Industry Standard Setting and Antitrust - Revision history

https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust Industry Standard Setting and Antitrust - Revision history 2026-04-22T21:11:15Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.43.6 https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3772&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:22, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:22:35Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 19:22, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l27">Line 27:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 27:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>== The Balance Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">== </del><ref> In Part II-A, II-B, and II-C, I followed the analysis structure of a working paper written by Professor Lemley. See Mark A. Lemley, ''A New Balance between IP and Antitrust,'' Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 340 (April 2007), ''available at'' SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980045.</ref> </div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>== The Balance Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law<ref> In Part II-A, II-B, and II-C, I followed the analysis structure of a working paper written by Professor Lemley. See Mark A. Lemley, ''A New Balance between IP and Antitrust,'' Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 340 (April 2007), ''available at'' SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980045.</ref> <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">==</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Intellectual Property Law ===</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Intellectual Property Law ===</div></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3771&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:20, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:20:50Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 19:20, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l56">Line 56:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 56:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>In summary, the purpose of intellectual property law is to grant temporary exclusive rights to encourage innovation through competition while antitrust law aims at elimination of anticompetitive conducts and increasing consumer welfare. Given that any firm’s ultimate goal is to use their products to attract consumers’ attention, a common goal can be inferred behind these two laws - to earn the ultimate wealth by producing what consumers want with high quality but at a low price. Although IPRs grant the inventors temporary exclusive rights that limit competition, it provides inventors sufficient incentives to undertake efficient production to maximize consumer welfare in the long run.<ref>''See supra'' note 1, at 12. (Citing Ward Bowman, Jr., ''Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal'' (1973)).</ref> So, we can say the temporary exclusivity for IPRs is a trade-off in the middle of the way to achieve its goal. Based on this view, we can conclude that intellectual property law and antitrust law should be two complementary systems.<ref>''See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.'' (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are ''actually complementary'', as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”[''Emphasis added''], 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> The question here is simple: “just ask yourself whether you’d rather pay monopoly price for an iPod or a competitive price for an eight-track tape player.”<ref>''Supra'' note 1, at 13. (The author was inspired by Judge John Wiley to come up with this analogy.)</ref> Most of us will choose the former without being aware that this is because we all know that through the grant of temporary monopoly power, it will create more competition and bring us more innovative products. In this sense, both intellectual property law and antitrust law serve the same goal - to encourage innovation and competition, and to eventually maximize consumer welfare.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>In summary, the purpose of intellectual property law is to grant temporary exclusive rights to encourage innovation through competition while antitrust law aims at elimination of anticompetitive conducts and increasing consumer welfare. Given that any firm’s ultimate goal is to use their products to attract consumers’ attention, a common goal can be inferred behind these two laws - to earn the ultimate wealth by producing what consumers want with high quality but at a low price. Although IPRs grant the inventors temporary exclusive rights that limit competition, it provides inventors sufficient incentives to undertake efficient production to maximize consumer welfare in the long run.<ref>''See supra'' note 1, at 12. (Citing Ward Bowman, Jr., ''Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal'' (1973)).</ref> So, we can say the temporary exclusivity for IPRs is a trade-off in the middle of the way to achieve its goal. Based on this view, we can conclude that intellectual property law and antitrust law should be two complementary systems.<ref>''See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.'' (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are ''actually complementary'', as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”[''Emphasis added''], 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> The question here is simple: “just ask yourself whether you’d rather pay monopoly price for an iPod or a competitive price for an eight-track tape player.”<ref>''Supra'' note 1, at 13. (The author was inspired by Judge John Wiley to come up with this analogy.)</ref> Most of us will choose the former without being aware that this is because we all know that through the grant of temporary monopoly power, it will create more competition and bring us more innovative products. In this sense, both intellectual property law and antitrust law serve the same goal - to encourage innovation and competition, and to eventually maximize consumer welfare.