Index Definitions - Revision history

KeithHylton: /* Abusive Acts */

2012-06-23T17:41:10Z

Abusive Acts

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	===Abusive Acts===		===Abusive Acts===
	''The ~~Act~~ lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.''		''The act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant position.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments

KeithHylton: /* Limits Access */

2012-06-23T17:40:43Z

Limits Access

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	:;Comments		:;Comments
	:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.		:* This is limiting access to downstream purchasers or consumers to artificially keep prices high.
	:** Things to look for: quota language or output limits.		:* Look for quota language or output limits.

	:;Examples		:;Examples
	:*"This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to ... ~~Limit~~ access to a market or free competition among enterprises ..."<ref>Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf</ref>		:*"This article prohibits any concerted action, agreement, alliance or arrangement, express or tacit, which has the purpose of or may have the effect of hampering or limiting free competition, in particular when the action tends to . . . [l]imit access to a market or free competition among enterprises . . . ."<ref>Algeria, Ordinance No. 95-06 of 25 January 1995 on Competition, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf</ref>

	===Abusive Acts===		===Abusive Acts===

KeithHylton: /* Efficiency Defense */

2012-06-23T17:39:48Z

Efficiency Defense

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	===Efficiency Defense===		===Efficiency Defense===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.''		''The commission or council may allow an otherwise impermissible merger if it will contribute sufficiently to economic efficiency.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments
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	:;Examples		:;Examples
	:* "[The competition authority may weigh] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets."<ref>See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf</ref>		:* The competition authority may weigh "any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets."<ref>See Namibia (2003), Article 47(2)(h), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf</ref>

	==Dominance==		==Dominance==

KeithHylton: /* Other */

2012-06-23T17:39:09Z

Other

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	===Other===		===Other===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ considers other issues.''		''The commission or council considers other issues.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments
	:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.		:* As of now, this only includes business failure, or when two firms are allowed to merge in order to save one of the merging firms from insolvency.
	:* ~~Though~~ business failure is a ~~type~~ of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive of ~~each other~~.		:* Although business failure is a subset of restriction of competition assessment, a coder is to treat these two as mutually exclusive for the purpose of coding.
	:* This category is open for suggestions as to ~~what else should go under the "Other" heading~~.		:* This category is open for suggestions as to other inclusions.

	:;Examples		:;Examples
	:* "2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future; ..." <ref>Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf</ref>		:* "Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when: a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would exit the market in the near future . . . ." <ref>Albanian Competition Law (2003), Article 13(2)(a), http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Albania/Approved%20Law%209121%20A.pdf</ref>

	===Efficiency Defense===		===Efficiency Defense===

KeithHylton: /* Public Interest (Pro Authority) */

2012-06-23T17:36:43Z

Public Interest (Pro Authority)

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	===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===		===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests.''		''The commission or council has the power to prohibit a merger if they are concerned that the merger runs contrary to public interests.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments
	:* ~~These are~~ otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest.		:* This covers otherwise acceptable mergers that are prohibited for some governmental interest (e.g., national security concerns).
	~~:* National~~ security concerns ~~are a good example of this~~.

	:;Examples		:;Examples

KeithHylton: /* Public Interest (Pro D) */

2012-06-23T17:35:45Z

Public Interest (Pro D)

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	:;Example		:;Example
	:* The Minister may "[a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf</ref>		:* The Minister may "[a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it . . . has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf</ref>

	===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===		===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===

KeithHylton: /* Public Interest (Pro D) */

2012-06-23T17:35:16Z

Public Interest (Pro D)

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	===Public Interest (Pro D)===		===Public Interest (Pro D)===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.''		''The commission or council considers whether an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. Public interest is linked to social welfare, and not to market efficiency. For example, this would include international competitiveness, national champions, employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments
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	:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.		:* Lowering prices usually counts as efficiency under merger assessment.
	:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.		:*This definition is for things that increase public welfare but have less to do with the market.
	:**These ~~are~~ externalities ~~that~~ are good for people: increasing minority ownership, employment benefits~~, improves~~ the environment, etc.		:* These externalities are good for people (e.g., increasing minority ownership, improving employment benefits and the environment, etc.).
	:* Environmental benefits count here as well.		:* Environmental benefits count here as well.
	:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.		:* National champions exceptions fall under this category.

	:;~~Examples~~		:;Example
	:*"[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf</ref>		:* The Minister may "[a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it ... has positive economic benefits that outweigh any negative impact on competition, such as leading to a lowering of the price of services or products, or providing employment opportunities, or encouraging exports or attracting investment, or supporting the ability of national Enterprises to compete internationally."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf</ref>

	===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===		===Public Interest (Pro Authority)===

KeithHylton: /* Restriction of Competition */

2012-06-23T17:32:42Z

Restriction of Competition

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	===Restriction of Competition===		===Restriction of Competition===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and possible barriers to entry.''		''The commission or council considers the merger in light of maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and the possible barriers to entry.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments
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	:;Examples		:;Examples
	:* ~~The following would likely count:~~ In a two firm market, one firm buys a second.		:*In a two firm market, one firm buys the second firm.
	:*"[The Minister may] [a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition ..."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)</ref>		:*The Minister may "[a]pprove the economic concentration operation if it does not negatively impact competition . . . ."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 11A(1)</ref>

	===Public Interest (Pro D)===		===Public Interest (Pro D)===

KeithHylton: /* Dominance */

2012-06-23T17:31:43Z

Dominance

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	:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.		:* This is an assessment of the sheer size of the resulting firm, not whether or not the firm will engage in abusive acts.

	:;~~Examples~~		:;Example
	:*"The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, '''if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market'''."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B</ref>		:*"The accomplishment of economic concentration operations impacting the level of competition in the market by causing or enforcing a Dominant Position shall depend upon receiving the approval of the Minister in writing, '''if the total share of the Enterprise or Enterprises concerned in the economic concentration operation exceeds 40% of the total transactions in the market'''."<ref>See Jordan Competition Law (2004), Article 9B</ref>

KeithHylton: /* Dominance */

2012-06-23T17:31:28Z

Dominance

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:31, 23 June 2012
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	===Dominance===		===Dominance===
	''The ~~Commission~~ or ~~Council~~ takes into consideration the dominant position or market share that the company will ~~have~~ if the merger occurs.''		''The commission or council takes into consideration the dominant position and market share that the company will obtain if the merger occurs.''

	:;Comments		:;Comments