France, 2005: Difference between revisions
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| Fines | | Fines | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger. | ||
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| Line 25: | Line 25: | ||
| Prison Sentences | | Prison Sentences | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute. | ||
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| Line 37: | Line 37: | ||
| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.440-1 allows third parties to initiate proceedings. | ||
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| Line 43: | Line 43: | ||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | | Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. | ||
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| Line 61: | Line 61: | ||
| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| | | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. | ||
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| Line 67: | Line 67: | ||
| Pre-merger | | Pre-merger | ||
| 2 | | 2 | ||
| | | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances. | ||
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| Line 79: | Line 79: | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. | ||
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| Line 85: | Line 85: | ||
| Restriction of Competition | | Restriction of Competition | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. | ||
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| Line 114: | Line 114: | ||
| Dominance | | Dominance | ||
| Limits Access | | Limits Access | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.442-1 (citing Articles 121-35 and 122-1 of the Consumer code) prohibits refusing to sell to consumers. Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits limiting production. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Abusive Acts | | Abusive Acts | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-2 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Price Setting | | Price Setting | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | |Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits price setting. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Discriminatory Pricing | | Discriminatory Pricing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-2 prohibits discriminatory pricing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | | Resale Price Maintenance | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.442-5 prohibits resale price maintenance. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | | Obstacles to Entry | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1)prohibits creating obstacles to entry. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Efficiency Defense | | Efficiency Defense | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-4 allows otherwise prohibited practices if they promote more efficient practices, especially for small and medium sized companies. | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | | Restrictive Trade Practices | ||
| Price Fixing | | Price Fixing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-1 bans price fixing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Tying | | Tying | ||
| | | 0 | ||
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| | | | ||
| Market Division | | Market Division | ||
| | | 0 | ||
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| Line 174: | Line 175: | ||
| | | | ||
| Output Restraint | | Output Restraint | ||
| | |1 | ||
| | |Art. L.420-1(3) bans output restraint. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Market Sharing | | Market Sharing | ||
| | | 1 | ||
| | | Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | | Eliminating Competitors | ||
| | | 0 | ||
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| Line 192: | Line 194: | ||
| | | | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | | Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | ||
| | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
Revision as of 15:29, 26 June 2008
This page is currently under construction. Check back in early July.
Some French competition law is codified in provisions of the code de la consommation (consumer code).[1] The majority is contained in Livre (book) IV of the Code de commerce (commercial code).[2][3][4] Unless otherwise specified, all provisions cited refer to the Code de commerce.
Score = 24
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article L.420-1 extends the scope of the act outside of France in limited circumstances. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Art. L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Art. L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute. | |
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Art. L.440-1 allows third parties to initiate proceedings. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances. | |
| Post-merger | |||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of public public interest, especially with regard to international competitors, when deciding whether to permit a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Art. L.442-1 (citing Articles 121-35 and 122-1 of the Consumer code) prohibits refusing to sell to consumers. Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits limiting production. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Art. L.420-2 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits price setting.
| |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Art. L.420-2 prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Art. L.442-5 prohibits resale price maintenance. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1)prohibits creating obstacles to entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Art. L.420-4 allows otherwise prohibited practices if they promote more efficient practices, especially for small and medium sized companies. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Art. L.420-1 bans price fixing. |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Art. L.420-1(3) bans output restraint.
| |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| Efficiency Defense |
References
- ↑ Available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069565&dateTexte=20080624
- ↑ most recent version of the commercial code available in French at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?dateTexte=20080624&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&fastReqId=239729146&fastPos=6&oldAction=rechCodeArticle
- ↑ Limited English version available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3094
- ↑ The French Commercial Code in English 2005, Philip Raworth translator, 2005, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications, Inc.