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| == Malta 1995 Divestiture == | | == Algeria 2003 Obstacles to Entry == |
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| ''This seems to allow the commission to make structural changes, that would count as divestiture, correct?'' | | ''Below is Algeria's definition of dominance (using Google Translator). Does this sound like obstacles to entry language? Perhaps we should have a translator look at it.'' |
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| Article 13 - | | Article 3(c) - Dominant Position: the position allowing a company to hold, on the market in question, a position of economic power which '''gives him the capacity to make obstacle with the maintenance of an effective competition''', by providing him the possibility of independent behaviors in an appreciable measurement with respect to its competitors, of its customers or its suppliers; |
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| (2) The '''power to issue a cease and desist order''' or a compliance | | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:01, 11 September 2007 (EDT) |
| order in cases of infringements as defined in article 12A(2) and (3)
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| shall rest solely with the Commission.
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| (3) Any '''behavioural or structural remedies''' set out in a
| | == Algeria 2000 Tying == |
| compliance order shall be proportionate to the infringement
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| committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an
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| end.
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| (4) '''Structural remedies set out in a compliance order may be imposed''' only where there is no equally effective behavioural
| | ''One of the criteria for establishing a dominant position includes being able to create advantageous contractual bonds. Would this just be another abusive act prohibition, or tying under RTP? Or should this be nothing since it's just establishing what is a dominant position and doesn't say it's an abusive act? The text below was translated with Google.'' |
| remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would
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| be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the
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| structural remedy.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 16:36, 11 July 2007 (EDT) | | Article 2 - The criteria of determination of the dominant position of an economic agent on a market or a market segment of goods or services are in particular: financial, contractual bonds or in fact which bind the economic agent to one or more economic agents and which get advantages of any nature to him; |
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| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:08, 11 September 2007 (EDT) |
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| (3) Looks like splitting-up the company, alright, but only doing so in order to end the abusive behavior. Makes sense as a divestiture in my opinion. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:16, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
| | == Egypt 2005 - Collusive Tendering == |
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| == Malta 1995 Merger - Restriction of Competition ==
| | Article 6(c) - "Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement." |
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| ''This seems to allow the Commission the power to block a merger which would result in a restriction of competition.''
| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 00:49, 8 October 2007 (EDT) |
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| Article 32 - "The Minister may . . . prescribe rules for the control of
| | == Egypt 2005 - Defenses == |
| concentrations including concentrative joint ventures which may
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| prevent, restrict or distort competition within the relevant market."
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 16:44, 11 July 2007 (EDT)
| | '''Article 9''' |
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| | The provisions of this Law shall not apply to public utilities managed by the State. |
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| I'd say this is a GO under Merger Assessment - Restricting Competition for sure. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:19, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
| | The Authority may, upon the request of the concerned parties, exempt some or all the acts provided for in articles 6 [on Restrictive Trade Practices], 7 [on Restrictive Trade Practices] and 8 [on Dominance] regarding public utilities that are managed by companies subject to the Private Law where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. This shall be done in accordance with the regulations and procedures set out by the Executive Regulation of this Law. |
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| == Malta 1995 - RTP Eliminating Competitors ==
| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 00:58, 8 October 2007 (EDT) |
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| ''Would this code as one for eliminating competitors?''
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| Article 5(1)(b) - "[It is prohibited where an agreement] imposes the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other parties outside such agreement, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 16:49, 11 July 2007 (EDT) | |
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| Sounds more like discriminatory pricing to me. I'd ask Hylton. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:20, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Malta 1995 Dom. Obstacles to Entry ==
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| ''This sounds like a prohibition for a dominant firm to take actions that would eliminate competitors, wouldn't that count as a prohibition against setting obstacles to entry?''
