Norway 2004: Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 17''' | ||
''Governed by:'' The Competition Act of 2004, Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 on competition between undertakings and control with concentrations (including amendments in Act of 17 December 2004 No. 100). | ''Governed by:'' The Competition Act of 2004, Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 on competition between undertakings and control with concentrations (including amendments in Act of 17 December 2004 No. 100). | ||
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| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §13 provides an efficiency defense. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
Latest revision as of 13:21, 12 October 2007
Score = 17
Governed by: The Competition Act of 2004, Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 on competition between undertakings and control with concentrations (including amendments in Act of 17 December 2004 No. 100). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | §5 extends the Act's reach to firms outside Norway's borders. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | §§28-29 give the Competition Authority the power to impose fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | §31 allows for imprisonment. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | §12 gives the Competition Authority the power to make "structural" changes to dominant firms where behavioral changes would not work. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §18 requires notification. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | §18 requires notification before the merger takes place. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | §16 considers whether the merger "will create or strengthen a significant restriction on competition." | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §11 generally prohibits any abusive act by a dominant firm. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §11(a) | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | §11(c) | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | §11(a) | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §13 provides an efficiency defense. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §10(a) |
| Tying | 1 | §10(e) and §11(d) | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §10(b) | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | §10(c) | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §10 grants an efficiency defense. |