Estonia (March 8, 2003): Difference between revisions
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| Merger Assessment | | Merger Assessment | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | §22(1)(1) says that the Competition Board may prohibits a merger if it would strengthen the dominant position. | ||
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| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| §22(1) allows consideration of whether a merger creates barriers to entry. | | §22(1)(1) allows consideration of whether a merger creates barriers to entry. | ||
|- | |- | ||
Revision as of 03:18, 9 January 2008
Score =
Governed by: Competition Act of 5 June 2001 (RT I 2001, 56, 332) entered into force 1 October 2001, as amended February 11 2003, entered into force March 8, 2003 (RT I 2003, 23, 133) (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | § 1(2) states that the Act applies "if an act or omission directed at restricting competition is committed outside the territory of Estonia but restricts competition within the territory of Estonia" |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | §75 allows imposition of fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | §79 of the amended 2004 Act allows prison sentences for criminal violations. | |
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §25 requires notification of concentrations. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | §25 requires that the notification come within one week of one of the enumerated decisive acts. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | §22(1)(1) says that the Competition Board may prohibits a merger if it would strengthen the dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | §22(1)(1) allows consideration of whether a merger creates barriers to entry. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | §16(2) lists limiting production and markets as an example of an abusive act. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §16 prohibits abuse by dominant undertakings. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §16(1) lists price setting as an example of an abusive act. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | §4(1)(5) lists applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent agreements as an abusive act. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §4(1)(1) prohibits price fixing |
| Tying | 1 | §4(1)(6) prohibits tying arrangements. | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §4(1)(2) prohibits limiting production and service. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | §4(1)(3) prohibits market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | §4(1)(3) prohibits attempts to exclude another person from the market. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | §16(6) prohibits the unjustified refusal to sell or buy goods. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §6(2) grants an exception to the §4 prohibitions for companies that contribute to technological and economic progress. |