Slovak Republic (1994): Difference between revisions

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'''Score = INCOMPLETE'''
'''Score = 13'''


''Governed by:'' Act No.188/1994 Coll. on Protection of Economic Competition (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).  
''Governed by:'' Act No.188/1994 Coll. on Protection of Economic Competition (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).  
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| Voluntary
| Voluntary
| 0
| 0
|  
|
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 0
| 3
|  
| Merger notification is mandatory, and the Antimonopoly Office can impose fines for failing to notify. <ref>OECD 1997 at 9</ref>
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
| 0
| 1
|  
| A merger must be "notified to the Authority within 15 days after agreement conclusion"<ref>OECD 1997 at 10</ref>


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| Dominance
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits a merger that "creates or strengthens a dominant position"<ref>OECD 1997 at 8</ref>
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
|  
| 1
|  
| In assessing mergers, the Antimonopoly Office looks to whether the merger will restrict competition<ref>OECD 1997 at 12</ref>
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act allows otherwise impermissible mergers if "the harm resulting from the restriction
on competition will be outweighed by overall economic advantages of the concentration"<ref>OECD 1997 at 8</ref>
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits "restrictions on production"<ref>OECD 1997 at 6</ref>


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|  
|  
| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 0
| 1
|  
|  


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|  
|  
| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits "commitment by the parties to the agreement that different trade conditions relating
to the same contractual subject matter will be applied to individual entrepreneurs" <ref>OECD 1997 at 5</ref>
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Tying
| Tying
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits "conditions which connect conclusion of contracts to the acceptance of
supplementary obligations which are not related to the subject of those contracts"<ref>OECD 1997 at 5</ref>
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Market Division
| Market Division
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits market division. <ref>OECD 1997 at 5</ref>
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 0
| 1
|  
| The Act prohibits agreements that "limit or control production"<ref>OECD 1997 at 5</ref>


|-
|-

Latest revision as of 17:08, 30 January 2008

Score = 13

Governed by: Act No.188/1994 Coll. on Protection of Economic Competition (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 1 The Competition Act allows imposing sanctions for violations of its provisions. [2]
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 0
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 "Parties to the proceedings or those whose interests have been affected by the decision can

submit an appeal against the decision"[3]

Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Merger notification is mandatory, and the Antimonopoly Office can impose fines for failing to notify. [4]
Pre-merger 0
Post-merger 1 A merger must be "notified to the Authority within 15 days after agreement conclusion"[5]
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 The Act prohibits a merger that "creates or strengthens a dominant position"[6]
Restriction of Competition 1 In assessing mergers, the Antimonopoly Office looks to whether the merger will restrict competition[7]
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 1 The Act allows otherwise impermissible mergers if "the harm resulting from the restriction

on competition will be outweighed by overall economic advantages of the concentration"[8]

Dominance Limits Access 1 The Act prohibits "restrictions on production"[9]


Abusive Acts 1
Price Setting 0
Discriminatory Pricing 1 The Act prohibits "commitment by the parties to the agreement that different trade conditions relating

to the same contractual subject matter will be applied to individual entrepreneurs" [10]

Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 The Act prohibits agreements that fix prices. [11]
Tying 1 The Act prohibits "conditions which connect conclusion of contracts to the acceptance of

supplementary obligations which are not related to the subject of those contracts"[12]

Market Division 1 The Act prohibits market division. [13]
Output Restraint 1 The Act prohibits agreements that "limit or control production"[14]
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 0


References

  1. Primary source not available. We relied on two secondary sources: an OECD Report from 1997 and 1998 (hereinafter referred to as "OECD 1997" and "OECD 1998"). They are available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/1823848.pdf and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/35/1821797.pdf, respectively.
  2. OECD 1997 at 4
  3. OECD 1997 at 4
  4. OECD 1997 at 9
  5. OECD 1997 at 10
  6. OECD 1997 at 8
  7. OECD 1997 at 12
  8. OECD 1997 at 8
  9. OECD 1997 at 6
  10. OECD 1997 at 5
  11. OECD 1997 at 5
  12. OECD 1997 at 5
  13. OECD 1997 at 5
  14. OECD 1997 at 5