Italy (October 10, 1990): Difference between revisions

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'''Score = '''
'''Score = 23'''


''Governed by:''  
''Governed by:''  
Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990: Competition and Fair Trading Act.  
 
Law No. 57 of 5 March 2001, Section 11: Abuse of Economic Dependence and Competition.
Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of 13 October 1990)<ref>http://www.agcm.it/AGCM_ENG/NORMATIV/E_NORMNA.NSF/b50758bf27025fecc125653d00467db4/d6cd09a87f1832b7802564a000533ce6?OpenDocument</ref>
<ref>http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm</ref>
 


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 13: Line 13:
| Scope
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| 0
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title IV, Section 25(2) implies that scope extends to foreign corporations.
|  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 20: Line 20:
| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 19 imposes fines for violations of the Act, or for failure to comply with violation remedies ordered by the Authority.
| Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement.  Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.  Section 14-''bis'' allows fines if interim measures are ordered but companies fail to comply.  Section 14-''ter'' permits fines if ccompanies fail to keep commitments they have made to rectify anti-competitive conduct.


|-
|-
Line 32: Line 32:
| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 18(3) permits the Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.
| Law no. 287, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 38: Line 38:
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter II, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Authority.  
| Law no. 287, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.  


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 49: Line 49:
|  
|  
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
|  
| 0
|  
|  


Line 55: Line 55:
| Merger Notification
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| Voluntary
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 62: Line 62:
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title II, Chapter III, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
|  
| 2
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 79: Line 79:
| Merger Assessment
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| Dominance
|  
| 1
|  
| Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved.  A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis.  If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
|  
| 1
|  
| Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
|  
| 1
|  
| Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement.  Law no. 287, Section 25(2).
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Other
| Other
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 109: Line 109:
|  
|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 116: Line 116:
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access.
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
Line 122: Line 122:
| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.


|-
|-
Line 128: Line 128:
| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting.
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(a) prohibits price setting.


|-
|-
Line 134: Line 134:
| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(c) forbids applying to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 0
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
|  
|-
|-
Line 146: Line 146:
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access.
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 158: Line 158:
| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
| Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Tying
| Tying
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(e) prohibits tying.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Market Division
| Market Division
|  
| 1
|  
| Market division is not mentioned specifically in the Italian Competition law, however, one of the goals of the law is to prevent any secret cartels or agreements that restrict or distort competition. The Competition Authority's website mentions that market division is one of the types of agreements the law is meant to prevent.<ref>http://www.agcm.it/eng/A21.htm</ref>
|-
|-
Line 176: Line 176:
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990, Title I, Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint.
| Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(b) prohibits agreements that limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(c) forbids anti-competitive agreements to share markets or sources of supplies.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically.  The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
|  
| 0
|  
|  
Line 199: Line 199:
|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including restricting production, market outlets or market access (Section 2(2)(b)), or that apply to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions (Section 2(2)(d)).
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
|  
| 1
|  
| Law no. 287, Section 4, allows some anti-competitive agreements to be approved for limited times if they are absolutely necessary to improve market supply, with substantial benefits for consumers.
|}
|}

Latest revision as of 22:38, 17 July 2008

Score = 23

Governed by:

Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of 13 October 1990)[1]


Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 1 Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement. Section 14-bis allows fines if interim measures are ordered but companies fail to comply. Section 14-ter permits fines if ccompanies fail to keep commitments they have made to rectify anti-competitive conduct.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Law no. 287, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Law no. 287, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
Pre-merger 2 Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis. If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.
Restriction of Competition 1 Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 1 Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement. Law no. 287, Section 25(2).
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Abusive Acts 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.
Price Setting 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(a) prohibits price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(c) forbids applying to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
Tying 1 Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(e) prohibits tying.
Market Division 1 Market division is not mentioned specifically in the Italian Competition law, however, one of the goals of the law is to prevent any secret cartels or agreements that restrict or distort competition. The Competition Authority's website mentions that market division is one of the types of agreements the law is meant to prevent.[2]
Output Restraint 1 Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(b) prohibits agreements that limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Market Sharing 1 Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(c) forbids anti-competitive agreements to share markets or sources of supplies.
Eliminating Competitors 1 Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically. The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 1 Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including restricting production, market outlets or market access (Section 2(2)(b)), or that apply to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions (Section 2(2)(d)).
Efficiency Defense 1 Law no. 287, Section 4, allows some anti-competitive agreements to be approved for limited times if they are absolutely necessary to improve market supply, with substantial benefits for consumers.

References