Slovenia (2004): Difference between revisions

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| Article 41(4) allows Office to perform  “demerger of undertakings, demerger of assets, sale of interests, sale of securities, or other appropriate measures" if a merger is made that violates the act.
interests, sale of securities, or other appropriate measures” if a merger is made that violates the act.
 


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| Article 44 states that damaged third parties "may claim compensation in accordance with the law of obligation rules."
obligation rules."
 
 
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| Article 5(2) prohibits agreements that fix prices and price discriminate.
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Revision as of 22:45, 20 July 2008

Score = 21

Governed by: Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act (Official Gazette of the RS, nos. 56/1999 and 37/2004 ) (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Although not listed in the scope of the Act, Article 5 prohibits acts that have the effect of restricting competition in Slovenia (even if they do not occur in the country).
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 52-54 provide guidelines for the imposition of fines.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 Article 41(4) allows Office to perform “demerger of undertakings, demerger of assets, sale of interests, sale of securities, or other appropriate measures" if a merger is made that violates the act.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Article 23(2) allows people who have a legal interest to initiate proceedings with the Office for Protection of Competition
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 44 states that damaged third parties "may claim compensation in accordance with the law of obligation rules."
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Article 26 says that people demonstrating a legal interest may apply for participation in the proceeding.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 12 requires notification of mergers.
Pre-merger 2 Article 12(2) requires that the notification happen at the latest, 1 week from the conclusion of the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 13(1) lists creating or strengthening of a dominant position as a factor in apprising mergers.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 13(1) lists the impediment of effective competition as a factor in merger assessment.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 13(1) considers the effects of the merger on international competitiveness
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Limiting production and markets is listed in Article 10(5) as an example of abuse of a dominant position.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 10(1) prohibits abusing a dominant position.
Price Setting 1 Article 10(5) prohibits dominant firms from setting unfair prices.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions is listed in Article 10(5) as an example of abuse of a dominant position.
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 5(2) prohibits price fixing.
Tying 1 Article 5(2) prohibits tying arrangements.
Market Division 0
Output Restraint 1 Article 5(2) prohibits limiting or controlling production.
Market Sharing 1 Article 5(2) prohibits market sharing.
Eliminating Competitors 1 Article 5(3) exempts agreements that have the possibility of eliminating competition from the usual exceptions to Article 5(2).
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 5(3) exempts from the Article 5(2) prohibitions agreements that contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress.

References