Mali (April 13, 1992): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 13''' ''Governed by:'' Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992. <ref>http://www.remed.org/ORDONANC.rtf (own trans... |
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''Governed by:'' Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992. | ''Governed by:'' Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992. | ||
<ref>http://www.remed.org/ORDONANC.rtf (own translation)</ref> | <ref>http://www.remed.org/ORDONANC.rtf (own translation)</ref><ref>[http://www.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2F64.233.169.104%2Fsearch%3Fq%3Dcache%3A-gcCQeTJg7YJ%3Awww.remed.org%2FORDONANC.rtf%26hl%3Den%26ct%3Dclnk%26cd%3D4%26gl%3Dus&langpair=fr%7Cen&hl=en&ie=UTF8 Google Translation]</ref> | ||
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| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| Art. 18 prohibits price setting | | Art. 18 prohibits price setting. Moreover, Art. 17 prohibits predatory pricing. However, there is a defense to predatory pricing where the goods are non durable or where there is a force resale. | ||
|- | |- | ||
Latest revision as of 12:19, 24 July 2007
Score = 13
Governed by: Ordonnance N°92-021/P-CTSP Instituant la Liberte des Prix et de la Concurrence, dated April 13, 1992. [1][2]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Title V provides for fines |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Art. 44 allows injured parties to initiate civil lawsuits |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Art. 44 allows injured parties to recover damages | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits limiting access |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits abuse of a dominant position | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits price setting. Moreover, Art. 17 prohibits predatory pricing. However, there is a defense to predatory pricing where the goods are non durable or where there is a force resale. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits discriminatory pricing | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Art. 17 prohibits directly or indirectly imposing a minimum sale price or a minimum margin | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits restricting free competition | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Art. 17 prohibits price fixing |
| Tying | 1 | Art. 13, 18 prohibit tying | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Art. 18 prohibits restricting free competition | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Art. 13 prohibits supply refusal | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 |
References
- ↑ http://www.remed.org/ORDONANC.rtf (own translation)
- ↑ Google Translation