Netherlands/EU, 2007: Difference between revisions
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New page: Score = Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legisla... |
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Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>. | Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)<ref> Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html</ref> , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref>. | ||
'''Score = 22''' | |||
''Governed by:'' Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | |||
<ref>''Competition Law in the EU'', at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf</ref> | |||
{| class="wikitable" | |||
|- | |||
! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Scope | |||
| Extraterritoriality | |||
| 1 | |||
| The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.<ref>Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in <i>Competition Law in the EU</i> 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).</ref> | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Remedies | |||
| Fines | |||
| 1 | |||
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Prison Sentences | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Divestitures | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Private Enforcement | |||
| 3rd Party Initiation | |||
| 1 | |||
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | |||
| 1 | |||
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | |||
| 1 | |||
| “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case. | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Notification | |||
| Voluntary | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Mandatory | |||
| 3 | |||
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Pre-merger | |||
| 2 | |||
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Post-merger | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Merger Assessment | |||
| Dominance | |||
| 1 | |||
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Restriction of Competition | |||
| 1 | |||
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | |||
| 1 | |||
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | |||
| 1 | |||
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Other | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Dominance | |||
| Limits Access | |||
| 1 | |||
| Case law has shown this to be disallowed. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Abusive Acts | |||
| 1 | |||
| Article 24 says that undertakings are prohibited from abusing a dominant position.<ref>Case 650, ''Hydro Energy BV v. SEP'', 26.8 1999 (concerning the refusal of third party access to the electricity network).</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Price Setting | |||
| 1 | |||
| Case Law and an adoption of the Article 82 EC has shown this to be impermissible.<ref>NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998)(involving excessive prices charged for PO boxes); Case C-26-86, ''Akzo v. Commission'', [1991] ECR I-3359 (involving predatory pricing).</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Discriminatory Pricing | |||
| 1 | |||
| Discriminatory pricing and conditions are prohibited as per Article 82 EC.<ref>''See'' NMa decision re complaint 13/''Diverse klagers v. PTT Post'' (1998).</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Predatory Pricing | |||
| 1 | |||
| "Prices are regarded as abusive if they are below average variable costs"<ref><i>Competition Law in the EU</i> at 454</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Resale Price Maintenance | |||
| 1 | |||
| Adopts the EC position and per se bans r.p.m.<ref>''See'' Michaela Drahos, ''Convergence of the Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community'', 146 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); see NMa decision re complaint 146/''Gemeente Dinxperlo v. IBM'' (1999) and NMa decision re exemption 524/''Postkantoren'' (1999); <i>Competition Law in the EU</i> at 445.</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Obstacles to Entry | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 1 | |||
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref> | |||
|- class="categorydivision" | |||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | |||
| Price Fixing | |||
| 1 | |||
| Adopted Article 8(2)(a) EC which has shown this to be impermissible. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Tying | |||
| 1 | |||
| Tying is impermissible in accordance with the EC and case law.<ref>NMa decision re administrative appeal 1092/I.T. ''Holland v. Microsoft''.</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Division | |||
| 1 | |||
| Adopted the EC position banning closed exclusive distribution agreements. | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Output Restraint | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Market Sharing | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Eliminating Competitors | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | |||
| 0 | |||
| | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Supply Refusal | |||
| 1 | |||
| Supply refusal is sometimes illegal, particularly in cases involving “essential facilities”.<ref>''See'' <I> Competition Law in the EU</I> at 455; NMa decision re exemption 1/''De Telegraaf v. NOS en HMG'' (1998); NMa decision complaint 650/''Hydro Energy v. Sep'' (1999)</ref> | |||
|- | |||
| | |||
| Efficiency Defense | |||
| 1 | |||
| Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.<ref>''See'', ''Competition Law in the EU'', at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/''Stibat'' (1998).</ref> | |||
|} | |||
== References == | |||
<references /> | |||
Revision as of 17:33, 6 August 2008
Score =
Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)[1] , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)[2].
Score = 22
Governed by: Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007(hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [3]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | The Competition Act applies to any company or violation that has a substantial effect on Dutch competition regardless of where it occurred.[4] |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.[5] |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.[6] | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 1 | Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service. | |
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Case law has shown this to be disallowed. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 24 says that undertakings are prohibited from abusing a dominant position.[7] | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Case Law and an adoption of the Article 82 EC has shown this to be impermissible.[8] | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Discriminatory pricing and conditions are prohibited as per Article 82 EC.[9] | |
| Predatory Pricing | 1 | "Prices are regarded as abusive if they are below average variable costs"[10] | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | Adopts the EC position and per se bans r.p.m.[11] | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.[12] | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Adopted Article 8(2)(a) EC which has shown this to be impermissible. |
| Tying | 1 | Tying is impermissible in accordance with the EC and case law.[13] | |
| Market Division | 1 | Adopted the EC position banning closed exclusive distribution agreements. | |
| Output Restraint | 0 | ||
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Supply refusal is sometimes illegal, particularly in cases involving “essential facilities”.[14] | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Adopts the EC position (as per Art. 86(2) EEC) on allowing Article 24(1) of the Competition Act to be deemed inapplicable when in the interest of economic progress.[15] |
References
- ↑ Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU, at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU, at 753-791; http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Netherlands/New%20regulations%20on%20economic%20competition.pdf
- ↑ Bart L.P. van Reeken & Steven B Noë, "Competition Law in the Netherlands" in Competition Law in the EU 417 (Floris O.W. Vogelaar et. al., eds).
- ↑ See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.
- ↑ See Competition Law in the EU, at 457.
- ↑ Case 650, Hydro Energy BV v. SEP, 26.8 1999 (concerning the refusal of third party access to the electricity network).
- ↑ NMa decision re complaint 13/Diverse klagers v. PTT Post (1998)(involving excessive prices charged for PO boxes); Case C-26-86, Akzo v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359 (involving predatory pricing).
- ↑ See NMa decision re complaint 13/Diverse klagers v. PTT Post (1998).
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU at 454
- ↑ See Michaela Drahos, Convergence of the Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community, 146 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2001); see NMa decision re complaint 146/Gemeente Dinxperlo v. IBM (1999) and NMa decision re exemption 524/Postkantoren (1999); Competition Law in the EU at 445.
- ↑ See, Competition Law in the EU, at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/Stibat (1998).
- ↑ NMa decision re administrative appeal 1092/I.T. Holland v. Microsoft.
- ↑ See Competition Law in the EU at 455; NMa decision re exemption 1/De Telegraaf v. NOS en HMG (1998); NMa decision complaint 650/Hydro Energy v. Sep (1999)
- ↑ See, Competition Law in the EU, at 441; Explanatory Memorandum, at 24; NMa decision re exemption 51/Stibat (1998).