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| Article 9(2)(d) - "[It is prohibited for a firm in a dominant position to] refuse to supply goods or services indiscriminately in order to eliminate a trading party from the relevant market to the prejudice of consumers;"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 16:53, 11 July 2007 (EDT)
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| I'd say this is more on the side of eliminating competitors than preventing them from entering the market. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:22, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Malta 2003 - Merger Efficiency Defense ==
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| ''This looks like a merger efficiency defense.''
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| Article 4(4) - "Concentrations that bring about or are likely to bring about
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| gains in efficiency that will be greater than and will offset the
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| effects of any prevention or lessening of competition resulting from
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| or likely to result from the concentration shall not be prohibited if
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| the undertakings concerned prove that such efficiency gains cannot
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| otherwise be attained, are verifiable and likely to be passed on to
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| consumers in the form of lower prices, or greater innovation,
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| choice or quality of products or services."
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 16:56, 11 July 2007 (EDT)
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| Classic merger efficiency defense! --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:23, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Malawi 1998 RTP Efficiency Defense ==
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| ''Efficiency defense? Public interest defense?''
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| Article 44(1) - "The Commission may authorize any act, agreement or understanding
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| which is not prohibited outright by this Act, that is, one which is not necessarily
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| illegal unless abused if that act, agreement or understanding is consistent with the
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| objectives of this Act and the Commission considers that, on balance, the advantage
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| to Malawi outweigh the disadvantages"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:01, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
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| I'd say this counts as an efficiency defense. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:24, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Mauritius 2003 Predatory Pricing ==
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| ''Predatory pricing prohibition?''
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| Article 11(2)(a) - "[It is prohibited to directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions such as '''below-cost pricing''';"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:48, 13 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Mauritius 2003 Output Restraint ==
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| ''Is a prohibition against limited production the same thing as output restraint?''
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| Article 11(2)(b) - "[It is prohibited to] limit[] supply, '''production''', markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:50, 13 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Mauritius 2003 RTP Efficiency Defense ==
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| ''Efficiency defense?''
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| Article 16(b)
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| "(b) '''whether the effects of any absence, prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are outweighed by any specific benefits in respect of''' –
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| (i) the safety of goods and services;
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| (ii) '''the efficiency with which goods are produced, supplied or distributed or services are supplied or made available'''; or
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| (iii) the development and use of new and improved goods and services and means of production and distribution . . ."
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Algeria 2003 Obstacles to Entry
Below is Algeria's definition of dominance (using Google Translator). Does this sound like obstacles to entry language? Perhaps we should have a translator look at it.
Article 3(c) - Dominant Position: the position allowing a company to hold, on the market in question, a position of economic power which gives him the capacity to make obstacle with the maintenance of an effective competition, by providing him the possibility of independent behaviors in an appreciable measurement with respect to its competitors, of its customers or its suppliers;
--AchalOza 08:01, 11 September 2007 (EDT)
Algeria 2000 Tying
One of the criteria for establishing a dominant position includes being able to create advantageous contractual bonds. Would this just be another abusive act prohibition, or tying under RTP? Or should this be nothing since it's just establishing what is a dominant position and doesn't say it's an abusive act? The text below was translated with Google.
Article 2 - The criteria of determination of the dominant position of an economic agent on a market or a market segment of goods or services are in particular: financial, contractual bonds or in fact which bind the economic agent to one or more economic agents and which get advantages of any nature to him;
--AchalOza 08:08, 11 September 2007 (EDT)
Egypt 2005 - Collusive Tendering
Article 6(c) - "Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement."
--AchalOza 00:49, 8 October 2007 (EDT)
Egypt 2005 - Defenses
Article 9
The provisions of this Law shall not apply to public utilities managed by the State.
The Authority may, upon the request of the concerned parties, exempt some or all the acts provided for in articles 6 [on Restrictive Trade Practices], 7 [on Restrictive Trade Practices] and 8 [on Dominance] regarding public utilities that are managed by companies subject to the Private Law where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. This shall be done in accordance with the regulations and procedures set out by the Executive Regulation of this Law.
--AchalOza 00:58, 8 October 2007 (EDT)