Russia (July 26, 2006): Difference between revisions
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| Remedies | | Remedies | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
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| | | Article 51(3) requires companies violating the monopoly rules to transfer their ill-gotten gains to the state. Additionally, Russian Federal Law No.45-FZ<ref>Unofficial translation ofthe statute available at the Antimonopoly Service website, at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/12479.shtml</ref> provides fines for various anticompetitive activities. | ||
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| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| Article | | Article 27 requires that very large companies seek approval before merging. | ||
|- | |- | ||
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| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| | | 2 | ||
| | | Article 27 requires that very large companies seek approval before merging. Article 30 requires post-merger notification for smaller companies. | ||
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| Post-merger | | Post-merger | ||
| | | 0 | ||
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|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 33(2)(5) states that the Authority will examine whether the merger will result in strengthening of a dominant position. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 33(2)(5) states that the Authority will examine whether the merger will result in a restriction of competition. | ||
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| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 10(1)(2) prohibits removing goods from the market to drive prices up. | ||
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| Tying | | Tying | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Article | | Article 11(1)(5) prohibits imposing on a counterparty contractual terms which are unprofitable for the latter or not connected with the subject of agreement. | ||
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| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | |Article 17 prohibits collusive tendering. | ||
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Latest revision as of 16:53, 23 June 2008
Score = 22
Governed by: Law no. 135 on the Protection of Competition, 26 July 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3 extends the sphere of application to foreign entities whose agreements lead or can lead to restriction of competition in the Russian Federation. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 51(3) requires companies violating the monopoly rules to transfer their ill-gotten gains to the state. Additionally, Russian Federal Law No.45-FZ[2] provides fines for various anticompetitive activities. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 38(1) gives the Authority the right to take decision on forced division of organizations in violation of the Competition Act or decision on separation of one or several organizations from them. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 39(2)(2) states that the Authority may initiate proceedings based on an application from a legal person or a natural person. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 43 gives persons participating in the case (including the 3rd party initiator) to have the right to familiarize themselves with the materials of the case. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 27 requires that very large companies seek approval before merging. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 27 requires that very large companies seek approval before merging. Article 30 requires post-merger notification for smaller companies. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 33(2)(5) states that the Authority will examine whether the merger will result in strengthening of a dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 33(2)(5) states that the Authority will examine whether the merger will result in a restriction of competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 10(1)(2) prohibits removing goods from the market to drive prices up. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | The language of Article 10(1) suggests the enumerated lists of prohibitions is not exhaustive, and therefore, includes other abusive acts. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 6 prohibits a dominant firm from setting a price that exceeds the competitive market price. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 10(1)(6) prohibits economically, technologically or in any other way unjustified establishment of different prices. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 10(1)(9) prohibits creation of barriers to entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 13(1)(1) provides a defense where the practice leads to economic progress. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 11(1)(2) prohibits agreements for raising, lowering, or maintaining of prices. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 11(1)(5) prohibits imposing on a counterparty contractual terms which are unprofitable for the latter or not connected with the subject of agreement. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 11(1)(3) prohibits division of the commodity market according to the territorial principle, the volume of sales or purchases of commodities, the range of sold products or composition of sellers or purchasers. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 11(1)(7) prohibits agreements causing the reduction or cutting off the production of commodities for which there is a demand. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 11(1)(9) prohibits agreements leading to the restriction or elimination of competition. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 17 prohibits collusive tendering. | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 13(1)(1) provides a defense where the practice leads to economic progress. |
References
- ↑ http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/8955.shtml
- ↑ Unofficial translation ofthe statute available at the Antimonopoly Service website, at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/12479.shtml