</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== Policy Shifting <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=== </del><ref> In Part II-D, I followed the analysis structure of one paper written by former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim. See Makan Delrahim, ''Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries,'' 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 343.</ref> </div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== Policy Shifting<ref> In Part II-D, I followed the analysis structure of one paper written by former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim. See Makan Delrahim, ''Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries,'' 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 343.</ref> <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>It is settled that the market itself is imperfect, so when market failure occurs, the government must appropriately intervene in order to restore the market disorder and maintain competition. In intellectual property law, when IPR owners misuse their rights, it results in anti-competitive effects. The Federal Circuit stated in ''Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,'' “[a] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”<ref>897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> When a patent owner does so, the government must intervene to limit the exercise of IPRs. </div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>It is settled that the market itself is imperfect, so when market failure occurs, the government must appropriately intervene in order to restore the market disorder and maintain competition. In intellectual property law, when IPR owners misuse their rights, it results in anti-competitive effects. The Federal Circuit stated in ''Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,'' “[a] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”<ref>897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> When a patent owner does so, the government must intervene to limit the exercise of IPRs. </div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l173">Line 173:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 173:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>(3) Were those engineer representatives authorized to promise and confirm the legal obligation to VESA, and if so, did such authority constitute equitable estoppel? These issues were all left unexamined. </div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>(3) Were those engineer representatives authorized to promise and confirm the legal obligation to VESA, and if so, did such authority constitute equitable estoppel? These issues were all left unexamined. </div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Union Oil of California (Unocal) <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">===== </del><ref> Complaint, ''In re Union Oil Co. of Cal''. (''Unocal'' Complaint), No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), ''available at'' http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/unocalcp.htm; In addition to the Antitrust-IP report, I also relied on the paper written by Ms. Angela Gomes and Mr. Scott H. Segal respectively to learn of all relevant decisions of the courts and FTC related to ''Unocal'' case. See Angela Gomes, “Note: Noerr-Pennington: Unocal's Savior -- Or Is It?” 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 102; Scott H. Segal, “Fuel for thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents,” 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 49, 66-7.</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Union Oil of California (Unocal)<ref> Complaint, ''In re Union Oil Co. of Cal''. (''Unocal'' Complaint), No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), ''available at'' http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/unocalcp.htm; In addition to the Antitrust-IP report, I also relied on the paper written by Ms. Angela Gomes and Mr. Scott H. Segal respectively to learn of all relevant decisions of the courts and FTC related to ''Unocal'' case. See Angela Gomes, “Note: Noerr-Pennington: Unocal's Savior -- Or Is It?” 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 102; Scott H. Segal, “Fuel for thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents,” 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 49, 66-7.</ref> <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">=====</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Unocal involved proposed low-emissions gasoline standards in state regulatory proceedings in California. During the state regulatory proceedings, Unocal presented its research results (a formula) as a non-proprietary technology, and the state regulating board used these results to establish its standards. The board itself did not established any disclosure rules. While the board was setting the standard, Unocal secretly filed patent applications to cover both its refining process and formula. In 1995, oil companies sued Unocal, seeking declaratory judgment of invalidity for Unocal’s patent.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (showing the plaintiffs in the case included Atlantic Richfield Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Products Company, and Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.)</ref> Unocal counterclaimed for willful patent infringement.<ref>''Id''.</ref> Oil companies claimed Unocal should be estopped from asserting patents because Unocal failed to disclose that, while participating in the standard setting, it secretly patented its refining process and formula (or did not even invent both of them) and amended pending patent applications in order to fully cover California standards. However, the district court turned the declaratory judgment action into an infringement case, and ruled that whether there was literal infringement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide.