Honduras 2006: Difference between revisions

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'''Score = 19 '''
'''Score = 20 '''


''Governed by:'' The Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, Decree no. 527-2005 of November 26, 2005, entered into force in January 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>Own translation of Competition Act, as available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21326341~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html; for secondary source analysis in English, see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21326314~menuPK:2137514~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html</ref>
''Governed by:'' The Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, Decree No. 527-2005 of November 26, 2005, entered into force in January 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>Own translation of Competition Act, as available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21326341~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html; for secondary source analysis in English, see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21326314~menuPK:2137514~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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| Merger Notification
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| Voluntary
| 1
| 0
| Article 20 allow for voluntary notification of concentrations.
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 0
| 3
|  
| Article 13 requires mandatory notification of intended concentrations although prior verification is generally voluntary.
|-
|-
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| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 2
| Article 20 allows for voluntary notification of concentrations before realization. The Competition Authority has 3 years to challenge any realized concentrations of which it was not voluntarily notified beforehand (Article 22).   
| Article 13 requires notification to be pre-merger.   
|-
|-
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Article 25(2) mandates that market power and degree of concentration be taken into account when determining which concentrations shall be challenged or sanctioned.
| Article 16(1) requires market share of the agents involved in the concentration to be assessed regarding compliance with the law.
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article 19 prohibits mergers that have the effect of impeding competition.
| Article 12 prohibits concentrations that have the purpose or effect of restricting, reducing, damaging or preventing competition.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Other
| Other
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 16(4) allows the authority to assess the need for the economic concentration as the only choice to prevent the involved agents' exit from the market.
|-
|-
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| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 1
| 1
| Article 19 allows for an efficiency defense if the concentration would yield certain benefits like increasing the production or distribution of goods and services, promoting technical or economic progress or driving the competitive development of an industry or sector.
| Article 12 allows for an efficiency defense for concentrations that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Article 14(5) prohibits “unilateral action consisting in refusing to sell or provide, to certain persons, goods or services.
| Article 7(7) prohibits contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that limit the production, distribution or technological development by an operator to the detriment of other operators or consumers.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 0
| Article 11(1) prohibits prices setting.
|  


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 0
| Article 8(7) of the Monopoly Decree of 1998 prohibited discriminatory pricing.<ref>http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCOMPLEGALDB/Resources/500.pdf</ref> Article 14 of the Competition Act prohibits general discriminatory practices.
|
|-
|-
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| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 1
| Article 14(2) prohibits resale price maintenance
| Article 7(2) prohibits resale price maintenance.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 0
| Article 14(7) prohibits predatory actions taken to prevent a potential competitor from entering the market.
|  
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 4-A allows for a defense if the act, agreement, partnership, association or contract gives rise to increased economic efficiency and is not detrimental to the consumer.
| Article 9 allows agreements or behaviors that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare offseting the negative impact on free competition.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(1) of the Act prohibits price fixing.
| Article 5(1) states that price fixing is illegal per se.
|-
|-
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| Tying
| Tying
| 1
| 1
| Article 14(3) prohibits tying arrangements.
| Article 7(4) prohibits tying.  
|-
|-
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| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(3) prohibits market division.
| Article 7(1) prohibits market division.
|-
|-
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| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(2) prohibits output restraint.
| Article 5(2) makes contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that restrict all or part of the production, distribution, marketing or supply of goods or services illegal per se.
|-
|-
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| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
| 1
| 1
| Article 14(1) prohibits market sharing.
| Article 5(3) states that market sharing is illegal per se.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 0
| Article 14(7) prohibits predatory actions taken to squeeze a competitor out of a market.
|  
|-
|-
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| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(4) prohibits bid rigging.
| Article 5(4) states that acting in concert to either participate or abstain from tenders, quotations or public auctions is illegal per se.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 5(2) makes contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that restrict all or part of the production, distribution, marketing or supply of goods or services illegal per se.
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 4-A allows for a defense if the act, agreement, partnership, association or contract gives rise to increased economic efficiency and is not detrimental to the consumer.
| Article 9 allows agreements or behaviors that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare offseting the negative impact on free competition.
|}
|}

Latest revision as of 20:55, 3 February 2009

Score = 20

Governed by: The Law for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, Decree No. 527-2005 of November 26, 2005, entered into force in January 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)[1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article 4[2] states that the scope of the law extends to those whose activities have an effect within the national territory of Honduras.
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 37-39, 41 deal with fines.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Article 19(1) allows total or partial divestitures of improper mergers.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Article 49 allows outside parties to file complaints with the authority.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 58 allows all concerned parties to seek damages through civil actions.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 13 requires mandatory notification of intended concentrations although prior verification is generally voluntary.
Pre-merger 2 Article 13 requires notification to be pre-merger.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 16(1) requires market share of the agents involved in the concentration to be assessed regarding compliance with the law.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 12 prohibits concentrations that have the purpose or effect of restricting, reducing, damaging or preventing competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 1 Article 16(4) allows the authority to assess the need for the economic concentration as the only choice to prevent the involved agents' exit from the market.
Efficiency 1 Article 12 allows for an efficiency defense for concentrations that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 7(7) prohibits contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that limit the production, distribution or technological development by an operator to the detriment of other operators or consumers.
Abusive Acts 0
Price Setting 0
Discriminatory Pricing 0
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Article 7(2) prohibits resale price maintenance.
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 9 allows agreements or behaviors that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare offseting the negative impact on free competition.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 5(1) states that price fixing is illegal per se.
Tying 1 Article 7(4) prohibits tying.
Market Division 1 Article 7(1) prohibits market division.
Output Restraint 1 Article 5(2) makes contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that restrict all or part of the production, distribution, marketing or supply of goods or services illegal per se.
Market Sharing 1 Article 5(3) states that market sharing is illegal per se.
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Article 5(4) states that acting in concert to either participate or abstain from tenders, quotations or public auctions is illegal per se.
Supply Refusal 1 Article 5(2) makes contracts, agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that restrict all or part of the production, distribution, marketing or supply of goods or services illegal per se.
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 9 allows agreements or behaviors that generate increases in economic efficiency and consumer welfare offseting the negative impact on free competition.

References