Italy (October 10, 1990): Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = 28''' ''Governed by:'' Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). <ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 735-749.</ref> {| class="wikitabl...
 
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'''Score = 28'''
'''Score = 23'''
 
''Governed by:''
 
Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of  13 October 1990)<ref>http://www.agcm.it/AGCM_ENG/NORMATIV/E_NORMNA.NSF/b50758bf27025fecc125653d00467db4/d6cd09a87f1832b7802564a000533ce6?OpenDocument</ref>


''Governed by:'' Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).
<ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 735-749.</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 11: Line 13:
| Scope
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| 0
| Scope extends to foreign corporations.<ref>Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, 4th ed. 2003 at 99.</ref>
|  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 18: Line 20:
| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Articles 13 and 19 allow for fines for serious violations of the Competition Act.
| Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement.  Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement.  Section 14-''bis'' allows fines if interim measures are ordered but companies fail to comply.  Section 14-''ter'' permits fines if ccompanies fail to keep commitments they have made to rectify anti-competitive conduct.


|-
|-
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| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 1
| 1
| Article 7 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 allows for structural remedies
| Law no. 287, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 36: Line 38:
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Article 12 says that any interested party can bring a violation to the attention of the Authority.
| Law no. 287, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.  


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| 0
| Article 33 allows 3rd parties to file a civil suit for damages.
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| 0
| Article 27(3) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 affords evidentiary rights to 3rd parties
|  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 60: Line 62:
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Article 7(1) of CR 139/2004 requires notification.<ref>The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give undertakings the ability to request exemption from notification requirements.  However, because a formal request must be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption, the new notification guidelines are encoded as requiring mandatory pre-merger notification.</ref>
| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
|-
|-
Line 66: Line 68:
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 2
| Article 7(1) of 139/2004 requires pre-clearance
| Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
|-
|-
Line 78: Line 80:
| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers dominance
| Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved.  A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis.  If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.
|-
|-
Line 84: Line 86:
| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1)(a) of CR 139/2004 considers effect on competition in the market
| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
|-
|-
Line 90: Line 92:
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the development of technical and economic progress
| Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.
|-
|-
Line 96: Line 98:
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers
| Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement.  Law no. 287, Section 25(2).
|-
|-
Line 107: Line 109:
|  
|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 1
| 0
| Article 2(4) of CR 139/2004 allows an efficiency defense
|  
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 114: Line 116:
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Article 82(b) prohibits limiting access
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.


|-
|-
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| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Article 82(a) prohibits price setting
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(a) prohibits price setting.


|-
|-
Line 132: Line 134:
| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Articles 81(1)(d), 82(c) prohibit discriminatory conditions
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(c) forbids applying to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 0
| Article 81 prohibits minimum resale price restrictions.<ref>EC Competition Law, at 97.</ref>
|  
|-
|-
Line 144: Line 146:
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 1
| Article 82 prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.<ref>Id, at 283.</ref>
| Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
Line 156: Line 158:
| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) prohibits price fixing
| Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
|-
|-
Line 162: Line 164:
| Tying
| Tying
| 1
| 1
| Articles 81(1)(e), 82(d) prohibit tying
| Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(e) prohibits tying.
|-
|-
Line 168: Line 170:
| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Article 81 prohibits customer allocation clauses.<ref>Id, at 97.</ref>
| Market division is not mentioned specifically in the Italian Competition law, however, one of the goals of the law is to prevent any secret cartels or agreements that restrict or distort competition. The Competition Authority's website mentions that market division is one of the types of agreements the law is meant to prevent.<ref>http://www.agcm.it/eng/A21.htm</ref>
|-
|-
Line 174: Line 176:
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits limiting production
| Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(b) prohibits agreements that limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
|-
|-
Line 180: Line 182:
| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) prohibits market sharing
| Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(c) forbids anti-competitive agreements to share markets or sources of supplies.
|-
|-
Line 186: Line 188:
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1) prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition
| Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically.  The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| 0
| Article 81 prohibits bid-rigging
|  
|-
|-
Line 198: Line 200:
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits supply refusal
| Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including restricting production, market outlets or market access (Section 2(2)(b)), or that apply to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions (Section 2(2)(d)).
|-
|-
Line 204: Line 206:
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(3) allows an efficiency defense
| Law no. 287, Section 4, allows some anti-competitive agreements to be approved for limited times if they are absolutely necessary to improve market supply, with substantial benefits for consumers.
|}
|}

Latest revision as of 22:38, 17 July 2008

Score = 23

Governed by:

Law no. 287 of October 10th, 1990 - Competition and Fair Trading Act (Official Gazette no. 240 of 13 October 1990)[1]


Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 1 Law no. 287, Section 15 allows fines for failure to remedy violations, depending on the gravity and duration of the infringement. Section 19 imposes fines for failure to comply with prohibitions on concentrations or the merger notification requirement. Section 14-bis allows fines if interim measures are ordered but companies fail to comply. Section 14-ter permits fines if ccompanies fail to keep commitments they have made to rectify anti-competitive conduct.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Law no. 287, Section 18(3) permits the Competition Authority to require corrective measures that will restore effective competition.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Law no. 287, Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Competition Authority.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation.
Pre-merger 2 Law no. 287, Section 16(1) requires notification prior to merger, if the value of the merging undertakings, or their combined value, exceeds set levels that are adjusted annually for inflation.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Under Law no. 287, Section 6, market dominance is considered before mergers are approved. A merger may not be approved if it will result in market dominance with the effect of eliminating or restricting competition appreciably and on a lasting basis. If it is approved, the Competition Authority may require measures designed to prevent the merger from abusing its dominant position.
Restriction of Competition 1 Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the restriction of competition, when deciding whether to approve the merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Section 25(1) permits temporary waivers for mergers that restrict competition when major general interests of the national economy are involved in the process of European integration, provided that competition is not eliminated from the market or restricted to an extent that is not strictly justified by the aforementioned general interests.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 1 Mergers with companies based in other countries may be prohibited, in order to protect national economic interests, if it is found the other country does not have an adequate and independent competition law and enforcement. Law no. 287, Section 25(2).
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Abusive Acts 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it.
Price Setting 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(a) prohibits price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(c) forbids applying to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 1 Law no. 287, Section 3(1)(b) prohibits abuse of a dominant position to limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices.
Tying 1 Law no. 287, Sections 2(2)(e) prohibits tying.
Market Division 1 Market division is not mentioned specifically in the Italian Competition law, however, one of the goals of the law is to prevent any secret cartels or agreements that restrict or distort competition. The Competition Authority's website mentions that market division is one of the types of agreements the law is meant to prevent.[2]
Output Restraint 1 Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(b) prohibits agreements that limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, technical development or technological progress.
Market Sharing 1 Law no. 287, Section 2(2)(c) forbids anti-competitive agreements to share markets or sources of supplies.
Eliminating Competitors 1 Law no. 287, Section 6(1) requires that the Competition Authority consider whether a merger will result in the elimination of competition in general, but not existing competitors specifically. The Authority must consider market access, ease of market entry, and several other factors related to the structure of that market and the future of competition in that market.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 1 Law no. 287, Section 2 forbids agreements that restrict freedom of competition, including restricting production, market outlets or market access (Section 2(2)(b)), or that apply to other trading partners objectively dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions (Section 2(2)(d)).
Efficiency Defense 1 Law no. 287, Section 4, allows some anti-competitive agreements to be approved for limited times if they are absolutely necessary to improve market supply, with substantial benefits for consumers.

References