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| Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as "Cartel Act").<ref>Austrian Competition Act, ''Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland'', 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).</ref>
| | *[[Austria (January 1, 2006)]]<ref>Based on changes from [http://www.bwb.gv.at/BWB/Gesetze/Kartellgesetz/default.htm The New Act (Kartellgesetz 2005 - KartG 2005) KARTG 2005]</ref> |
| | *[[Austria (January 1, 2000)]]<ref>History of Austrian competition law legislation: http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/europe.htm#austria</ref> |
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| {| class="wikitable" border="1 "
| | <h1 style="margin:0; font-size:155%;text-align:left; color:#666; padding:0.2em 0.2em;">EU law</h1> |
| |-
| | * [[Austria/EU, 2006]]<ref>As a member of the EU, Austria is obliged to apply EU competition law in some circumstances, but not when anticompetitive practices and effects are limited to the national market. This coding represents how the national authorities would apply EU Law in the national courts.</ref> |
| ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment
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| | |
| |-
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| | Scope
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| | Extraterritoriality
| |
| | 1
| |
| | § 6(1) of the Cartel Act applies to behavior in a foreign country in so far as it affects the domestic market.
| |
| | |
| |-
| |
| | Remedies
| |
| | Fines
| |
| | 1
| |
| | § 129-133 provide for violations of the Cartel Act to be sanctioned with fines.
| |
| | |
| |-
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| |
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| | Prison sentences
| |
| | 1
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| | § 129(1) also provides for imprisonment for up to 3 years in certain cases.
| |
| | |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Divestitures
| |
| | 0
| |
| |
| |
| | |
| |-
| |
| | Private Enforcement
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| | 3rd party initiation
| |
| | 1
| |
| | A 3rd party can bring a claim against anything that is based on § 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG)
| |
| | |
| |-
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| |
| |
| | Remedies available to 3rd parties
| |
| | 1
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| | A 3rd party can assert civil claims IF they have suffered a damage caused by a punishable act.
| |
|
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| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | 3rd party rights in proceedings
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| | 0
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| | 3rd parties are not entitled to request a 2nd phase investigation or challenge decisions of the court and have no access to evidence.
| |
| | |
| |-
| |
| | Merger Notification
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| | Voluntary
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| | 0
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| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Mandatory
| |
| | 3
| |
| | § 42a(1) says if the companies made a certain combined income in the previous year, they must apply to the cartel court.
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Pre-merger
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| | 0
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| |
| |
|
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| |-
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| |
| | Post-merger
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| | 1
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| | §42a(5) says that the Cartel Court shall determine whether the concentration WAS implemented in a prohibited manner (sounds like post…)
| |
|
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| |-
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| | Merger Assessment
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| | Dominance
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| | 1
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| | §42b(2)(2) The Cartel Court shall prohibit the concentration if it will strengthen the market dominating position.
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|
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| |-
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| |
| |
| | Restriction of competition
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
| | |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Public interest (ProD)
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| | 1
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| | The effect on the national economy and public interest is investigated when deciding whether to grant an exception (see §42b(3)).
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Public Interest (ProAuthority)
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| | 0
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| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Other
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Efficiency
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| | Dominance
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| | Limits access
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| | 1
| |
| | § 35(1)(2) prohibits the restriction of production, sales, or development to the detriment of the consumer.
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Abusive acts
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| | 1
| |
| | § 35(1) lists several punishable abusive acts.
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| | |
| |-
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| |
| |
| | Price Setting
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| | 1
| |
| | § 35(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of unreasonable prices.
| |
| | |
| |-
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| | Discriminatory pricing
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| | 1
| |
| | § 35(1)(3) identifies as abuse the placing of contractual partners at a competitive disadvantage by applying different terms for the provision of equivalent services.
| |
|
| |
| |-
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| |
| |
| | Resale price maintenance
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| | 0
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| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Obstacles to entry
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Efficiency Defense
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
| |
| | Restrictive Trade Practices
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| | Price fixing
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| | 1
| |
| | § 10(3) identifying a restraint of competition with respect to prices (not per se illegal)
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|
| |
| |-
| |
| |
| |
| | Tying
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
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| |-
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| |
| |
| | Market Division
| |
| | 1
| |
| | § 23(1) per se prohibits arrangements under which the parties agree that they shall only market certain products.
| |
|
| |
| |-
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| |
| |
| | Output restraint
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| | 1
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| | § 23 (1)(b) does not cartels that require companies to sell products in specifically restricted quantities.
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|
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| |-
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| |
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| | Market sharing
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| | 0
| |
| |
| |
|
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| |-
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| |
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| | Eliminating competitors
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| | 1
| |
| | Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1).
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|
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| |-
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| |
| |
| | Collusive tendering/bid-rigging
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| | 0
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| |
| |
|
| |
| |-
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| |
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| | Supply refusal
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| | 1
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| | § 30 prohibits supply boycotts when they cause damage. Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1)(c).
| |
|
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| |-
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| | Efficiency Defense
| |
| | 1
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| | §23(3) allows cartels when they are justified with respect to the national economy.
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| |}
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| == References == | | == References == |
| <references /> | | <references /> |