divestitures
| 1
| Article 59 §7 of the statute states that anticompetitive mergers may be dissolved.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
|1
| Art 44 §1 (2) states that prosecutors shall investigate complaints from interested third parties. |

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 0
|

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| Article 48 §5 says that the Council shall hear the complainant's testimony for competition violations, if the complainant wishes to testify. Article 57 §2 allows interested third parties to be heard in merger hearings.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 0
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 3
| Article 8 §1 says the concentrations involving large companies shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 2
| Articles 8 §1 and 9 §1 says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council.

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 8 §2(2) states that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 8 §2(1) state that mergers that limit competition through strengthening of a dominant position are impermissible.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Article 8 Article 8 §6 and Article 60 §1 both allow for consideration of the public interest in whether to permit a merger. Article 60 specifically allows an anticompetitive merger to take place if the Council of Ministers decides that its public benefits outweigh the harm to competition.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 1
| Article 8 §2(2) requires consideration of economic and technical progress in merger analysis.