Italy/EU, 2005 - Revision history

LMyhre at 23:43, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T23:43:19Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:43, 16 August 2008
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	\| Fines		\| Fines
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act. Italian Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.[3] ~~Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act.~~		\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act. Italian Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.[3]

	\|-		\|-

LMyhre at 23:40, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T23:40:35Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:40, 16 August 2008
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	\| Extraterritoriality		\| Extraterritoriality
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Scope extends~~ to ~~foreign corporations.<ref>Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, 4th ed.~~ 2003~~, at 99~~.~~</ref>~~		\| EU law governs whenever conduct has effects on trade between Member States pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
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	\| Fines		\| Fines
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act. Italian Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.[3]		\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act. Italian Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.[3] Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act.

	\|-		\|-

LMyhre at 20:48, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T20:48:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:48, 16 August 2008
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	'''Score = 27'''		'''Score = 26'''

	''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union [hereafter EU Treaty], and European Commission Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>		''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union [hereafter EU Treaty], and European Commission Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>

LMyhre at 20:47, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T20:47:51Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:47, 16 August 2008
Line 17:		Line 17:
	\| Fines		\| Fines
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act.		\| Articles 13 and 19 of CR 1/2003 allow for fines for serious violations of the EU Competition Act. Italian Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.[3]

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Divestitures		\| Divestitures
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies.		\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies. Italian Law no. 287, Section 18(3), permits the Italian Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
	\| Private Enforcement		\| Private Enforcement
	\| 3rd Party Initiation		\| 3rd Party Initiation
	\| 1		\| 0
	\| ~~CR 1/2003, Article 12, says that any interested party can~~ bring a violation to the attention of the Authority.		\| Third parties may bring a violation to the attention of the national Competition Authority, but cannot compel an investigation or civil suit under Italian Competition law.

	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
	\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties		\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
	\| 1		\| 0
	\| ~~CR 1/2003, Article 33, allows 3rd parties to file a civil suit for damages.~~		\|

	\|-		\|-
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	\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings		\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 27(3) of CR 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties.		\| Article 27(3) of CR 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties. Under Italian law, Presidential Decree no. 217/98, Section 7(1)(b) permits participation by 3rd parties representing public or private interests, and associations representing consumers that might be directly, immediately and presently damaged by the violations under investigation or by any measures adopted as a result of it. Section 7(2) of 217/98 states that these 3rd parties may produce written submission, documents, arguments and opinions, and also have access to documents, in accordance with Section 13 of the decree (which covers confidentiality).

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
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	\| Mandatory		\| Mandatory
	\| 3		\| 3
	\| ~~Article 7~~(1) ~~of CR 139/2004~~ requires notification~~.<ref>The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give~~ undertakings ~~the ability to request exemption from notification requirements. However, because a formal request must be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption~~, ~~the new notification guidelines~~ are ~~encoded here as requiring mandatory pre-merger notification~~.~~</ref>~~		\| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Pre-merger		\| Pre-merger
	\| 2		\| 2
	\| ~~Article 7~~(1) of ~~139/2004 requires pre-clearance~~.		\| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Dominance		\| Dominance
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2(1)~~ of ~~CR 139/2004 considers dominance~~.		\| Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis. If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Restriction of Competition		\| Restriction of Competition
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2~~(1) of ~~CR 139/2004 considers~~ the ~~interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers~~.		\| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.

	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
	\| Public Interest (Pro D)		\| Public Interest (Pro D)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2~~(1) of ~~CR 139/2004 considers~~ the ~~development~~ of ~~technical and economic progress~~.		\| Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)		\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article~~ 2(1) ~~of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers~~.		\| Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement. Law no. 287, Section 25(2).

	\|-		\|-
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	\|		\|
	\| Efficiency		\| Efficiency
	\| 0		\| 1
	\|		\| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 allows an efficiency defense.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"

LMyhre at 20:47, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T20:47:14Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:47, 16 August 2008
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	\| Extraterritoriality		\| Extraterritoriality
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~EU law governs whenever conduct has effects on trade between Member States pursuant~~ to ~~Article 3 of Regulation 1/~~2003.		\| Scope extends to foreign corporations.<ref>Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, 4th ed. 2003, at 99.</ref>

