Germany (July 12, 2005): Difference between revisions
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'''Score = 19''' | |||
''Governed by:'' Act Against Restraints of Competition as amended by the Sixth Act to amend the Act against Restraints of Competition and the act to amend the Law on Public Procurement in the version published on September 2, 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2547) and amended as of July 12 2005 (hereinafter “Competition Act”).<ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 881-952</ref> | |||
{| class="wikitable" | |||
|- | |||
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Scope | |||
| Extraterritoriality | |||
| 1 | |||
| §130(2) extends the Competition Act to all acts that have an effect in Germany. | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Remedies | |||
| Fines | |||
| 1 | |||
| §81(1)(1) says that the Cartel Authorities may impose administrative fines. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Prison Sentences | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Divestitures | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Private Enforcement | |||
| 3rd Party Initiation | |||
| 1 | |||
| §32 says that 3rd parties may apply to the Cartel Authority to investigate RPM. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | |||
| 1 | |||
| §33 says that 3rd parties may initiate private suits for damages incurred as a result of a violation of the Competition Act. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | |||
| 1 | |||
| §54(3) allows 3rd parties whose interests will be substantially affected by the decision to be admitted as intervening parties to the proceedings before the Cartel Authority. | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Notification | |||
| Voluntary | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Mandatory | |||
| 3 | |||
| §37 requires notification of an impending merger to the FCO. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Pre-merger | |||
| 2 | |||
| §37 requires this notification to occur before the merger had been put into effect. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Post-merger | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Assessment | |||
| Dominance | |||
| 1 | |||
| §36(1) says that a merger is permissible unless it strengthens or creates a dominant position. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Restriction of Competition | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Other | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Dominance | |||
| Limits Access | |||
| 1 | |||
| §19(4)(4) prohibits limiting access. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Abusive Acts | |||
| 1 | |||
| §19(1) prohibits abusive acts by companies in a dominant position. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Price Setting | |||
| 1 | |||
| §19(4)(2) prohibits price setting by dominant companies. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Discriminatory Pricing | |||
| 1 | |||
| §19(4)(3) prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Resale Price Maintenance | |||
| 1 | |||
| §14 prohibits all forms of RPM. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Obstacles to Entry | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | |||
| Price Fixing | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Tying | |||
| 1 | |||
| §16(4) says that tying is subject to review. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Division | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Output Restraint | |||
| 1 | |||
| §16(1) says that restrictions on the freedom to use and purchase goods are subject to review. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Sharing | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | |||
| 1 | |||
| Bid rigging is a criminal offence under §298 of the Criminal Code. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| 1 | |||
| §21 prohibits boycotts. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 1 | |||
| Exemptions to restrictive trade practices are allowed if they "contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress"<ref>http://217.160.60.235/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl105s1954.pdf at 1</ref> | |||
|} | |||
== References == | |||
<references /> | |||
Revision as of 04:51, 22 November 2007
Score = 19
Governed by: Act Against Restraints of Competition as amended by the Sixth Act to amend the Act against Restraints of Competition and the act to amend the Law on Public Procurement in the version published on September 2, 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2547) and amended as of July 12 2005 (hereinafter “Competition Act”).[1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | §130(2) extends the Competition Act to all acts that have an effect in Germany. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | §81(1)(1) says that the Cartel Authorities may impose administrative fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | §32 says that 3rd parties may apply to the Cartel Authority to investigate RPM. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | §33 says that 3rd parties may initiate private suits for damages incurred as a result of a violation of the Competition Act. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | §54(3) allows 3rd parties whose interests will be substantially affected by the decision to be admitted as intervening parties to the proceedings before the Cartel Authority. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §37 requires notification of an impending merger to the FCO. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | §37 requires this notification to occur before the merger had been put into effect. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | §36(1) says that a merger is permissible unless it strengthens or creates a dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | §19(4)(4) prohibits limiting access. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §19(1) prohibits abusive acts by companies in a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §19(4)(2) prohibits price setting by dominant companies. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | §19(4)(3) prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | §14 prohibits all forms of RPM. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 0 | |
| Tying | 1 | §16(4) says that tying is subject to review. | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §16(1) says that restrictions on the freedom to use and purchase goods are subject to review. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Bid rigging is a criminal offence under §298 of the Criminal Code. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | §21 prohibits boycotts. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Exemptions to restrictive trade practices are allowed if they "contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress"[2] |
References
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU, at 881-952
- ↑ http://217.160.60.235/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl105s1954.pdf at 1