<ref>''Id''.</ref> The jury found for Unocal and assessed a reasonable royalty rate the plaintiffs should pay to Unocal.<ref>''Id''. (Determining that literal infringement is a question of fact for the jury to decide.)</ref> The oil company then moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) to overturn the jury’s verdict, but was denied by the court.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998 U.S. Dist.Lexis 22847, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (“This court does not find any reason to overturn the jury’s factual finding on this issue, and cannot issue a contrary ruling of law.”)</ref> In a separate proceeding, oil companies argued that because of Unocal’s inequitable conduct during the standard setting process, its patents should be held unenforceable.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208. (citing ''Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc''., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (defining inequitable conduct as an “''affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive''.")) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> But the district court held that these oil companies did not meet their burden of showing inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 1222. (“[C]onsidering the evidence as a whole, including ''the ample evidence of good faith in contrast to the lack of evidence of intentional deception'', the Court finds the Defendants have not proved by ''clear and convincing evidence'' that any inequitable conduct occurred in the filing or prosecution of the patent application…”) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> Later on, the oil companies appealed the denial of JMOL and the inequitable conduct argument by the district court, but both were denied.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 208 F.3d 989, 991. (“Because the appellant refiners did not show a reversible flaw in the jury's verdict, this court affirms the district court's denial of JMOL... Similarly, this court affirms the trial court's discretionary judgment of no inequitable conduct.”)</ref> Finally, the Attorneys' generals from 34 states and Washington, D.C. joined in the oil companies' petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court asked the DOJ whether it wished to take position on the petition, but the DOJ declined to do so. As a result, the petition was denied.<ref>''See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co''., 531 U.S. 1183 (U.S. 2001).</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Unocal involved proposed low-emissions gasoline standards in state regulatory proceedings in California. During the state regulatory proceedings, Unocal presented its research results (a formula) as a non-proprietary technology, and the state regulating board used these results to establish its standards. The board itself did not established any disclosure rules. While the board was setting the standard, Unocal secretly filed patent applications to cover both its refining process and formula. In 1995, oil companies sued Unocal, seeking declaratory judgment of invalidity for Unocal’s patent.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (showing the plaintiffs in the case included Atlantic Richfield Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Products Company, and Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.)</ref> Unocal counterclaimed for willful patent infringement.<ref>''Id''.</ref> Oil companies claimed Unocal should be estopped from asserting patents because Unocal failed to disclose that, while participating in the standard setting, it secretly patented its refining process and formula (or did not even invent both of them) and amended pending patent applications in order to fully cover California standards. However, the district court turned the declaratory judgment action into an infringement case, and ruled that whether there was literal infringement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide.<ref>''Id''.</ref> The jury found for Unocal and assessed a reasonable royalty rate the plaintiffs should pay to Unocal.<ref>''Id''. (Determining that literal infringement is a question of fact for the jury to decide.)</ref> The oil company then moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) to overturn the jury’s verdict, but was denied by the court.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998 U.S. Dist.Lexis 22847, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (“This court does not find any reason to overturn the jury’s factual finding on this issue, and cannot issue a contrary ruling of law.”)</ref> In a separate proceeding, oil companies argued that because of Unocal’s inequitable conduct during the standard setting process, its patents should be held unenforceable.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208. (citing ''Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc''., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (defining inequitable conduct as an “''affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive''.")) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> But the district court held that these oil companies did not meet their burden of showing inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 1222. (“[C]onsidering the evidence as a whole, including ''the ample evidence of good faith in contrast to the lack of evidence of intentional deception'', the Court finds the Defendants have not proved by ''clear and convincing evidence'' that any inequitable conduct occurred in the filing or prosecution of the patent application…”) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> Later on, the oil companies appealed the denial of JMOL and the inequitable conduct argument by the district court, but both were denied.