Saudi Arabia 2004: Difference between revisions
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JWSchneider (talk | contribs) New page: '''Score = 20''' ''Governed by:'' Competition Law (Royal Decree No. M/25) of 2004 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). <ref>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLA... |
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| Line 11: | Line 11: | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | Extraterritoriality | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 3 extends the Act's reach to any firm working withing Saudi Arabia's borders. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 17: | Line 17: | ||
| Fines | | Fines | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to impose fines. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 23: | Line 23: | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to imprison offenders. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Divestitures | | Divestitures | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 16 allows the council to force a firm to "dispose of some of the assets, shares or proprietary rights, or to undertake any other action to remove the violation’s effects." | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Private Enforcement | | Private Enforcement | ||
| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 18 states that "Any natural or corporate person harmed by practices prohibited under the provisions of this Law may apply for compensation before the competent judicial body." | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 18 | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 47: | Line 47: | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | | 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 15 allows anyone to file a grievance with the council's decision. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Line 59: | Line 59: | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| | | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 65: | Line 65: | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| 2 | | 2 | ||
| | | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 76: | Line 76: | ||
| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
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| | | | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 88: | Line 88: | ||
| | | | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | | Public Interest (Pro D) | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 106: | Line 106: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency | | Efficiency | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 112: | Line 112: | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5(2) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 119: | Line 119: | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 5 | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 125: | Line 125: | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(1) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 142: | Line 142: | ||
| | | | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| | | Article 5(4) prohibits "refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market." | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 148: | Line 148: | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense for both cartels and dominant firms. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(1) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 167: | Line 167: | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(6) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 173: | Line 173: | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(8) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 179: | Line 179: | ||
| Market Sharing | | Market Sharing | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(6) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 190: | Line 190: | ||
| | | | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4(7) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Supply Refusal | | Supply Refusal | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
| Line 203: | Line 203: | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense. | ||
|} | |} | ||
Revision as of 19:33, 31 July 2007
Score = 20
Governed by: Competition Law (Royal Decree No. M/25) of 2004 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3 extends the Act's reach to any firm working withing Saudi Arabia's borders. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to impose fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to imprison offenders. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 16 allows the council to force a firm to "dispose of some of the assets, shares or proprietary rights, or to undertake any other action to remove the violation’s effects." | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 18 states that "Any natural or corporate person harmed by practices prohibited under the provisions of this Law may apply for compensation before the competent judicial body." |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 18 | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 15 allows anyone to file a grievance with the council's decision. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 5(2) |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 5 | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 4(1) | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | Article 5(4) prohibits "refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market." | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense for both cartels and dominant firms. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 4(1) |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | Article 4(6) | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 4(8) | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 4(6) | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 4(7) | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense. |