Netherlands/EU, 2007: Difference between revisions

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| Fines
| Fines
| 1
| 1
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 require fines for certain violations.
| Articles 56, 69, 71-75 of the Dutch Competition Act require fines for certain violations.


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| 3rd Party Initiation
| 3rd Party Initiation
| 1
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref>
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref>


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| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties
| 1
| 1
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref>
| Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.<ref><I> See Competition Law in the EU</i>, at 457.</ref>
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| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Article 34 requires notification of concentrations to the director general.
| Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act requires notification of concentrations to the director general.
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| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 2
| Article 34 says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.
| Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.
| Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.
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| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| 1
| Article 47(1) states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.
| Article 47(1) of the Dutch Competition Act states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.
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| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| 1
| Article 41(3) considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.
| Article 41(3) of the Dutch Competition Act considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.
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| 0
| 0
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|- class="categorydivision"
| Merger Assessment
| Dominance
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act says that the Competition Council may ban a merger if it would strengthen a dominant position.
|-
|
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| Article 11d(1) of the Finnish Competition Act allows the Competition Council to ban a merger which would significantly impede competition.
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|
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 0
|
|-
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| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 0
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|-
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| Other
| 0
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|-
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| Efficiency
| 0
|
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
| Dominance
| Dominance

Revision as of 16:07, 8 August 2008

Score =

Governed by: EU law: Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities (Rome Treaty)[1] , Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 and Law no. 1997/242 of 22 May 1997 as last amended on 1 October 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)[2].

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 EU Law (Rome Treater) governs whether conduct has effects on trade between Member States, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003.
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 56, 69, 71-75 of the Dutch Competition Act require fines for certain violations.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.[3]
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Third parties can rely on Articles 6(1) and 24(1) of the Dutch Competition Act to bring an action for damages or ask for an injunction.[4]
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 “Interested Parties” have several rights in the course of proceedings including the right to appeal and participate in the case.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act requires notification of concentrations to the director general.
Pre-merger 2 Article 34 of the Dutch Competition Act says that this notification must occur 4 weeks before the merger.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if there is evidence that it will create a dominant position.
Restriction of Competition 1 Articles 37(2) and 41(2) of the Dutch Competition Act state that a merger may require further investigation if it may significantly restrict effective competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 47(1) of the Dutch Competition Act states that a Minister may allow an otherwise prohibited merger to go through if doing so is in the public interest.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 1 Article 41(3) of the Dutch Competition Act considers whether one or both of the companies is “entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest” in which case the Commission must decide what effect allowing or not allowing the merger would have on their performance of that service.
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 82(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting access.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits abuse of dominant position.
Price Setting 1 Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Article 82(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits discriminatory conditions.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Article 82(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits resale price maintenance.
Obstacles to Entry 1 Article 82 of the Rome Treaty prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes.
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 81(1)(a) of the Rome Treaty prohibits price fixing.
Tying 1 Article 81(1)(e) of the Rome Treaty prohibits tying.
Market Division 1 Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits customer allocation clauses.
Output Restraint 1 Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits limiting production.
Market Sharing 1 Article 81(1)(c) of the Rome Treaty prohibits market sharing.
Eliminating Competitors 1 Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 Article 81 of the Rome Treaty prohibits bid-rigging.[5]
Supply Refusal 1 Article 81(1)(b) of the Rome Treaty prohibits supply refusal.
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty allows an efficiency defense.

References