Zimbabwe 1996: Difference between revisions

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recoded 1996.
 
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'''Score = 11'''
'''Score = 20'''


''Governed by:'' Competition Act of 1996<ref>United Nations Conference on Trade Development website, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb_ncl_zimbabwe_en.pdf</ref> ( “Competition Act”).  
''Governed by:'' Competition Act of 1996<ref>United Nations Conference on Trade Development website, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb_ncl_zimbabwe_en.pdf</ref> ( “Competition Act”).  
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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to fine for violations of the Act.
| Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to fine for violations of the Act, as does article 42(3).


|-
|-
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| Prison Sentences
| Prison Sentences
| 1
| 1
| Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to impose imprisonment for violations of the act.
| Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to impose imprisonment for violations of the act, as does article 42(3).


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 31(2)(d) allows the Commission to force divestitures in the case of prohibited merger or monopoly situations.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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|  
|  
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 28(2)(b) requires the Commission to accept written submissions from interested parties for its proceedings. However, Article 36(1) allows the Commission to bypass this requirement in merger considerations, if it feels that accepting submissions would be counterproductive.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| Voluntary
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 35 allows merging parties to request authorization before they merge.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 0
| 2
|  
| Article 35 allows merging parties to seek Commission authorization before they merge.
|-
|-
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Article 32(3) defines a merger that is contrary to the public interest as one that is likely to result in a monopoly situation.
| Article 32(4)(b) requires the Commission to consider whether mergers will create anticompetitive monopolies.  
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article 32(1)(a) of the Competition Act says that in assessing a merger the Commission must take into consideration the interest in maintaining and promoting competition.
| Article 32(4)(a) of the Competition Act says that in assessing a merger the Commission must consider whether the merger will lessen competition.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 31(2) disallows mergers that are contrary to public interest. Article 32(2), however, has a list of pro-defendant public interest effects which may suffice to permit an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| 0
| Article 32(1) of the Competition Act tells the Commission to consider whether the merger will be contrary to the public interest.
|  
|-
|-
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| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 1
| 1
| Article 32(1)(c) of the Competition At says that the Commission can take into account the reduction of costs and development of new technologies.
| Article 32(1)(c) of the Competition At says that the Commission can take into account the reduction of costs and development of new technologies. Article 32(5)(a) provides for an efficiency defense for some mergers.  
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which would restrict production. Restrictive practices are subject to regulation per Article 31. 
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which sets prices.


|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 5 of the First Schedule bans refusing to sell to any party unless that party resells at a specified price.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which restricts entry to markets.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
| 1
|  
| Section 32(2)(b) allows a limited defense if the restrictive trade practices has allowed consumers a substantial benefit because of the practice. Section 32(3) exempts practices in the First Schedule from this defense.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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|  
|  
| Market Division
| Market Division
| 0
|1
|  
|Article 7(1)(b) of the First Schedule bans market division.
 
|-
|-
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| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Section 2 defines "restrictive practice" as one "restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or service"
| Section 2 defines "restrictive practice" as one "restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or service." Article (1)(c) of the First Schedule bans output restraint.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
| 0
| 1
|  
|Article 7(1)(b) of the First Schedule bans market sharing.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 2 states that agreements "restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or services" is a restrictive trade practice, and subject to regulation.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 7(2) of the First Schedule permits banned practices if they are targeted at improving production or distribution of goods and services.
|}
|}

Latest revision as of 20:16, 14 July 2008

Score = 20

Governed by: Competition Act of 1996[1] ( “Competition Act”).

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 1 Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to fine for violations of the Act, as does article 42(3).
Prison Sentences 1 Article 29(7) of the Competition Act allows the Commission to impose imprisonment for violations of the act, as does article 42(3).
Divestitures 1 Article 31(2)(d) allows the Commission to force divestitures in the case of prohibited merger or monopoly situations.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Article 44 gives injured 3rd parties a right of action.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 44 gives injured 3rd parties the right to collect damages.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Article 28(2)(b) requires the Commission to accept written submissions from interested parties for its proceedings. However, Article 36(1) allows the Commission to bypass this requirement in merger considerations, if it feels that accepting submissions would be counterproductive.
Merger Notification Voluntary 1 Article 35 allows merging parties to request authorization before they merge.
Mandatory 0
Pre-merger 2 Article 35 allows merging parties to seek Commission authorization before they merge.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 32(4)(b) requires the Commission to consider whether mergers will create anticompetitive monopolies.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 32(4)(a) of the Competition Act says that in assessing a merger the Commission must consider whether the merger will lessen competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 31(2) disallows mergers that are contrary to public interest. Article 32(2), however, has a list of pro-defendant public interest effects which may suffice to permit an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 1 Article 32(1)(c) of the Competition At says that the Commission can take into account the reduction of costs and development of new technologies. Article 32(5)(a) provides for an efficiency defense for some mergers.
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which would restrict production. Restrictive practices are subject to regulation per Article 31.
Abusive Acts 0
Price Setting 1 Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which sets prices.
Discriminatory Pricing 0
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Article 5 of the First Schedule bans refusing to sell to any party unless that party resells at a specified price.
Obstacles to Entry 1 Article 2 lists as a restrictive trade practice any practice by any entity which restricts entry to markets.
Efficiency Defense 1 Section 32(2)(b) allows a limited defense if the restrictive trade practices has allowed consumers a substantial benefit because of the practice. Section 32(3) exempts practices in the First Schedule from this defense.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Section 2 defines "restrictive practice" as one "enhancing or maintaining the price of any commodity or service"
Tying 0
Market Division 1 Article 7(1)(b) of the First Schedule bans market division.


Output Restraint 1 Section 2 defines "restrictive practice" as one "restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or service." Article (1)(c) of the First Schedule bans output restraint.
Market Sharing 1 Article 7(1)(b) of the First Schedule bans market sharing.


Eliminating Competitors 1 Section 2 defines "restrictive practice" as one "preventing or restricting the entry into any market of persons producing or distributing any commodity or service"
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Article 6 of the First Schedule of the Competition Act prohibits bid rigging.
Supply Refusal 1 Article 2 states that agreements "restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or services" is a restrictive trade practice, and subject to regulation.
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 7(2) of the First Schedule permits banned practices if they are targeted at improving production or distribution of goods and services.

References

  1. United Nations Conference on Trade Development website, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb_ncl_zimbabwe_en.pdf