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 208 F.3d 989, 991. (“Because the appellant refiners did not show a reversible flaw in the jury's verdict, this court affirms the district court's denial of JMOL... Similarly, this court affirms the trial court's discretionary judgment of no inequitable conduct.”)</ref> Finally, the Attorneys' generals from 34 states and Washington, D.C. joined in the oil companies' petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court asked the DOJ whether it wished to take position on the petition, but the DOJ declined to do so. As a result, the petition was denied.<ref>''See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co''., 531 U.S. 1183 (U.S. 2001).</ref></div></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3770&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:17, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:17:08Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 19:17, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l27">Line 27:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 27:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>== The Balance Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law==<ref> In Part II-A, II-B, and II-C, I followed the analysis structure of a working paper written by Professor Lemley. See Mark A. Lemley, ''A New Balance between IP and Antitrust,'' Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 340 (April 2007), ''available at'' SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980045.</ref> </div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>== The Balance Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law== <ref> In Part II-A, II-B, and II-C, I followed the analysis structure of a working paper written by Professor Lemley. See Mark A. Lemley, ''A New Balance between IP and Antitrust,'' Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 340 (April 2007), ''available at'' SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980045.</ref> </div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Intellectual Property Law ===</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Intellectual Property Law ===</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l56">Line 56:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 56:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>In summary, the purpose of intellectual property law is to grant temporary exclusive rights to encourage innovation through competition while antitrust law aims at elimination of anticompetitive conducts and increasing consumer welfare. Given that any firm’s ultimate goal is to use their products to attract consumers’ attention, a common goal can be inferred behind these two laws - to earn the ultimate wealth by producing what consumers want with high quality but at a low price. Although IPRs grant the inventors temporary exclusive rights that limit competition, it provides inventors sufficient incentives to undertake efficient production to maximize consumer welfare in the long run.<ref>''See supra'' note 1, at 12. (Citing Ward Bowman, Jr., ''Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal'' (1973)).</ref> So, we can say the temporary exclusivity for IPRs is a trade-off in the middle of the way to achieve its goal. Based on this view, we can conclude that intellectual property law and antitrust law should be two complementary systems.<ref>''See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.'' (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are ''actually complementary'', as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”[''Emphasis added''], 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> The question here is simple: “just ask yourself whether you’d rather pay monopoly price for an iPod or a competitive price for an eight-track tape player.”<ref>''Supra'' note 1, at 13. (The author was inspired by Judge John Wiley to come up with this analogy.)</ref> Most of us will choose the former without being aware that this is because we all know that through the grant of temporary monopoly power, it will create more competition and bring us more innovative products. In this sense, both intellectual property law and antitrust law serve the same goal - to encourage innovation and competition, and to eventually maximize consumer welfare.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>In summary, the purpose of intellectual property law is to grant temporary exclusive rights to encourage innovation through competition while antitrust law aims at elimination of anticompetitive conducts and increasing consumer welfare. Given that any firm’s ultimate goal is to use their products to attract consumers’ attention, a common goal can be inferred behind these two laws - to earn the ultimate wealth by producing what consumers want with high quality but at a low price. Although IPRs grant the inventors temporary exclusive rights that limit competition, it provides inventors sufficient incentives to undertake efficient production to maximize consumer welfare in the long run.<ref>''See supra'' note 1, at 12. (Citing Ward Bowman, Jr., ''Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal'' (1973)).</ref> So, we can say the temporary exclusivity for IPRs is a trade-off in the middle of the way to achieve its goal. Based on this view, we can conclude that intellectual property law and antitrust law should be two complementary systems.<ref>''See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.'' (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are ''actually complementary'', as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”[''Emphasis added''], 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> The question here is simple: “just ask yourself whether you’d rather pay monopoly price for an iPod or a competitive price for an eight-track tape player.”<ref>''Supra'' note 1, at 13. (The author was inspired by Judge John Wiley to come up with this analogy.)</ref> Most of us will choose the former without being aware that this is because we all know that through the grant of temporary monopoly power, it will create more competition and bring us more innovative products. In this sense, both intellectual property law and antitrust law serve the same goal - to encourage innovation and competition, and to eventually maximize consumer welfare.