Netherlands 1999: Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 21''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 6 October 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 6 October 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ||
Revision as of 12:52, 12 October 2007
Score = 21
Governed by: Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 6 October 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | 3rd parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | 3rd parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 1 | Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service. | |
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Case law has shown this to be disallowed. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 24 says that undertakings are prohibited from abusing a dominant position.[2] | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Case Law and an adoption of the Article 82 EC has shown this to be impermissible.[3] | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Discriminatory pricing and conditions are prohibited as per Article 82 EC.[4] | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Adopts the EC position and per se bans r.p.m.[5] | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.[6] | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Adopted Article 8(2)(a) EC which has shown this to be impermissible. |
| Tying | 1 | Tying is impermissible in accordance with the EC and case law.[7] | |
| Market Division | 1 | Adopted the EC position banning closed exclusive distribution agreements. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Supply refusal is sometimes illegal, particularly in cases involving “essential facilities”.[8] | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.[9] |
References
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU, at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf
- ↑ Case 650, Hydro Energy BV v. SEP, 26.8 1999 (concerning the refusal of third party access to the electricity network).
- ↑ NMa decision re complaint 13/Diverse klagers v. PTT Post (1998)(involving excessive prices charged for PO boxes); Case C-26-86, Akzo v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359 (involving predatory pricing).
- ↑ See NMa decision re complaint 13/Diverse klagers v. PTT Post (1998).
- ↑ See Michaela Drahos, Convergence of the Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community, 146 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); see NMa decision re complaint 146/Gemeente Dinxperlo v. IBM (1999) and NMa decision re exemption 524/Postkantoren (1999).
- ↑ See, Competition Law in the EU, at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/Stibat (1998).
- ↑ NMa decision re administrative appeal 1092/I.T. Holland v. Microsoft.
- ↑ See NMa decision re exemption 1/De Telegraaf v. NOS en HMG (1998); NMa decision complaint 650/Hydro Energy v. Sep (1999)
- ↑ See, Competition Law in the EU, at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/Stibat (1998).