Cote d'Ivoire (December 27, 1991): Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = 20''' ''Governed by:'' Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition Act No. 143 Coll. of 4 April 2001 last amended by Act No. 484/2004 Coll. of 5 August 2004 (hereinafter ...
 
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'''Score = 20'''
'''Score = 13'''


''Governed by:'' Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition Act No. 143 Coll. of 4 April 2001 last amended by Act No. 484/2004 Coll. of 5 August 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).<ref>Czech Republic Office for the Protection of Competition website, http://www.compet.cz/English/HS.htm.</ref>
''Governed by:'' Law No. 91-999 of 27 December 1991 on Competition.  
<ref> Taken from excerpts on Cote d’Ivoire’s Competition Law in a report for the United Nations Conference on Trade and development of 24 November 1997, available at, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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| Scope
| Scope
| Extraterritoriality
| Extraterritoriality
| 1
| 0
| Article 1(5) says that the Act applies to actions which occurred abroad if they had an effect in the Czech Republic.
|  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Article 22 provides guidelines for fining.
| Article 18 allows the Minister of Trade to impose monetary penalties.


|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 34 allows the commission to break up a merged company that restricts competition.


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Merger Notification
| Merger Notification
| Voluntary
| Voluntary
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 34 says that notification is voluntary.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 0
| Article 15(2) requires notification of mergers.
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 0
| Article 15(3) says that the notification must be filed prior to the conclusion of the agreement or prior to acquisition of control.
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
| 0
| 1
|  
|  
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| Merger Assessment
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 0
| Article 17(1) lists market share as a factor in merger assessment.
|  
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article 17(1) lists the necessity of fostering competition as a factor in merger assessment.
| Article 34 allows the commission to ban any merger that is likely to jeopardize competition.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| 0
| Article 17(1) list the needs and interests of consumers as factors in merger assessment and will allow a merger if it is to the advantage of consumers.
|  
|-
|-
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| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(1)(d) lists the limitation of production, sales, research and development as an abusive act.
| Article 8 prohibits refusing access to production.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(1) prohibits abuses by an undertaking in a dominant position.
| Article 8 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.


|-
|-
|  
|  
| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 0
| Article 11(1)(a) lists price setting as an example of an abusive act.
|  


|-
|-
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| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Article 11(1)(c) prohibits discriminatory pricing.
| Article 8 prohibits discriminatory sales conditions.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 0
| Article 6(2)(b) implicitly includes RPM under the prohibition in Article 3(2)(a).
|  
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 10 offers an efficiency defense for anti-competitive practices.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Article 3(2)(a) prohibits price fixing.
| Article 7 prohibits price fixing agreements.
|-
|-
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| Tying
| Tying
| 1
| 1
| Article 3(2)(d) prohibits tying arrangements.
| Article 30 prohibits tying arrangements.
|-
|-
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| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Article 3(2)(c) prohibits market division.
| Article 7 prohibits market division.
|-
|-
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| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Article 3(2)(b) prohibits limiting or controlling production and sales.
| Article 7 prohibits output restraint.
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 0
| Article 3(4)(c) does not allow agreements that will eliminate competition to be exempted under the usual exceptions to the Article 3(2) prohibitions.
|  
|-
|-
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|  
|  
| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| 0
| Article 3(2)(f) prohibits group boycotts.
|
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 3(4) allows agreements which contribute to improving the production of goods and promote economic progress.
| Article 10 offers an efficiency defense for anti-competitive practices.
|}
|}

Revision as of 17:18, 25 June 2007

Score = 13

Governed by: Law No. 91-999 of 27 December 1991 on Competition. [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 1 Article 18 allows the Minister of Trade to impose monetary penalties.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Article 34 allows the commission to break up a merged company that restricts competition.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 0
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 1 Article 34 says that notification is voluntary.
Mandatory 0
Pre-merger 0
Post-merger 1
Merger Assessment Dominance 0
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 34 allows the commission to ban any merger that is likely to jeopardize competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 8 prohibits refusing access to production.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 8 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
Price Setting 0
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Article 8 prohibits discriminatory sales conditions.
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 10 offers an efficiency defense for anti-competitive practices.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 7 prohibits price fixing agreements.
Tying 1 Article 30 prohibits tying arrangements.
Market Division 1 Article 7 prohibits market division.
Output Restraint 1 Article 7 prohibits output restraint.
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 10 offers an efficiency defense for anti-competitive practices.

References

  1. Taken from excerpts on Cote d’Ivoire’s Competition Law in a report for the United Nations Conference on Trade and development of 24 November 1997, available at, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2emd11.pdf