Austria (January 1, 2006): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 0''' ''Governed by:'' TitleOfAct of DateOfAct, amended by TitleOfAmendment DateOfAmendment (herein referred to as "ShortTitle").<ref>[http://translate.google.com/translate?u=ht... |
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'''Score = | '''Score = 19''' | ||
''Governed by:'' | ''Governed by:'' The New Act (Kartellgesetz 2005) (herein referred to as "Competition Act").<ref>Based on changes from [http://www.bwb.gv.at/BWB/Gesetze/Kartellgesetz/default.htm The New Act (Kartellgesetz 2005 - KartG 2005) KARTG 2005]</ref><ref>[http://translate.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bwb.gv.at%2FBWB%2FGesetze%2FKartellgesetz%2Fdefault.htm&langpair=de%7Cen&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&prev=%2Flanguage_tools Google Translation]</ref><ref>http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/austria.cfm</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Scope | | [[Index_Definitions#Scope|Scope]] | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | [[Index_Definitions#Extraterritoriality|Extraterritoriality]] | ||
| 0 | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
| Remedies | | Remedies | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Prohibited undertakings involved may be subject to fines.<ref>http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/austria.cfm</ref> | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Collusive tendering constitutes a criminal offence under section 168b Criminal Code and is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 58: | Line 58: | ||
| | | | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| | | 3 | ||
| | | §9(1) requires merger notification in certain instances. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| | | 2 | ||
| | | Secondary source states that mergers must not be implemented before clearance.<ref>http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/591.pdf</ref> | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 76: | Line 76: | ||
| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Cartel Court will assess whether the proposed concentration will create or strengthen a dominant position in the relevant market. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 88: | Line 88: | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration is indispensable to the international competitiveness of the undertakings concerned and justifiable on macroeconomic grounds. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 106: | Line 106: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration will improve competition in the market in such a way that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §5(1) prohibits limiting markets to the detriment of consumers. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §5(1)(3) A dominant firm may not disadvantage contracting parties by the application of different conditions with equivalent achievements. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §5(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of inadequate purchase or selling prices. Moreover, §5(1)(5) prohibits predatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | 5(1) prohibits discrimination by way of imposing different contractual conditions to similar transactions. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 142: | Line 142: | ||
| | | | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §4(1)(2) prohibits a dominant firm from limiting other firms from admission into the market. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 154: | Line 154: | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §1(2)(1) prohibits agreements against setting prices directly or indirectly. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §1(2)(5) prohibits conditions attached to the conclusion of contracts that the contracting parties accept additional achievements which are not related to the contractual item. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 172: | Line 172: | ||
| | | | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §1(2)(2) prohibits agreements restricting or controlling production. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Sharing | | Market Sharing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §1(2)(3) prohibit agreements that share markets or sources of supply. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §1(2)(4) prohibits the application of different conditions with equivalent trade partners, whereby these are disadvantaged in competition. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Bid-rigging is prohibited. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 202: | Line 202: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §2(1) provides an exception for agreements that contribute to the promotion of technical or economic progress. | ||
|} | |} | ||
Latest revision as of 12:19, 11 September 2007
Score = 19
Governed by: The New Act (Kartellgesetz 2005) (herein referred to as "Competition Act").[1][2][3]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Prohibited undertakings involved may be subject to fines.[4] |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Collusive tendering constitutes a criminal offence under section 168b Criminal Code and is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. | |
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §9(1) requires merger notification in certain instances. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Secondary source states that mergers must not be implemented before clearance.[5] | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Cartel Court will assess whether the proposed concentration will create or strengthen a dominant position in the relevant market. |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration is indispensable to the international competitiveness of the undertakings concerned and justifiable on macroeconomic grounds. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration will improve competition in the market in such a way that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | §5(1) prohibits limiting markets to the detriment of consumers. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §5(1)(3) A dominant firm may not disadvantage contracting parties by the application of different conditions with equivalent achievements. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §5(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of inadequate purchase or selling prices. Moreover, §5(1)(5) prohibits predatory pricing. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | 5(1) prohibits discrimination by way of imposing different contractual conditions to similar transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | §4(1)(2) prohibits a dominant firm from limiting other firms from admission into the market. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §1(2)(1) prohibits agreements against setting prices directly or indirectly. |
| Tying | 1 | §1(2)(5) prohibits conditions attached to the conclusion of contracts that the contracting parties accept additional achievements which are not related to the contractual item. | |
| Market Division | 1 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §1(2)(2) prohibits agreements restricting or controlling production. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | §1(2)(3) prohibit agreements that share markets or sources of supply. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | §1(2)(4) prohibits the application of different conditions with equivalent trade partners, whereby these are disadvantaged in competition. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Bid-rigging is prohibited. | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §2(1) provides an exception for agreements that contribute to the promotion of technical or economic progress. |