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
Line 29:		Line 29:
	\| Divestitures		\| Divestitures
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies~~. Italian Law no. 287, Section 18(3), permits the Italian Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition~~.		\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
Line 47:		Line 47:
	\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings		\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 27(3) of CR 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties. Under Italian law, Presidential Decree no. 217/98, Section 7(1)(b) permits participation by 3rd parties representing public or private interests, and associations representing consumers that might be directly, immediately and presently damaged by the violations under investigation or by any measures adopted as a result of it. Section 7(2) of 217/98 states that these 3rd parties may produce written submission, documents, arguments and opinions, and also have access to documents, in accordance with Section 13 of the decree (which covers confidentiality).		\| Article 27(3) of CR 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
	\| Merger Notification<ref>The National Competition Authority will assess mergers under the National Competition Act. If the concentration affects trade between the Member States, the European Commission will assess the merger under Regulation 139/2004. See the coding for the European Commission for those provisions.</ref>		\| Merger Notification
	\| Voluntary		\| Voluntary
	\| 0		\| 0
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	\| Mandatory		\| Mandatory
	\| 3		\| 3
	\| ~~Law no. 287, Section 16~~(1) requires ~~mandatory~~ notification to the ~~Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which~~ are ~~adjusted each year for inflation~~.		\| Article 7(1) of CR 139/2004 requires notification.<ref>The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give undertakings the ability to request exemption from notification requirements. However, because a formal request must be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption, the new notification guidelines are encoded here as requiring mandatory pre-merger notification.</ref>

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Pre-merger		\| Pre-merger
	\| 2		\| 2
	\| ~~Law no. 287, Section 16~~(1) requires ~~notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation~~.		\| Article 7(1) of 139/2004 requires pre-clearance.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Dominance		\| Dominance
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market~~ dominance is considered before mergers are approved. A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis. If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.		\| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers dominance.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Restriction of Competition		\| Restriction of Competition
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Law no. 287, Section 6~~(1) ~~requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in~~ the ~~restriction~~ of ~~competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger~~.		\| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers.

	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
	\| Public Interest (Pro D)		\| Public Interest (Pro D)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Section 25~~(1) ~~permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests~~ of the ~~national economy are involved in the process~~ of ~~European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests~~.		\| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers the development of technical and economic progress.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)		\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic~~ interests~~, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate~~ and ~~independent competition law and enforcement. Law no. 287, Section 25(2)~~.		\| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers.

	\|-		\|-
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	\|		\|
	\| Efficiency		\| Efficiency
	\| 1		\| 0
	\| ~~Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 allows an efficiency defense.~~		\|

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"

LMyhre at 03:16, 16 August 2008

2008-08-16T03:16:16Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:16, 16 August 2008
Line 11:		Line 11:
	\| Extraterritoriality		\| Extraterritoriality
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Scope extends~~ to ~~foreign corporations.<ref>Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, 4th ed.~~ 2003~~, at 99~~.~~</ref>~~		\| EU law governs whenever conduct has effects on trade between Member States pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"

HCargill at 21:15, 14 August 2008

2008-08-14T21:15:49Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:15, 14 August 2008
Line 50:		Line 50:

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
	\| Merger Notification		\| Merger Notification<ref>The National Competition Authority will assess mergers under the National Competition Act. If the concentration affects trade between the Member States, the European Commission will assess the merger under Regulation 139/2004. See the coding for the European Commission for those provisions.</ref>
	\| Voluntary		\| Voluntary
	\| 0		\| 0

LMyhre at 09:54, 14 August 2008

2008-08-14T09:54:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:54, 14 August 2008
Line 29:		Line 29:
	\| Divestitures		\| Divestitures
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies.		\| Article 7 of CR 1/2003 allows for structural remedies. Italian Law no. 287, Section 18(3), permits the Italian Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
Line 59:		Line 59:
	\| Mandatory		\| Mandatory
	\| 3		\| 3
	\| ~~Article 7~~(1) ~~of CR 139/2004~~ requires notification~~.<ref>The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give~~ undertakings ~~the ability to request exemption from notification requirements. However, because a formal request must be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption~~, ~~the new notification guidelines~~ are ~~encoded here as requiring mandatory pre-merger notification~~.~~</ref>~~		\| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.

	\|-		\|-
Line 65:		Line 65:
	\| Pre-merger		\| Pre-merger
	\| 2		\| 2
	\| ~~Article 7~~(1) of ~~139/2004 requires pre-clearance~~.		\| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.

	\|-		\|-
Line 77:		Line 77:
	\| Dominance		\| Dominance
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2(1)~~ of ~~CR 139/2004 considers dominance~~.		\| Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis. If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.

	\|-		\|-
Line 83:		Line 83:
	\| Restriction of Competition		\| Restriction of Competition
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2~~(1) of ~~CR 139/2004 considers~~ the ~~interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers~~.		\| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.

	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
	\| Public Interest (Pro D)		\| Public Interest (Pro D)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article 2~~(1) of ~~CR 139/2004 considers~~ the ~~development~~ of ~~technical and economic progress~~.		\| Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)		\| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| ~~Article~~ 2(1) ~~of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers~~.		\| Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement. Law no. 287, Section 25(2).

