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| == Albania 2003 Public Interest Pro-D == | | == Algeria 2003 Obstacles to Entry == |
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| Does this sound like a public interest (or efficiency) defense to you? | | ''Below is Algeria's definition of dominance (using Google Translator). Does this sound like obstacles to entry language? Perhaps we should have a translator look at it.'' |
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| 2. Commission may not prohibit concentrations where one of the undertakings risks
| | Article 3(c) - Dominant Position: the position allowing a company to hold, on the market in question, a position of economic power which '''gives him the capacity to make obstacle with the maintenance of an effective competition''', by providing him the possibility of independent behaviors in an appreciable measurement with respect to its competitors, of its customers or its suppliers; |
| seriously a failure, there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the concentration, when:
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| a) this undertaking is in such a situation that without the concentration it would
| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:01, 11 September 2007 (EDT) |
| exit the market in the near future;
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| b) there is no serious prospects of reorganizing the activity of this undertaking.
| | == Algeria 2000 Tying == |
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 12:57, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
| | ''One of the criteria for establishing a dominant position includes being able to create advantageous contractual bonds. Would this just be another abusive act prohibition, or tying under RTP? Or should this be nothing since it's just establishing what is a dominant position and doesn't say it's an abusive act? The text below was translated with Google.'' |
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| | Article 2 - The criteria of determination of the dominant position of an economic agent on a market or a market segment of goods or services are in particular: financial, contractual bonds or in fact which bind the economic agent to one or more economic agents and which get advantages of any nature to him; |
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| I'd ask Hylton about this one. This is the case of when there are two firms, and one will perish if it isn't allowed to merge with the other. Not strictly an efficiency defense, because it won't advance technology, the market, etc.
| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 08:08, 11 September 2007 (EDT) |
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| Not public interest, either. Maybe it belongs under "Other."
| | == Egypt 2005 - Collusive Tendering == |
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:42, 21 June 2007 (EDT) | | Article 6(c) - "Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement." |
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| | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 00:49, 8 October 2007 (EDT) |
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| Discussed with Hylton and he said that this "Business Failure" defense should be included as a comment to "Restriction of Trade". Moreover, he suggested refining the definitions so Efficiency Defense is for benefiting economic cost and public interest is for things like international competitiveness, minority ownership, income distribution, unemployment, national security and the environment. We should keep an eye out for what else is included under "Other."
| | == Egypt 2005 - Defenses == |
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:17, 22 June 2007 (EDT)
| | '''Article 9''' |
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| | The provisions of this Law shall not apply to public utilities managed by the State. |
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| However, the Albania statute does not include "Restriction of Trade" in their merger assessment. Is it still appropriate to include "Business Failure" as a comment there?
| | The Authority may, upon the request of the concerned parties, exempt some or all the acts provided for in articles 6 [on Restrictive Trade Practices], 7 [on Restrictive Trade Practices] and 8 [on Dominance] regarding public utilities that are managed by companies subject to the Private Law where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. This shall be done in accordance with the regulations and procedures set out by the Executive Regulation of this Law. |
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:56, 22 June 2007 (EDT) | | --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 00:58, 8 October 2007 (EDT) |
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| == Armenia 2000 Extraterritoriality ==
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| Sounds to me like the scope extends to foreign companies that have an effect on Armenia:
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| Article 2. The Subject Governed by the Law
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| 1. The present Law shall apply to those activities and conduct of economic entities, government
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| and local government administration bodies, which might result in the restriction, prevention
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| and distortion of competition or in acts of unfair competition, except where otherwise stipulated
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| by law.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:18, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| I'd ask Hylton. It doesn't restrict application to the state, nor does it explicitly extend it to foreign firms. With this kind of language, my guess is that extraterritoriality applies.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:45, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Discussed with Hylton. He said where it does not explicitly allow extraterritoriality, we should not infer it.
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:17, 22 June 2007 (EDT)
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| == Armenia 2000 Output Restraint and Big-Rigging ==
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| Would this include output restraint and big-rigging?
