Norway 1993: Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 13''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Act No. 65 of 11 June 1993 relating to Competition in Commercial Activity (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ''Governed by:'' Act No. 65 of 11 June 1993 relating to Competition in Commercial Activity (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ||
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| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §6-5 grants power to the competition authority to split-up a dominant firm. Language under §3-11(1)(c) may also provide the basis for a divestiture action shortly after a merger. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
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| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §3-1 bans price setting. | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:10, 16 July 2007
Score = 13
Governed by: Act No. 65 of 11 June 1993 relating to Competition in Commercial Activity (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | §1-5 says that the Act applies to actions which have effect or are liable to have effect in Norway. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | §6-4 and 6-6 allow fines for certain violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | §6-6 allows for imprisonment for serious violations. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | §6-5 grants power to the competition authority to split-up a dominant firm. Language under §3-11(1)(c) may also provide the basis for a divestiture action shortly after a merger. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 0 | ||
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | §3-11: The Competition Authority may intervene in a merger if it may restrict competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §3-10 bans maintaining a dominant position by use of anti-competitive methods. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §3-1 bans price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 0 | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | §3-1 prohibits RPM. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §3-9 allows an efficiency defense to price setting by dominant companies. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §3-1 prohibits price fixing. |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | §3-3 prohibits market sharing by means of area division and customer division. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 1 | §3-3 prohibits market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | §3-2 prohibits collusive tendering. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | §3-10 prohibits refusing to deal with certain undertakings. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §3-9 has an exemption to other §3 prohibitions for agreements meant to increase efficiency enough to compensate for the restriction on competition. |