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| == Netherlands 1999 - Merger assessment - Efficiency ==
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| ''Does this count?''
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| Article 47(1) - Our Minister may, after the director general has refused a licence for the
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| realisation of a concentration, decide in response to a request to that effect
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| that the licence shall be granted if, in the Minister's view, this is necessary for
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| serious reasons in the general interest, which outweigh the expected
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| restriction of competition.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 12:00, 24 July 2007 (EDT)
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| Hylton: Public interest. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 10:18, 25 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Bosnia 2005 - Merger assessment - public interest (pro-authority) / other ==
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| ''This was marked as pro-authority AND other, but I have my doubts. Doesn't look like either qualifies. I see no business failure, for example.''
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| ''Article 17''
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| ''Appraisal of Concentrations''
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| In making the assessment of intended concentration, the Council of Competition shall analyze the positive and
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| negative effects, or whether that concentration creates or strengthens dominant position which will result in the
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| significant distortion of market competition, in particular:
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| *a) the structure of the relevant market;
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| *b) the effects of the concentration concerned on other actual and potential competitors;
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| *c) the market position of parties in competition, their market shares, economic and financial power;
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| *d) alternatives available to suppliers and users;
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| *e) economic, legal and other barriers to entry to the market;
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| *f) level of internal and international competitiveness of the parties to concentration;
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| *g) supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and/or services;
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| *h) the trends of technical and economic progress;
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| *i) consumers` interests.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:05, 24 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Bosnia 2005 - RTP - Supply refusal ==
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| ''See it anywhere? The previous coder found it in this article.''
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| ''Article 4''
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| ''Agreements''
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| (1) There shall be prohibited all agreements, contracts, single provision of agreements or contracts, concerted
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| practices, explicit and tacit agreements between the undertakings, as well as decisions by associations of
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| undertakings (hereinafter: agreements) the object or effect of which is to prevent, restrict or distort market
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| competition in the relevant market, and in particular those which:
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| *a) directly or indirectly fix purchase and selling prices or any other trading conditions;
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| *b) limit or control the production, markets, technical development or investment;
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| *c) share markets or sources of supply;
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| *d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other undertakings, thereby placing them at a
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| competitive disadvantage;
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| *e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
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| which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
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| contracts.
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:15, 24 July 2007 (EDT)
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| Hylton: This is output restraint, not supply refusal. --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 10:24, 25 July 2007 (EDT)
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| == Bosnia 2005 - Predatory Pricing ==
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| ''Found one''
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| ''Act on Competition of 2005'' is supplemented by the ''Regulation on Definition of a Dominant Posision of 2006''. Article 9(c) of this by-law prohibits "fixing a price of the product or service below the production costs with the view to eliminate the competitors."
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| --[[User:JWSchneider|JWSchneider]] 16:19, 24 July 2007 (EDT)
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