HCargill: cut and pasted old link from statute into page linked to year to increase consistency

2008-06-24T13:14:40Z

cut and pasted old link from statute into page linked to year to increase consistency

New page

'''Score = 18'''

''Governed by:'' Ordinance no. 86-1243 of 1 December 1986 on the freedom of prices and of competition as last amended on 9 July 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “The Ordinance”).
<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 647-670</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment

|- class="categorydivision"
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| The Ordinance applies to anything having a competition effect on the French market.<ref>CA Paris, 1ère Ch. sect. conc., 15 September 1993, Sté. Brassler et Ass.: BOCCRF 8 April 1994.</ref>

|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Fines
| 1
| Article 13 and 14 provide for monetary sanctions for certain offenses.

|-
|
| Prison Sentences
| 1
| Article 17 provides prison sentences for company officers for criminal violations.

|-
|
| Divestitures
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| Any party who has an interest can commence an action before the courts by serving an assignation.

|-
|
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| Plaintiffs can bring an action for damages in a civil court AFTER the Council has decided that there is an abuse.

|-
|
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| 1
|

|-
|
| Mandatory
| 0
|

|-
|
| Pre-merger
| 0
|

|-
|
| Post-merger
| 1
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 38 requires that the companies’ market shares are examined when deciding whether the merger needs review.

|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 0
|

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| Art. 41 makes an exception for "National Champion" firms.

|-
|
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
|

|-
|
| Other
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency
| 0
|

|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| 0
|

|-
|
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| Article 8 prohibits abusive exploitation by a dominant enterprise.

|-
|
| Price Setting
| 1
| Article 8 applies the restriction on price setting as established in Article 7 to dominant companies.

|-
|
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| Article 8 bans discriminatory pricing by dominant companies.

|-
|
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| Article 32 bans RPM when the distributor sets a minimum price (but not for setting a max price)

|-
|
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
|

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 10(2) offers a defense for showing that the effect of the acts if they ensure economic progress.

|- class="categorydivision"
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| 1
| Article 7(2) prohibits price fixing.

|-
|
| Tying
| 1
| Article 8 prohibits tying arrangements.

|-
|
| Market Division
| 1
| Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply.

|-
|
| Output Restraint
| 1
| Article 7(3) prohibits limiting or controlling production.

|-
|
| Market Sharing
| 1
| Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply.

|-
|
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| Article 7(1) prohibits agreements that limits access to the market or free exercise of competition by other enterprises.

|-
|
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
|

|-
|
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| Article 8 prohibits refusing to sell.

|-
|
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| Article 10 exempts for Article 7 and 8 agreements that have the effect of ensuring economic progress.

|}

== References ==
<references />

France, 1999 - Revision history

HCargill: cut and pasted old link from statute into page linked to year to increase consistency