</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== Policy Shifting ===<ref> In Part II-D, I followed the analysis structure of one paper written by former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim. See Makan Delrahim, ''Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries,'' 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 343.</ref> </div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== Policy Shifting === <ref> In Part II-D, I followed the analysis structure of one paper written by former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust Division, Makan Delrahim. See Makan Delrahim, ''Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries,'' 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 343.</ref> </div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>It is settled that the market itself is imperfect, so when market failure occurs, the government must appropriately intervene in order to restore the market disorder and maintain competition. In intellectual property law, when IPR owners misuse their rights, it results in anti-competitive effects. The Federal Circuit stated in ''Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,'' “[a] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”<ref>897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> When a patent owner does so, the government must intervene to limit the exercise of IPRs. </div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>It is settled that the market itself is imperfect, so when market failure occurs, the government must appropriately intervene in order to restore the market disorder and maintain competition. In intellectual property law, when IPR owners misuse their rights, it results in anti-competitive effects. The Federal Circuit stated in ''Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,'' “[a] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”<ref>897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).</ref> When a patent owner does so, the government must intervene to limit the exercise of IPRs. </div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l173">Line 173:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 173:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>(3) Were those engineer representatives authorized to promise and confirm the legal obligation to VESA, and if so, did such authority constitute equitable estoppel? These issues were all left unexamined. </div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>(3) Were those engineer representatives authorized to promise and confirm the legal obligation to VESA, and if so, did such authority constitute equitable estoppel? These issues were all left unexamined. </div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Union Oil of California (Unocal) =====<ref> Complaint, ''In re Union Oil Co. of Cal''. (''Unocal'' Complaint), No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), ''available at'' http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/unocalcp.htm; In addition to the Antitrust-IP report, I also relied on the paper written by Ms. Angela Gomes and Mr. Scott H. Segal respectively to learn of all relevant decisions of the courts and FTC related to ''Unocal'' case. See Angela Gomes, “Note: Noerr-Pennington: Unocal's Savior -- Or Is It?” 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 102; Scott H. Segal, “Fuel for thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents,” 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 49, 66-7.</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Union Oil of California (Unocal) ===== <ref> Complaint, ''In re Union Oil Co. of Cal''. (''Unocal'' Complaint), No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), ''available at'' http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/unocalcp.htm; In addition to the Antitrust-IP report, I also relied on the paper written by Ms. Angela Gomes and Mr. Scott H. Segal respectively to learn of all relevant decisions of the courts and FTC related to ''Unocal'' case. See Angela Gomes, “Note: Noerr-Pennington: Unocal's Savior -- Or Is It?” 11 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 102; Scott H. Segal, “Fuel for thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents,” 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 49, 66-7.</ref></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Unocal involved proposed low-emissions gasoline standards in state regulatory proceedings in California. During the state regulatory proceedings, Unocal presented its research results (a formula) as a non-proprietary technology, and the state regulating board used these results to establish its standards. The board itself did not established any disclosure rules. While the board was setting the standard, Unocal secretly filed patent applications to cover both its refining process and formula. In 1995, oil companies sued Unocal, seeking declaratory judgment of invalidity for Unocal’s patent.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (showing the plaintiffs in the case included Atlantic Richfield Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Products Company, and Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.)</ref> Unocal counterclaimed for willful patent infringement.<ref>''Id''.</ref> Oil companies claimed Unocal should be estopped from asserting patents because Unocal failed to disclose that, while participating in the standard setting, it secretly patented its refining process and formula (or did not even invent both of them) and amended pending patent applications in order to fully cover California standards. However, the district court turned the declaratory judgment action into an infringement case, and ruled that whether there was literal infringement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide.<ref>''Id''.