Vietnam (July 1, 2005): Difference between revisions
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updated page, since English translation of statute has become available. |
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'''Score = | '''Score = 22''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Competition Law of 4 November 2004 (came into force 1 July 2005) ( | ''Governed by:'' Competition Law of 4 November 2004 (came into force 1 July 2005) ("Competition Law").<ref>Available online at the Asian Development Bank's website, at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-Toolkits/Competition-Law/documents/VN_Order_23_2004.pdf</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| Line 11: | Line 11: | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | Extraterritoriality | ||
| 0 | | 0 | ||
| | | Article 2 of the Competition Law regulates unhealthy competitive practices and practices in restraint of competition by all businesses in Vietnam, including 'foreign enterprises operating in Vietnam.' | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Remedies | | Remedies | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 118 allows fines of up to 10% of annual turnover for violations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 29: | Line 29: | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 117(3) unlawful mergers may be undone and structural remedies may be forced on companies abusing a dominant position. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 35: | Line 35: | ||
| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 58, any party that believes its legal rights and interests have been infringed due to a breach of the Competition Law can submit a complaint to the Competition Commission. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 117(3) provides that violators whose actions have harmed others must pay compensation. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | | 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings<ref>While third parties are given many rights in proceedings, if they bring proceedings and competition violations are ''not'' discovered, under Article 63, the complainant will have to pay the case-handling charges. Under Article 62, if administrative procedures initiated by a complaint cause damage to an innocent accused party, the complainant must pay damages.</ref> | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Numerous provisions of the statute, among them articles 61, 64, 66, 67, 71, 104, and 107, afford third parties participation and evidentiary rights in proceedings. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 59: | Line 59: | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| | | Under Article 20, if the parties to a merger have a combined market share of between 30% and 50% of the relevant market, they must notify the Competition Commission before the proposed merger. Mergers between companies with larger market share are generally prohibited. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 65: | Line 65: | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| 2 | | 2 | ||
| | | See above. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 77: | Line 77: | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 18, mergers resulting in greater than 50% market share are usually prohibited | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 19, otherwise prohibited mergers may be allowed if they contribute to exports, or if they contribute to socioeconomic progress. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 101: | Line 101: | ||
| Other | | Other | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 19(1), the Competition Commission may grant a business failure exemption if one or more of the parties to the merger is at risk of being dissolved or declared bankrupt. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 107: | Line 107: | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Under Article 19(2), the Competition Commission may grant an exemption if the merger has the effect of contributing to technical progress. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 13(3) prohibits a dominant party from limiting production. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 119: | Line 119: | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| An enterprise in a monopoly market position may not impose disadvantageous conditions on customers or abuse its monopoly position to unilaterally change or rescind a signed contract without a legitimate reason. | | Under Articles 14(2) and 14(3), An enterprise in a monopoly market position may not impose disadvantageous conditions on customers or abuse its monopoly position to unilaterally change or rescind a signed contract without a legitimate reason. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 125: | Line 125: | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 13(1)(low prices) and 13(2)(high prices) bans price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 13(4) bans discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 137: | Line 137: | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 13(2) bans RPM. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 143: | Line 143: | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 13(1) bans using predatory pricing to drive competition from the market. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 149: | Line 149: | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| 0 | | 0 | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices<ref>Under Article 8, which governs restrictive trade practices, the regulations on price fixing, market distribution, output restraint, restricting technical development, and tying only apply to groups of enterprises with a combined market share of 30% or more. However, the bans on agreements for bid-rigging, obstacles to entry, and elimination of competition apply across the board.</ref> | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 8(1) bans price-fixing agreements. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 161: | Line 160: | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 8(5) and 13(5) ban tying by groups of enterprises and a single dominant enterprise, respectively. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 8(2) bans market division. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 173: | Line 172: | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 8(3) and 8(4) ban the restriction of output and technical development. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Sharing | | Market Sharing | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 185: | Line 184: | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 8(6) and 8(7) ban agreements to eliminate competitors or create obstacles to entry. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 191: | Line 190: | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 8(8) bans bid-rigging. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 203: | Line 202: | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 10 allows for an efficiency defense for otherwise forbidden practices. | ||
|} | |} | ||
Latest revision as of 22:06, 12 August 2008
Score = 22
Governed by: Competition Law of 4 November 2004 (came into force 1 July 2005) ("Competition Law").[1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | Article 2 of the Competition Law regulates unhealthy competitive practices and practices in restraint of competition by all businesses in Vietnam, including 'foreign enterprises operating in Vietnam.' |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 118 allows fines of up to 10% of annual turnover for violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Under Article 117(3) unlawful mergers may be undone and structural remedies may be forced on companies abusing a dominant position. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Under Article 58, any party that believes its legal rights and interests have been infringed due to a breach of the Competition Law can submit a complaint to the Competition Commission. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 117(3) provides that violators whose actions have harmed others must pay compensation. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings[2] | 1 | Numerous provisions of the statute, among them articles 61, 64, 66, 67, 71, 104, and 107, afford third parties participation and evidentiary rights in proceedings. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Under Article 20, if the parties to a merger have a combined market share of between 30% and 50% of the relevant market, they must notify the Competition Commission before the proposed merger. Mergers between companies with larger market share are generally prohibited. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | See above. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Under Article 18, mergers resulting in greater than 50% market share are usually prohibited |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Under Article 19, otherwise prohibited mergers may be allowed if they contribute to exports, or if they contribute to socioeconomic progress. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | Under Article 19(1), the Competition Commission may grant a business failure exemption if one or more of the parties to the merger is at risk of being dissolved or declared bankrupt. | |
| Efficiency | 1 | Under Article 19(2), the Competition Commission may grant an exemption if the merger has the effect of contributing to technical progress. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 13(3) prohibits a dominant party from limiting production. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Under Articles 14(2) and 14(3), An enterprise in a monopoly market position may not impose disadvantageous conditions on customers or abuse its monopoly position to unilaterally change or rescind a signed contract without a legitimate reason. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Articles 13(1)(low prices) and 13(2)(high prices) bans price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 13(4) bans discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Article 13(2) bans RPM. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 13(1) bans using predatory pricing to drive competition from the market. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices[3] | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 8(1) bans price-fixing agreements. |
| Tying | 1 | Articles 8(5) and 13(5) ban tying by groups of enterprises and a single dominant enterprise, respectively. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 8(2) bans market division. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Articles 8(3) and 8(4) ban the restriction of output and technical development. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Articles 8(6) and 8(7) ban agreements to eliminate competitors or create obstacles to entry. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 8(8) bans bid-rigging. | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 10 allows for an efficiency defense for otherwise forbidden practices. |
References
- ↑ Available online at the Asian Development Bank's website, at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-Toolkits/Competition-Law/documents/VN_Order_23_2004.pdf
- ↑ While third parties are given many rights in proceedings, if they bring proceedings and competition violations are not discovered, under Article 63, the complainant will have to pay the case-handling charges. Under Article 62, if administrative procedures initiated by a complaint cause damage to an innocent accused party, the complainant must pay damages.
- ↑ Under Article 8, which governs restrictive trade practices, the regulations on price fixing, market distribution, output restraint, restricting technical development, and tying only apply to groups of enterprises with a combined market share of 30% or more. However, the bans on agreements for bid-rigging, obstacles to entry, and elimination of competition apply across the board.