Finland 2004: Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = ''' ''Governed by:'' Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) as last amended by Act No. 318/2004 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). <ref>''http://www.kilp...
 
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| Scope
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
|  
| 1
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| Article 2(4) implies that the Competition Act applies to anything that affects Finnish customers.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Remedies
| Remedies
| Fines
| Fines
|  
| 1
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| Article 8(1) allows for fines for violations of Articles 4-7.


|-
|-
|  
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| Prison Sentences
| Prison Sentences
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| 0
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|  


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| Divestitures
| Divestitures
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| 1
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| Competition authority can order the break-up of a firm.<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', pp. 379-80</ref>


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Private Enforcement
| Private Enforcement
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
|  
| 1
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| The Article 18a compensation proceedings can be initiated by the injured 3rd party within 5 years of the violation.


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
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| 1
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| Article 18a(1) provides that a company that violates a term of the Competition Act is liable for damages to the injured company(s).
|-
|-
|  
|  
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
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| 1
|  
| Injured 3rd parties are allowed to appeal (all whose rights, duties or benefits the decision directly affects).


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Notification
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| Voluntary
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| 0
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| Mandatory
| Mandatory
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| 3
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| Article 11c(1) requires notification.
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|-
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| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
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| 2
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| Article11c(1) requires that notification occur within a week of a triggering event (which ranges from the actual acquisition of control to a decision to merge).
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|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
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| 0
|  
|  
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| Merger Assessment
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| Dominance
|  
| 1
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| Article 11d(1) says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
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| 1
|  
| Article 11d(1) allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
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| 0
|  
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| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
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| 0
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| Other
| Other
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| 0
|  
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|  
| Efficiency
| Efficiency
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| 0
|  
|  
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| Limits Access
| Limits Access
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| 1
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| Article 7(1)(5) prohibits using dominance to restrict market access by competition.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
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| 1
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| Article 7(1) prohibits abusive acts by companies in a dominant position.


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Price Setting
| Price Setting
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| 1
|  
| Article 7(1)(3) lists unreasonable price setting as an example of a prohibited abuse.


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
|  
| 1
|  
| Article 7(1)(3) has been interpreted as applying to discriminatory pricing as well.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
|  
| 1
|  
| Article 4 bans some forms of RPM.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
|  
| 0
|  
|  
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|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
|  
| 0
|  
|  
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| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Restrictive Trade Practices
| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
|  
| 1
|  
| Article 6(1)(1) prohibits price fixing.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Tying
| Tying
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| 0
|  
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| Market Division
| Market Division
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| 1
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| Article 6(1)(2) bans market division unless necessary for economic development.
|-
|-
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|  
| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
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| 1
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| Article 6(1)(2) bans limiting production unless necessary.
|-
|-
|  
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| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
|  
| 0
|  
|  
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| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
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| 0
|  
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| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
|  
| 1
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| Article 5 prohibits collusive tendering.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
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| 0
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|  
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
|  
| 1
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| Article 6(1)(2)
|}
|}

Revision as of 03:27, 22 November 2007

Score =

Governed by: Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) as last amended by Act No. 318/2004 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article 2(4) implies that the Competition Act applies to anything that affects Finnish customers.
Remedies Fines 1 Article 8(1) allows for fines for violations of Articles 4-7.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Competition authority can order the break-up of a firm.[2]
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 The Article 18a compensation proceedings can be initiated by the injured 3rd party within 5 years of the violation.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 18a(1) provides that a company that violates a term of the Competition Act is liable for damages to the injured company(s).
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Injured 3rd parties are allowed to appeal (all whose rights, duties or benefits the decision directly affects).
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 11c(1) requires notification.
Pre-merger 2 Article11c(1) requires that notification occur within a week of a triggering event (which ranges from the actual acquisition of control to a decision to merge).
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 11d(1) says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 11d(1) allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 7(1)(5) prohibits using dominance to restrict market access by competition.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 7(1) prohibits abusive acts by companies in a dominant position.
Price Setting 1 Article 7(1)(3) lists unreasonable price setting as an example of a prohibited abuse.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Article 7(1)(3) has been interpreted as applying to discriminatory pricing as well.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Article 4 bans some forms of RPM.
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 6(1)(1) prohibits price fixing.
Tying 0
Market Division 1 Article 6(1)(2) bans market division unless necessary for economic development.
Output Restraint 1 Article 6(1)(2) bans limiting production unless necessary.
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Article 5 prohibits collusive tendering.
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 6(1)(2)

References