</ref> The jury found for Unocal and assessed a reasonable royalty rate the plaintiffs should pay to Unocal.<ref>''Id''. (Determining that literal infringement is a question of fact for the jury to decide.)</ref> The oil company then moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) to overturn the jury’s verdict, but was denied by the court.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998 U.S. Dist.Lexis 22847, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (“This court does not find any reason to overturn the jury’s factual finding on this issue, and cannot issue a contrary ruling of law.”)</ref> In a separate proceeding, oil companies argued that because of Unocal’s inequitable conduct during the standard setting process, its patents should be held unenforceable.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208. (citing ''Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc''., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (defining inequitable conduct as an “''affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive''.")) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> But the district court held that these oil companies did not meet their burden of showing inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 1222. (“[C]onsidering the evidence as a whole, including ''the ample evidence of good faith in contrast to the lack of evidence of intentional deception'', the Court finds the Defendants have not proved by ''clear and convincing evidence'' that any inequitable conduct occurred in the filing or prosecution of the patent application…”) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> Later on, the oil companies appealed the denial of JMOL and the inequitable conduct argument by the district court, but both were denied.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 208 F.3d 989, 991. (“Because the appellant refiners did not show a reversible flaw in the jury's verdict, this court affirms the district court's denial of JMOL... Similarly, this court affirms the trial court's discretionary judgment of no inequitable conduct.”)</ref> Finally, the Attorneys' generals from 34 states and Washington, D.C. joined in the oil companies' petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court asked the DOJ whether it wished to take position on the petition, but the DOJ declined to do so. As a result, the petition was denied.<ref>''See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co''., 531 U.S. 1183 (U.S. 2001).</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Unocal involved proposed low-emissions gasoline standards in state regulatory proceedings in California. During the state regulatory proceedings, Unocal presented its research results (a formula) as a non-proprietary technology, and the state regulating board used these results to establish its standards. The board itself did not established any disclosure rules. While the board was setting the standard, Unocal secretly filed patent applications to cover both its refining process and formula. In 1995, oil companies sued Unocal, seeking declaratory judgment of invalidity for Unocal’s patent.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (showing the plaintiffs in the case included Atlantic Richfield Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Products Company, and Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.)</ref> Unocal counterclaimed for willful patent infringement.<ref>''Id''.</ref> Oil companies claimed Unocal should be estopped from asserting patents because Unocal failed to disclose that, while participating in the standard setting, it secretly patented its refining process and formula (or did not even invent both of them) and amended pending patent applications in order to fully cover California standards. However, the district court turned the declaratory judgment action into an infringement case, and ruled that whether there was literal infringement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide.<ref>''Id''.</ref> The jury found for Unocal and assessed a reasonable royalty rate the plaintiffs should pay to Unocal.<ref>''Id''. (Determining that literal infringement is a question of fact for the jury to decide.)</ref> The oil company then moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) to overturn the jury’s verdict, but was denied by the court.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 1998 U.S. Dist.Lexis 22847, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998) (“This court does not find any reason to overturn the jury’s factual finding on this issue, and cannot issue a contrary ruling of law.”)</ref> In a separate proceeding, oil companies argued that because of Unocal’s inequitable conduct during the standard setting process, its patents should be held unenforceable.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208. (citing ''Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc''., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (defining inequitable conduct as an “''affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive''.")) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> But the district court held that these oil companies did not meet their burden of showing inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 1222. (“[C]onsidering the evidence as a whole, including ''the ample evidence of good faith in contrast to the lack of evidence of intentional deception'', the Court finds the Defendants have not proved by ''clear and convincing evidence'' that any inequitable conduct occurred in the filing or prosecution of the patent application…”) [''Emphasis added'']</ref> Later on, the oil companies appealed the denial of JMOL and the inequitable conduct argument by the district court, but both were denied.<ref>''See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co''., 208 F.3d 989, 991. (“Because the appellant refiners did not show a reversible flaw in the jury's verdict, this court affirms the district court's denial of JMOL... Similarly, this court affirms the trial court's discretionary judgment of no inequitable conduct.”)</ref> Finally, the Attorneys' generals from 34 states and Washington, D.C. joined in the oil companies' petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court asked the DOJ whether it wished to take position on the petition, but the DOJ declined to do so. As a result, the petition was denied.<ref>''See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co''., 531 U.S. 1183 (U.S. 2001).</ref></div></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3769&oldid=prev LMyhre: /* Cases in the History */ 2012-06-08T19:14:30Z