	\|-		\|-

LMyhre at 22:07, 7 August 2008

2008-08-07T22:07:58Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:07, 7 August 2008
Line 1:		Line 1:
	'''Score = 27'''		'''Score = 27'''

	''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union, and European Commission Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>		''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union [hereafter EU Treaty], and European Commission Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"
Line 35:		Line 35:
	\| 3rd Party Initiation		\| 3rd Party Initiation
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 12 says that any interested party can bring a violation to the attention of the Authority.		\| CR 1/2003, Article 12, says that any interested party can bring a violation to the attention of the Authority.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties		\| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 33 allows 3rd parties to file a civil suit for damages.		\| CR 1/2003, Article 33, allows 3rd parties to file a civil suit for damages.

	\|-		\|-
Line 47:		Line 47:
	\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings		\| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 27(3) of ~~Council Regulation No.~~ 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties. Under Italian law, Presidential Decree no. 217/98, Section 7(1)(b) permits participation by 3rd parties representing public or private interests, and associations representing consumers that might be directly, immediately and presently damaged by the violations under investigation or by any measures adopted as a result of it. Section 7(2) of 217/98 states that these 3rd parties may produce written submission, documents, arguments and opinions, and also have access to documents, in accordance with Section 13 of the decree (which covers confidentiality).		\| Article 27(3) of CR 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties. Under Italian law, Presidential Decree no. 217/98, Section 7(1)(b) permits participation by 3rd parties representing public or private interests, and associations representing consumers that might be directly, immediately and presently damaged by the violations under investigation or by any measures adopted as a result of it. Section 7(2) of 217/98 states that these 3rd parties may produce written submission, documents, arguments and opinions, and also have access to documents, in accordance with Section 13 of the decree (which covers confidentiality).

	\|- class="categorydivision"		\|- class="categorydivision"
Line 113:		Line 113:
	\| Limits Access		\| Limits Access
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 82(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position.		\| Article 82(b) of the EU Treaty prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Abusive Acts		\| Abusive Acts
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.		\| Article 82 of the EU Treaty prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Price Setting		\| Price Setting
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 82(a) prohibits price setting.		\| Article 82(a) of the EU Treaty prohibits price setting.


Line 132:		Line 132:
	\| Discriminatory Pricing		\| Discriminatory Pricing
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 81(1)(d), 82(c) prohibit discrimatory conditions.		\| Articles 81(1)(d) and 82(c) of the EU Treaty, prohibit discrimatory conditions.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Resale Price Maintenance		\| Resale Price Maintenance
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81 prohibits minimum resale price restrictions.<ref>EC Competition Law, at 97.</ref>		\| Article 81 of the EU Treaty prohibits minimum resale price restrictions.<ref>EC Competition Law, at 97.</ref>

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Obstacles to Entry		\| Obstacles to Entry
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 82 prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.<ref>Id, at 283.</ref>		\| Article 82 of the EU Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.<ref>Id, at 283.</ref>

	\|-		\|-
Line 156:		Line 156:
	\| Price Fixing		\| Price Fixing
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 81(1)(a) prohibits price fixing.		\| Articles 81(1)(a) of the EU Treaty prohibits price fixing.

	\|-		\|-
Line 162:		Line 162:
	\| Tying		\| Tying
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Articles 81(1)(e), 82(d) prohibit tying.		\| Articles 81(1)(e) and 82(d) of the EU Treaty prohibit tying.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Market Division		\| Market Division
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81 prohibits customer allocation clauses.<ref>Id, at 97.</ref>		\| Article 81 of the EU Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.<ref>Id, at 97.</ref>

	\|-		\|-
Line 174:		Line 174:
	\| Output Restraint		\| Output Restraint
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits limiting production.		\| Article 81(1)(b) of the EU Treaty prohibits limiting production.


Line 181:		Line 181:
	\| Market Sharing		\| Market Sharing
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81(1)(c) prohibits market sharing.		\| Article 81(1)(c) of the EU Treaty prohibits market sharing.

	\|-		\|-
Line 187:		Line 187:
	\| Eliminating Competitors		\| Eliminating Competitors
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81(1) prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.		\| Article 81(1) of the EU Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.

	\|-		\|-
Line 193:		Line 193:
	\| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging		\| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81 prohibits bid-rigging.		\| Article 81 of the EU Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.

	\|-		\|-
Line 199:		Line 199:
	\| Supply Refusal		\| Supply Refusal
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits supply refusal.		\| Article 81(1)(b) of the EU Treaty prohibits supply refusal.

	\|-		\|-
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	\| Efficiency Defense		\| Efficiency Defense
	\| 1		\| 1
	\| Article 81(3) allows an efficiency defense.		\| Article 81(3) of the EU Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

	\|}		\|}

LMyhre at 18:25, 7 August 2008

2008-08-07T18:25:44Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:25, 7 August 2008
Line 1:		Line 1:
	'''Score = 27'''		'''Score = 27'''

	''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union, and EU Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>		''Governed by:'' Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty on European Union, and European Commission Regulations 1/2003 [hereafter "CR 1/2003"] and 139/2004 [hereafter “CR 139/2004], as well as national legislation.<ref>EU statutes and regulations available online from the European Competition Network, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/documents.html</ref>

	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"