Russia (October 22, 2002): Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = 22''' ''Governed by:'' Law on Competition and Restriction of Monopoly Activity on the Commodity Markets’ No. 948-1 of 22 March 1991 last amended 22 October 2002 (hereinafter ...
 
HCargill (talk | contribs)
updated the 2002 page. Used full translated statute, noted sections where laws appear, and changed scoring. Changed reference links to reference ful statute.
 
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'''Score = 22'''
'''Score = 21'''


''Governed by:'' Law on Competition and Restriction of Monopoly Activity on the Commodity Markets’ No. 948-1 of 22 March 1991 last amended 22 October 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).  
''Governed by:'' Law of the RSFRF No. 948-1 on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodities Markets of 22 March 1991 (as Amended JUNE 24, 1992, МAY 25, 1995, МАY 6, 1998, January 2, 2000,December 30, 2001, march 21 and October 9, 2002).  
<ref>Full text of the Act was unavailable in English and thus information is taken from excerpts from the Global Competition Review website, http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/russia.cfm.</ref>
<ref>Statute from the International Competition Network, ttp://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerrussianlaw2003.pdf </ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| 1
| The Competition Law applies to operations performed outside Russian which have led to the limitation of competition or affects markets in Russia.
| Article 2 of the statute extends its reach to extraterritorial actions that affect competition in the Russian Market.  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Fines are imposed for certain violations.
| Article 12(2) authorizes fines. Article 23.1 allows the state to collect the income gained through monopolistic activities.  


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Prison Sentences
| Prison Sentences
| 1
| 0
| For certain monopolistic violations the court can impose prison sentences.
|  


|-
|-
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| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 1
| 1
| Judicial liquidation is a punishment for certain violations.
| Articles 12 and 19 authorize divestitures of monopolies.  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Legislation can be initiated by commercial and non-commercial 3rd parties.
| Article 27(2) allows third parties to initiate proceedings.  


|-
|-
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| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| 1
| Companies that violate the Act can be held responsible for the damages their actions caused to other undertakings.
| Article 26 provides for civil recovery by parties injured by competition violations.  
|-
|-
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| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| The Authority must be notified of mergers.
| Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 0
| 2
|  
| Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
| 1
| 0
| Notification must come within 45 days of the merger.
|  
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| The key factors in deciding whether to allow a merger are whether it will strengthen or create a dominant position or restrict competition.
| Article 17(3) states that strengthening of a dominant position is a factor against allowing a merger.  
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| The key factors in deciding whether to allow a merger are whether it will strengthen or create a dominant position or restrict competition.
| Article 17(3) states that restriction of competition is a factor against allowing a merger.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the public benefit outweighs the competitive loss.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the socio economic benefit exceeds the damage to competition.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Limiting the goods on the market but a dominant undertaking is considered an abusive act.
| Article 5(1) bans limiting access or supply.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Abuses of a dominant position are expressly forbidden by the act.
| Article 5 bans abuse of a dominant position.  


|-
|-
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| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Price setting is considered an abusive act.
| Article 5 bans price setting.  


|-
|-
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| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Discriminatory conditions are considered an abusive act.
| Article 5 bans discriminatory pricing.
|-
|-
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| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 1
| Creating obstacles to entry is considered an abusive act.
| Article 5 bans creating obstacles to entry.
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| The act provides exemptions when the economic and social benefit outweighs the detriment to competition.
| Article 5 permits certain otherwise impermissible activities when the socio-economic benefit is strong enough.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Price fixing is impermissible.
| Article 6 bans price fixing.
|-
|-
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| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Market division is prohibited.
| Article 6 bans market division.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 0
| Refusing to fulfill contracts is prohibited.
|  
|-
|-
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| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 1
| Removing others from the market is prohibited.
| Article 6(2) bans eliminating competitors.  
|-
|-
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| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| 1
| Bid rigging is prohibited.
| Article 6 bans bid rigging.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 6(1) bans supply refusal
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| The Act allows an exemption when the activity has a social or economic benefit that outweighs the detriment.
| Article 6(4) permits otherwise impermissible activity if the socio-economic benefit outweighs the harm from the activity.  
|}
|}

Latest revision as of 21:44, 20 June 2008

Score = 21

Governed by: Law of the RSFRF No. 948-1 on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodities Markets of 22 March 1991 (as Amended JUNE 24, 1992, МAY 25, 1995, МАY 6, 1998, January 2, 2000,December 30, 2001, march 21 and October 9, 2002). [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article 2 of the statute extends its reach to extraterritorial actions that affect competition in the Russian Market.
Remedies Fines 1 Article 12(2) authorizes fines. Article 23.1 allows the state to collect the income gained through monopolistic activities.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Articles 12 and 19 authorize divestitures of monopolies.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Article 27(2) allows third parties to initiate proceedings.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 26 provides for civil recovery by parties injured by competition violations.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies.
Pre-merger 2 Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 17(3) states that strengthening of a dominant position is a factor against allowing a merger.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 17(3) states that restriction of competition is a factor against allowing a merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the public benefit outweighs the competitive loss.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 1 Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the socio economic benefit exceeds the damage to competition.
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 5(1) bans limiting access or supply.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 5 bans abuse of a dominant position.
Price Setting 1 Article 5 bans price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Article 5 bans discriminatory pricing.
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 1 Article 5 bans creating obstacles to entry.
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 5 permits certain otherwise impermissible activities when the socio-economic benefit is strong enough.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 6 bans price fixing.
Tying 0
Market Division 1 Article 6 bans market division.
Output Restraint 0
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 1 Article 6(2) bans eliminating competitors.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Article 6 bans bid rigging.
Supply Refusal 1 Article 6(1) bans supply refusal
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 6(4) permits otherwise impermissible activity if the socio-economic benefit outweighs the harm from the activity.

References

  1. Statute from the International Competition Network, ttp://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerrussianlaw2003.pdf