Switzerland (October 6, 1995): Difference between revisions
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New page: '''Score = 22''' ''Governed by:'' Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of 6 October 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Acart”). <ref>Competition in the EU, at 83... |
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| Article 11 allows for exceptional authorization on the grounds of compelling public interests | | Article 11 allows for exceptional authorization on the grounds of compelling public interests, including international competitiveness | ||
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| | | Article 7(2) prohibits tying arrangements | ||
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Revision as of 23:53, 3 August 2007
Score = 22
Governed by: Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition of 6 October 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Acart”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 2(2) says that Acart is applicable to anything having an effect in Switzerland. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 50-52 and 54-55 provide for fines for various violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 37(4) allows for divestiture of firms that don’t adhere to merger conditions. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 12(1) says that anybody impeded by a restraint of competition can request a removal of the obstacle or damages. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 12(1) lists various remedies available to injured 3rd parties. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 43(1) says that 3rd parties can come forward during the investigation proceedings. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 9 requires the notification of all enterprises attempting a concentration. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 9(1) specifies that this must be done before the concentration occurs. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 10(1) says if the concentration is thought to create or strengthen dominance, the merger will be investigated further. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 10(2)(a) allows denial of a merger if it threatens to eliminate effective competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 11 allows for exceptional authorization on the grounds of compelling public interests, including international competitiveness | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | Article 10(4) instructs the Commission to take into account the effects of the merger on international competition. | |
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 7(2)(a) says tat the refusal to supply or buy goods may be unlawful. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 7 lists several unlawful abusive acts. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 7(2)(c) prohibits imposition of unfair prices. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 7(2)(b) prohibits discrimination with regards to prices. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 7(1) prohibits practices that prevent other enterprises from entering or competing in the market. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 8 defines what would constitute something allowed under a compelling public interest. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 5(3)(a) deems price fixing unlawful. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 7(2) prohibits tying arrangements | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 5(3)(c) prohibits allocating markets geographically. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 5(3)(b) calls restricting the quantity of goods produced unlawful. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 5(3)(c) prohibits allocating market according to trading partners. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 8 allows exceptions to Article 5 in special cases for the purposes of public interest. |
References
- ↑ Competition in the EU, at 835-854.