France/EU, 2005: Difference between revisions
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|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| Private Enforcement | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"|3rd Party Initiation | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| 1 | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry. | ||
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|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| 1 | ||
|style="background: | |style="background:peachpuff"| Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry. | ||
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Revision as of 22:07, 25 July 2008
This page is currently under construction. Please check back in mid-August, 2008.
Score = 26
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article L.420-1 extends the scope of the act outside of France in limited circumstances. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Art. L.420-6 allows for fines for violations of competitive practices. Article L.430-8 allows for fines for improper merger. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Art. L.420-6 allows for prison sentences of up to four years for violations of the competition statute. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | Are. L.430-8 authorizes divestment in the case of unauthorized mergers. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry. |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Art. L.442-6 establishes liability for a small set of competition violations. L.470-7 lets trade organizations file civil suits for practices affecting their industry. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Art. L.463-1, "interested parties" may participate in proceedings. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Art. L.430-2 requires that large companies get government approval before or when they merge. However, article L. 430-4 allows companies to merge while awaiting approval under urgent circumstances. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of dominance as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of the effects on competition as part of the decision whether to grant a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Art. L.430-6 requires consideration of public public interest, especially with regard to international competitors, when deciding whether to permit a merger. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Art. L.442-1 (citing Articles 121-35 and 122-1 of the Consumer code) prohibits refusing to sell to consumers. Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits limiting production. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Art. L.420-2 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1) prohibits price setting.
| |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Art. L.420-2 prohibits discriminatory pricing. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Art. L.442-5 prohibits resale price maintenance. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Art. L.420-2 (referencing L.420-1)prohibits creating obstacles to entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Art. L.420-4 allows otherwise prohibited practices if they promote more efficient practices, especially for small and medium sized companies. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Art. L.420-1 bans price fixing. |
| Tying | 1 | Articles L.420-2 and L.442-1 ban tying. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Art. L.464-6-2 treats market division as a blatant anticompetitive restriction. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Art. L.420-1(3) bans output restraint.
| |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Art. L.420-1(4) bans market sharing. French authorities have, on at least one occasion, treated bid rigging as market sharing.[1] | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Art. L.420-2 prohibits supply refusal | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Art. L-420-4 offers a limited efficiency defense for otherwise prohibited practices. |
References
- ↑ See the Drapo Software case, details from the French Competition Council, at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=185&id_article=542