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| Article 5. Anti-competitive Agreements and Prohibition of Anti-competitive Agreements
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| 1. In the context of the present Law, anti-competitive agreements are contracts and agreements
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| concluded between economic entities or their concerted practices (hereinafter referred to as
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| “agreements”), which might result in the restriction, prevention, prohibition of competition. These are the . . . (b) '''artificial increase, decrease or maintenance of prices''' on the commodity markets;
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:32, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| My call: Output restraint, Yes. Big-rigging, No.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:46, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Discussed with Hylton. He said the statute cited only applies to price fixing and not output restraint and bid-rigging. For those two, we should stick to locating specific language. However, the statute does include language indicated an efficiency defense (Art. 5(2)) and prohibits market sharing (Art. 5(1)(c)).
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 13:17, 22 June 2007 (EDT)
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| == Argentina 1999 Divestures ==
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| This is translated from Spanish, but it sounds to me like it allows for divestures.
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| Article 46(c) "Without damage of other sanctions that will be able to correspond, when acts are verified that constitute abuse of dominant position or when it is stated that it has acquired itself or consolidated a monopolistic or oligopolical position in violation of the dispositions of this law, the '''Court will be able to impose the fulfillment of conditions that aim to neutralize the distorsivos aspects on the competition or to ask for the competent judge who the infractoras companies are dissolved, eliminated, dispersed or divided''';"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 17:16, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Absolutely. "Dissolved," "dispersed," and "divided" all sound like divestitures to me.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:47, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| == Argentina 1999 3rd Party Initiation ==
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| Again, translated from Spanish. This seems to allow 3rd Party Initiation:
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| Article 26 -"The procedure will begin of office or by denunciation made '''by any physical or legal, public or deprived person'''."
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 17:27, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| "Deprived" person? Google may have translated this wrong. Maybe the term for "private" also means deprived? Based on this, it certainly looks like it's leaning towards private initiation.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:49, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| I should have clarified this. Based on the rest of the text, I think "deprived person" means "injured party."
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 09:16, 22 June 2007 (EDT)
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| == Argentina 1999 Remedies Available to 3rd Parties ==
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| Sounds like it allows damages for 3rd parties:
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| Article 51, "The physical '''people or legal victims by the acts prohibited by this law, will be able to exert the action for damages''' of damages and damages as the norms of the common right, before the competent judge in that matter."
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 17:39, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Agreed.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:49, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| == Argentina 1999 3rd Party Rights ==
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| Seems like they're saying that people who are affected by the anti-competitive firm have a right to evidence (the investigated facts):
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| Article 42, "The Court will be able to give intervention like helping part in the procedures that are abridged before he himself, the '''affected ones of the investigated facts''', to the associations of consumers and associations legally recognized industralists, to the provinces and '''all other person who can have a legitimate interest in the investigated facts.'''"
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| --[[User:AchalOza|AchalOza]] 17:43, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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| Agreed.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 17:50, 21 June 2007 (EDT)
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Algeria 2003 Obstacles to Entry
Below is Algeria's definition of dominance (using Google Translator). Does this sound like obstacles to entry language? Perhaps we should have a translator look at it.
Article 3(c) - Dominant Position: the position allowing a company to hold, on the market in question, a position of economic power which gives him the capacity to make obstacle with the maintenance of an effective competition, by providing him the possibility of independent behaviors in an appreciable measurement with respect to its competitors, of its customers or its suppliers;
--AchalOza 08:01, 11 September 2007 (EDT)
Algeria 2000 Tying
One of the criteria for establishing a dominant position includes being able to create advantageous contractual bonds. Would this just be another abusive act prohibition, or tying under RTP? Or should this be nothing since it's just establishing what is a dominant position and doesn't say it's an abusive act? The text below was translated with Google.
Article 2 - The criteria of determination of the dominant position of an economic agent on a market or a market segment of goods or services are in particular: financial, contractual bonds or in fact which bind the economic agent to one or more economic agents and which get advantages of any nature to him;
--AchalOza 08:08, 11 September 2007 (EDT)
Egypt 2005 - Collusive Tendering
Article 6(c) - "Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement."
--AchalOza 00:49, 8 October 2007 (EDT)
Egypt 2005 - Defenses
Article 9
The provisions of this Law shall not apply to public utilities managed by the State.
The Authority may, upon the request of the concerned parties, exempt some or all the acts provided for in articles 6 [on Restrictive Trade Practices], 7 [on Restrictive Trade Practices] and 8 [on Dominance] regarding public utilities that are managed by companies subject to the Private Law where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. This shall be done in accordance with the regulations and procedures set out by the Executive Regulation of this Law.
--AchalOza 00:58, 8 October 2007 (EDT)