Russia (October 22, 2002): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 22''' ''Governed by:'' Law on Competition and Restriction of Monopoly Activity on the Commodity Markets’ No. 948-1 of 22 March 1991 last amended 22 October 2002 (hereinafter ... |
updated the 2002 page. Used full translated statute, noted sections where laws appear, and changed scoring. Changed reference links to reference ful statute. |
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'''Score = | '''Score = 21''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Law | ''Governed by:'' Law of the RSFRF No. 948-1 on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodities Markets of 22 March 1991 (as Amended JUNE 24, 1992, МAY 25, 1995, МАY 6, 1998, January 2, 2000,December 30, 2001, march 21 and October 9, 2002). | ||
<ref> | <ref>Statute from the International Competition Network, ttp://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerrussianlaw2003.pdf </ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | Extraterritoriality | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 2 of the statute extends its reach to extraterritorial actions that affect competition in the Russian Market. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 12(2) authorizes fines. Article 23.1 allows the state to collect the income gained through monopolistic activities. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 30: | Line 30: | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Articles 12 and 19 authorize divestitures of monopolies. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 36: | Line 36: | ||
| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 27(2) allows third parties to initiate proceedings. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 42: | Line 42: | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 26 provides for civil recovery by parties injured by competition violations. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 60: | Line 60: | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| | | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| | | 2 | ||
| | | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Post-merger | | Post-merger | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 78: | Line 78: | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 17(3) states that strengthening of a dominant position is a factor against allowing a merger. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 84: | Line 84: | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 17(3) states that restriction of competition is a factor against allowing a merger. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the public benefit outweighs the competitive loss. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 107: | Line 107: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the socio economic benefit exceeds the damage to competition. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 114: | Line 114: | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(1) bans limiting access or supply. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 120: | Line 120: | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 bans abuse of a dominant position. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 126: | Line 126: | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 bans price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 132: | Line 132: | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 bans discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 144: | Line 144: | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 bans creating obstacles to entry. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 150: | Line 150: | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 permits certain otherwise impermissible activities when the socio-economic benefit is strong enough. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 156: | Line 156: | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6 bans price fixing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 168: | Line 168: | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6 bans market division. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 186: | Line 186: | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6(2) bans eliminating competitors. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 192: | Line 192: | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6 bans bid rigging. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Supply Refusal | | Supply Refusal | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6(1) bans supply refusal | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 204: | Line 204: | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 6(4) permits otherwise impermissible activity if the socio-economic benefit outweighs the harm from the activity. | ||
|} | |} | ||
Latest revision as of 21:44, 20 June 2008
Score = 21
Governed by: Law of the RSFRF No. 948-1 on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Commodities Markets of 22 March 1991 (as Amended JUNE 24, 1992, МAY 25, 1995, МАY 6, 1998, January 2, 2000,December 30, 2001, march 21 and October 9, 2002). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2 of the statute extends its reach to extraterritorial actions that affect competition in the Russian Market. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 12(2) authorizes fines. Article 23.1 allows the state to collect the income gained through monopolistic activities. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Articles 12 and 19 authorize divestitures of monopolies. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 27(2) allows third parties to initiate proceedings. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 26 provides for civil recovery by parties injured by competition violations. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 17 requires pre-merger notification by large companies. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 17(3) states that strengthening of a dominant position is a factor against allowing a merger. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 17(3) states that restriction of competition is a factor against allowing a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the public benefit outweighs the competitive loss. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 17(4) states that an otherwise impermissible merger may be allowed if the socio economic benefit exceeds the damage to competition. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 5(1) bans limiting access or supply. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 5 bans abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 5 bans price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 5 bans discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 5 bans creating obstacles to entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 5 permits certain otherwise impermissible activities when the socio-economic benefit is strong enough. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 6 bans price fixing. |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | Article 6 bans market division. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | Article 6(2) bans eliminating competitors. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 6 bans bid rigging. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 6(1) bans supply refusal | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 6(4) permits otherwise impermissible activity if the socio-economic benefit outweighs the harm from the activity. |
References
- ↑ Statute from the International Competition Network, ttp://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerrussianlaw2003.pdf