Macedonia (Jan 1, 2005): Difference between revisions
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Governed by the Law on Protection of Competition.<ref>http://www.kzk.gov.mk/images/LawOnProtectionOfCompetition.pdf</ref> | Governed by the Law on Protection of Competition.<ref>http://www.kzk.gov.mk/images/LawOnProtectionOfCompetition.pdf</ref> | ||
'''Score = | '''Score = 23''' | ||
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| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
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Latest revision as of 14:52, 18 June 2008
Governed by the Law on Protection of Competition.[1]
Score = 23
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3 extends the scope of the act to activities that affect competition in Macedonia. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 47 allows violators of the act to be fined. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 22(4)allows for the undoing of prohibited mergers, or for other actions which will undo the effect of the merger. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 30 allows third parties to initiate proceedings. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 43 allows parties injured by anticompetitive acts to "request compensation according to the law" | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 29 allows third parties to be parties to the proceedings. Article 37 allows parties to the proceedings to to participate. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 16(1) requires notification of mergers. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 16(2)(3) requires pre-merger notification. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 16 requires notification based on turnover, and percentage of total market share. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 17(2) requires consideration of effects on competition when considering whether to allow a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 17 requires consideration of consumer benefit when deciding whether to allow a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | Merger Guidelines[2] clarify that if a firm is failing, its merger application ought to be treated more favorably. | |
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 17 requires consideration of efficiency effects when deciding whether to allow a merger. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 14(2)bans limiting production |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 14(1)prohibits abusive acts by a dominant firm. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 14(2)(1) bans setting prices. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 14(2)(3) bans discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 14(2)(6) prohibits refusing to allow competitors to use vital facilities. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 7(1) prohibits price fixing. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 7(1)(5) prohibits tying. | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 7(1) bans output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 7(1)(3) bans market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 7(3) and (11) allow otherwise prohibited practices, if they increase efficency and pass some of those efficiency benefits to consumers. |