Italy (October 10, 1990): Difference between revisions
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| 3rd Party Initiation | | 3rd Party Initiation | ||
| 1 | | 1 | ||
| | | Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Authority. | ||
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| Mandatory | | Mandatory | ||
| 3 | | 3 | ||
| | | Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation. | ||
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Revision as of 16:05, 28 June 2008
Score =
Governed by: Law no. 287 of 10 October 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Scope extends to foreign corporations. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | |
| Prison Sentences | |||
| Divestitures | 1 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Section 12(1) allows any interested party to bring infringements to the attention of the Authority. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | |||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | |||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | ||
| Mandatory | 3 | Section 16(1) requires mandatory notification to the Authority of mergers of undertakings whose value or combined values exceed certain levels, which are adjusted each year for inflation. | |
| Pre-merger | |||
| Post-merger | |||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | ||
| Restriction of Competition | |||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | |||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | |||
| Other | |||
| Efficiency | |||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Section 2(2)(b) forbids use of dominant position to limit market access. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Section 3(1) prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the domestic market, or a substantial part of it. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit price setting. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Sections 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(c) forbid applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit obstacles to market access. | |
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Sections 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) prohibit directly or indirectly fixing or imposing prices. |
| Tying | |||
| Market Division | |||
| Output Restraint | 1 | Sections 2(2)(b) and 3(1)(b) prohibit output restraint. | |
| Market Sharing | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | |||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | |||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| Efficiency Defense |