Hong Kong (May 1998): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 10''' ''Governed by:'' The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Policy”). <ref>Competition ... |
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'''Score = | '''Score = 11''' | ||
''Governed by:'' The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Policy”). | ''Governed by:'' The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Policy”). | ||
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| | | Hong Kong has laws specific to the telecom industry allowing voluntary merger notification.<ref>[New merger control regime for Hong Kong telecoms sector http://www.freshfields.com/sector/comms-media/publications/pdfs/6164.pdf</ref> | ||
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| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
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| | | Article 6(d) prohibits members of a trade or professional body from intending to deny newcomers a chance to enter or contest in the market. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:39, 9 September 2007
Score = 11
Governed by: The Competition Policy Advisory Group Statement on Competition Policy, May 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Policy”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 0 | |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | Hong Kong has laws specific to the telecom industry allowing voluntary merger notification.[2] |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 7 considers abuse of a dominant market position that which limits market access. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 7 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 7(a) lists predatory pricing as an example of an abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 0 | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Article 7(b) lists RPM as an example of an abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | The Article 7 prohibitions are dependant on the practice resulting in economic inefficiencies. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 6(a) says price fixing is illegal when it restricts competition. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 7(c) lists RPM as a possibly illegal practice. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 6(b) says that market allocation may be illegal. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 6(b) says that sales and production quotas may be illegal. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 6(d) prohibits members of a trade or professional body from intending to deny newcomers a chance to enter or contest in the market. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 6(b) says that bid rigging may be illegal. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 6(c) says that group boycotts are impermissible when they impair economic efficiency. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | The Article 6 prohibitions are only in force if they have negative effects on efficiency. |
References
- ↑ Competition Policy Advisory Group website, http://www.compag.gov.hk/about/
- ↑ [New merger control regime for Hong Kong telecoms sector http://www.freshfields.com/sector/comms-media/publications/pdfs/6164.pdf