Canada (August 23, 2000)

Score = 24

Governed by: Competition Act of 23 August 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).

Category	Subcategory	Score	Comment
Scope	Extraterritoriality	1	§92 gives the Tribunal power over any merger (domestic or foreign) that has an effect in Canada. §46 also extends the reach of the statute to encompass foreign directives towards companies doing business in Canada.
Remedies	Fines	1	Numerous provisions provide for fines, including §79 (1) for abuse of dominance, §47 for bid rigging, and §45(1) for restrictive agreements.
	Prison Sentences	1	§45(1) allows prison sentences for restrictive agreements. §47 allows prison sentences for bid-rigging. §61(9) allows prison sentences for resale price maintenance.
	Divestitures	1	§92 allows the Tribunal to dissolve companies formed by impermissible mergers. §79(2) allows for divestitures if a near-monopoly is engaging in anti-competitive practices and other remedies are unlikely to restore competition.
Private Enforcement	3rd Party Initiation	1	§36(1)(a) states that any person who suffered loss due to a violation of §45-§62 can initiate a private suit in any “competent jurisdiction.”
	Remedies Available to 3rd Parties	1	§36(1) provides for monetary remedies to third party initiators.
	3rd Party Rights in Proceedings	0
Merger Notification	Voluntary	0
	Mandatory	3	§114 requires pre-merger notification for large mergers.
	Pre-merger	2	§114 requires pre-merger notification for large mergers.
	Post-merger	0
Merger Assessment	Dominance	1	§92 makes market share part of the merger assessment, though not sufficient in itself.
	Restriction of Competition	1	§92 allows Tribunal to issue a remedial order to any merger that is likely to prevent competition.
	Public Interest (Pro D)	1	§93 allows Tribunal to allow otherwise impermissible merger due to international competitiveness considerations.
	Public Interest (Pro Authority)	0
	Other	1	§93(b) allows the Tribunal to consider business failure in merger calculus.
	Efficiency	1	§96 contains an exception for mergers that are likely to bring about gains in efficiency.
Dominance	Limits Access	1	§78(e) prohibits “pre-emption of scarce facilities or resources . . . with the object of withholding the facilities or resources from a market.”
	Abusive Acts	1	§78 and 79 prohibit abuse of a dominant position.
	Price Setting	1	§50(1)(b) makes price setting (too low) a criminal offense.
	Discriminatory Pricing	1	§50(1)(a) makes discriminatory pricing a criminal offense.
	Resale Price Maintenance	1	§61(1) prohibits resale price maintenance.
	Obstacles to Entry	1	§78 prohibits anti-competitive acts that prevent market entry.
	Efficiency Defense	1	§79(4) allows the Commission to consider whether a dominant party's competition-limiting practices stem from better competitive performance.
Restrictive Trade Practices	Price Fixing	1	§45 makes price setting to lessen competition a criminal offense.
	Tying	1	§77 prohibits tying arrangements.
	Market Division	0
	Output Restraint	1	§45 makes output restraint to lessen competition a criminal offense.
	Market Sharing	0
	Eliminating Competitors	1	§50(1)(c) makes practices with the effect of eliminating a competitor a criminal offense.
	Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging	1	§47 makes bid rigging a criminal offense.
	Supply Refusal	1	§61(6) makes inducing a supply refusal a criminal offense.
	Efficiency Defense	1	§85-90 allow the Commissioner to take into account gains in efficiency in very limited circumstances when evaluating the prohibited practices.