<p><span class="autocomment">Cases in the History</span></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 19:14, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l161">Line 161:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 161:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The second antitrust concern is related to violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act.<ref>15 U.S.C. § 5 (Sec. 5).</ref> These violations may arise when an SSO participant intentionally or unintentionally under-disclosed or engaged in fraud regarding the existence of its IPRs during the standard-setting process, then later alleged that any practice of the standard infringed its IPRs and required the payment of a royalty for a license. These happen because SSO rules are usually ambiguous, and because SSOs themselves do not have a powerful enforcement mechanism. As a result, this leaves some room for certain speculative participants to “play around” the rules. So far, the FTC has prosecuted three cases based on violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and I will introduce them in the following section.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The second antitrust concern is related to violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act.<ref>15 U.S.C. § 5 (Sec. 5).</ref> These violations may arise when an SSO participant intentionally or unintentionally under-disclosed or engaged in fraud regarding the existence of its IPRs during the standard-setting process, then later alleged that any practice of the standard infringed its IPRs and required the payment of a royalty for a license. These happen because SSO rules are usually ambiguous, and because SSOs themselves do not have a powerful enforcement mechanism. As a result, this leaves some room for certain speculative participants to “play around” the rules. So far, the FTC has prosecuted three cases based on violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and I will introduce them in the following section.</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==== Cases in <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">the </del>History ====</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>==== Cases in History ====</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Dell Computer (1996) =====</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>===== Dell Computer (1996) =====</div></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3768&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:14, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:14:03Z

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LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3767&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:09, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:09:01Z

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LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3766&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:03, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:03:57Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 19:03, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l35">Line 35:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 35:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Antitrust Law ===</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>=== The Purpose of Antitrust Law ===</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The intrinsic concept of modern antitrust law is that competition can bring about economic efficiency, so that a sound market filled with competition is generally more desirable. However, this relies on a basic principle of our economic system, i.e., that free competition will ensure an efficient allocation of resources in the absence of a market failure. What is hidden behind this concept is: 1<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">. </del>there is always a public interest concern involved; and 2<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">. The </del>market itself is not perfect and cannot maintain a competitive system all the time.<ref> Keith N. Hylton, ''Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution,'' 37-38 (Cambridge University Press 1st ed., 2003).</ref> As a result, in order to advance public interests, the government should intervene appropriately to restore the market after a failure and to maintain competition.<ref>''Id.''</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The intrinsic concept of modern antitrust law is that competition can bring about economic efficiency, so that a sound market filled with competition is generally more desirable. However, this relies on a basic principle of our economic system, i.e., that free competition will ensure an efficient allocation of resources in the absence of a market failure. What is hidden behind this concept is: 1<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">) </ins>there is always a public interest concern involved; and 2<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">) the </ins>market itself is not perfect and cannot maintain a competitive system all the time.<ref> Keith N. Hylton, ''Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution,'' 37-38 (Cambridge University Press 1st ed., 2003).</ref> As a result, in order to advance public interests, the government should intervene appropriately to restore the market after a failure and to maintain competition.<ref>''Id.''</ref></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3765&oldid=prev LMyhre at 19:02, 8 June 2012 2012-06-08T19:02:10Z

