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Some French competition law is codified in provisions of the code de la consommation (consumer code).<ref>Available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20080624</ref> The majority is contained in Livre (book) IV of the Code de commerce (commercial code).<ref> most recent version of the commercial code available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?dateTexte=20080624&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&fastReqId=239729146&fastPos=6&oldAction=rechCodeArticle</ref><ref>Limited English version available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3094</ref><ref>The French Commercial Code in English 2005, Philip Raworth translator, 2005, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, Inc.</ref> Unless otherwise specified, all provisions cited refer to the Code de commerce.  
Some French competition law is codified in provisions of the code de la consommation (consumer code).<ref>Available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20080624</ref> The majority is contained in Livre (book) IV of the Code de commerce (commercial code).<ref> most recent version of the commercial code available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?dateTexte=20080624&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&fastReqId=239729146&fastPos=6&oldAction=rechCodeArticle</ref><ref>Limited English version available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3094</ref><ref>The French Commercial Code in English 2005, Philip Raworth translator, 2005, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, Inc.</ref> Unless otherwise specified, all provisions cited refer to the Code de commerce.  


'''Score = 24'''
'''Score = 26'''


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Article L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger.   
| Art. L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger.   


|-
|-
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| Prison Sentences
| Prison Sentences
| 1
| 1
| Article L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute.  
| Art. L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute.  


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 0
| 1
|  
| Are. L.430-8 authorizes divestment in the case of unauthorized mergers.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Article L.440-1 allows third parties to initiate proceedings.  
| L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry.  


|-
|-
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| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| 1
| Article L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations.  
| Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 0
| 1
|  
| Art. L.463-1, "interested parties" may participate in proceedings.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 59: Line 59:
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Article L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge.  
| Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge.  
|-
|-
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| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 2
| Article L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances.  
| Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
|  
| 0
|  
|  
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Article L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
| Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
| Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 1
| 0
| Article L.430-6 allows consideration of
|  
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 0
| 1
|  
| Art. L.442-1 (citing Articles 121-35 and 122-1 of the Consumer code) prohibits refusing to sell to consumers. Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits limiting production.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Article 8 prohibits abusive exploitation by a dominant enterprise.
| Art. L.420-2 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.  


|-
|-
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| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Article 8 applies the restriction on price setting as established in Article 7 to dominant companies.
|Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits price setting.  


|-
|-
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| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Article 8 bans discriminatory pricing by dominant companies.
| Art. L.420-2 prohibits discriminatory pricing.  
|-
|-
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| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 1
| Article 32 bans RPM when the distributor sets a minimum price (but not for setting a max price)
| Art. L.442-5 prohibits resale price maintenance.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 0
| 1
|  
| Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1)prohibits creating obstacles to entry.
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 10(2) offers a defense for showing that the effect of the acts if they ensure economic progress.
| Art. L.420-4 allows otherwise prohibited practices if they promote more efficient practices, especially for small and medium sized companies.  
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
Line 155: Line 156:
| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Article 7(2) prohibits price fixing.
| Art. L.420-1 bans price fixing.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Tying
| Tying
| 1
| 1  
| Article 8 prohibits tying arrangements.
| Articles L.420-2 and L.442-1 ban tying.  
|-
|-
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| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply.
| Art. L.464-6-2 treats market division as a blatant anticompetitive restriction.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
|1  
| Article 7(3) prohibits limiting or controlling production.
|Art. L.420-1(3) bans output restraint.  
|-
|-
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| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
| 1
| 1
| Article 7(4) prohibits allocating markets or sources of supply.
| Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing.  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 0
| Article 7(1) prohibits agreements that limits access to the market or free exercise of competition by other enterprises.
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 0
| 1
|  
| Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. French authorities have, on at least one occasion, treated bid rigging as market sharing.<ref>See the Drapo Software case, details from the French Competition Council, at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=185&id_article=542</ref>
|-
|-
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| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| 1
| Article 8 prohibits refusing to sell.
| Art. L.420-2 prohibits supply refusal
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 10 exempts for Article 7 and 8 agreements that have the effect of ensuring economic progress.
| Art. L-420-4 offers a limited efficiency defense for otherwise prohibited practices.  
|}
|}
== References ==
<references />


== References ==
== References ==
<references />
<references />

Latest revision as of 20:06, 18 July 2008

Some French competition law is codified in provisions of the code de la consommation (consumer code).[1] The majority is contained in Livre (book) IV of the Code de commerce (commercial code).[2][3][4] Unless otherwise specified, all provisions cited refer to the Code de commerce.

Score = 26

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article L.420-1 extends the scope of the act outside of France in limited circumstances.
Remedies Fines 1 Art. L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger.
Prison Sentences 1 Art. L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute.
Divestitures 1 Are. L.430-8 authorizes divestment in the case of unauthorized mergers.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Art. L.463-1, "interested parties" may participate in proceedings.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge.
Pre-merger 2 Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
Restriction of Competition 1 Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of public public interest, especially with regard to international competitors, when deciding whether to permit a merger.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Art. L.442-1 (citing Articles 121-35 and 122-1 of the Consumer code) prohibits refusing to sell to consumers. Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits limiting production.
Abusive Acts 1 Art. L.420-2 prohibits abuse of a dominant position.
Price Setting 1 Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits price setting.


Discriminatory Pricing 1 Art. L.420-2 prohibits discriminatory pricing.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Art. L.442-5 prohibits resale price maintenance.
Obstacles to Entry 1 Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1)prohibits creating obstacles to entry.
Efficiency Defense 1 Art. L.420-4 allows otherwise prohibited practices if they promote more efficient practices, especially for small and medium sized companies.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Art. L.420-1 bans price fixing.
Tying 1 Articles L.420-2 and L.442-1 ban tying.
Market Division 1 Art. L.464-6-2 treats market division as a blatant anticompetitive restriction.
Output Restraint 1 Art. L.420-1(3) bans output restraint.


Market Sharing 1 Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing.
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. French authorities have, on at least one occasion, treated bid rigging as market sharing.[5]
Supply Refusal 1 Art. L.420-2 prohibits supply refusal
Efficiency Defense 1 Art. L-420-4 offers a limited efficiency defense for otherwise prohibited practices.

References

  1. ↑ Available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20080624
  2. ↑ most recent version of the commercial code available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?dateTexte=20080624&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&fastReqId=239729146&fastPos=6&oldAction=rechCodeArticle
  3. ↑ Limited English version available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3094
  4. ↑ The French Commercial Code in English 2005, Philip Raworth translator, 2005, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, Inc.
  5. ↑ See the Drapo Software case, details from the French Competition Council, at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=185&id_article=542
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