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LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3764&oldid=prev LMyhre: /* ''Rambus'' */ 2012-06-08T18:53:00Z

<p><span class="autocomment">''Rambus''</span></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 18:53, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l179">Line 179:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 179:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The appellate court first defined the scope of disclosure, ruling that “Rambus 's duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents or applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.”<ref>''Id''., at 1100.</ref> That is, there must have been some reasonable expectation that a license would have been needed to practice the standard, and an equivalent analysis was unnecessary. After defining the disclosure scope, the appellate court went on to decide whether Rambus misrepresented during the standard setting process and ruled that:</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>The appellate court first defined the scope of disclosure, ruling that “Rambus 's duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents or applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.”<ref>''Id''., at 1100.</ref> That is, there must have been some reasonable expectation that a license would have been needed to practice the standard, and an equivalent analysis was unnecessary. After defining the disclosure scope, the appellate court went on to decide whether Rambus misrepresented during the standard setting process and ruled that: <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> </ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>To prove fraud in Virginia, a party must show by ''clear and convincing evidence: 1. a false representation (or omission in the face of a duty to disclose), 2. of a material fact, 3. made intentionally and knowingly, 4. with the intent to mislead, 5. with reasonable reliance by the misled party, and 6. resulting in damages to the misled party''. A party's ''silence'' or ''withholding of information'' does ''not'' constitute fraud in the absence of a duty to disclose that information. Generally, “fraud must relate to a ''present'' or a ''pre-existing'' fact, and ''cannot'' ordinarily be ''predicated on unfulfilled promises'' or ''statements'' as to future events.” In some cases, however, misrepresentations about a party's present intentions also may give rise to fraud. Failure to prove even one of the elements of fraud - such as existence of a duty to disclose - defeats a fraud claim.<ref>''Id''., at 1096.</ref> [ ''Emphasis added'']</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">"</ins>To prove fraud in Virginia, a party must show by ''clear and convincing evidence: 1. a false representation (or omission in the face of a duty to disclose), 2. of a material fact, 3. made intentionally and knowingly, 4. with the intent to mislead, 5. with reasonable reliance by the misled party, and 6. resulting in damages to the misled party''. A party's ''silence'' or ''withholding of information'' does ''not'' constitute fraud in the absence of a duty to disclose that information. Generally, “fraud must relate to a ''present'' or a ''pre-existing'' fact, and ''cannot'' ordinarily be ''predicated on unfulfilled promises'' or ''statements'' as to future events.” In some cases, however, misrepresentations about a party's present intentions also may give rise to fraud. Failure to prove even one of the elements of fraud - such as existence of a duty to disclose - defeats a fraud claim.<ref>''Id''., at 1096.<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">"</ins></ref> [''Emphasis added'']</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre https://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php?title=Industry_Standard_Setting_and_Antitrust&diff=3763&oldid=prev LMyhre: /* ''Rambus'' */ 2012-06-08T18:50:04Z

<p><span class="autocomment">''Rambus''</span></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 18:50, 8 June 2012</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l196">Line 196:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 196:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>1. Relationship between Patent and Antitrust Law in Cases Involving Fraud on the Patent Office or Patent Enforcement Initiated in Bad Faith.<ref> This is mainly a discussion about unclean hands principle.</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>1. Relationship between Patent and Antitrust Law in Cases Involving Fraud on the Patent Office or Patent Enforcement Initiated in Bad Faith.<ref> This is mainly a discussion about unclean hands principle.</ref></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>2. Standard of Proof Should Be Commensurate With Proposed Remedy.</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>2. Standard of Proof Should Be Commensurate With Proposed Remedy.</div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>3. Chilling Participation in SSOs.<ref>''See supra'' Part III, C-2 (discussing chilling effects in standard setting process).</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>3. Chilling Participation in SSOs.<ref>''See supra'' Part III, C-2 (discussing chilling effects in standard setting process).</ref></div></td></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-deleted"></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"></ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>4. Reliance on Testimony Rather than Contemporaneous Written Evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 22-6.</ref></div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>4. Reliance on Testimony Rather than Contemporaneous Written Evidence.<ref>''Id''. at 22-6.</ref></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br></td></tr> </table>

LMyhre