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| ''Governed by:'' Federal Act on Cartels and other Restrictions of Competition of 19 October 1988, amended by Cartel Act Amendment 1999 (herein referred to as "Cartel Act").<ref>Austrian Competition Act, ''Competition Law in the US, its Member States and Switzerland'', 955-1012 (v. II, ed. Floris O.W. Vogelaar, Jules Stuyck, Bart L.P. van Reeken, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000).</ref>
| | [[Austria 1999]] |
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| {| class="wikitable"
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| ! Category !! Subcategory !! Score !! Comment
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| | Scope
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| | Extraterritoriality
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| | 1
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| | § 6(1) of the Cartel Act applies to behavior in a foreign country in so far as it affects the domestic market.
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| |-
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| | Remedies
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| | Fines
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| | 1
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| | § 129-133 provide for violations of the Cartel Act to be sanctioned with fines.
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| |-
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| | Prison sentences
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| | 1
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| | § 129(1) also provides for imprisonment for up to 3 years in certain cases.
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| |-
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| | Divestitures
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Private Enforcement
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| | 3rd party initiation
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| | 1
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| | A 3rd party can bring a claim against anything that is based on § 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG)
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| |-
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| | Remedies available to 3rd parties
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| | 1
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| | A 3rd party can assert civil claims IF they have suffered a damage caused by a punishable act.
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|
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| |-
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| | 3rd party rights in proceedings
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| | 0
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| | 3rd parties are not entitled to request a 2nd phase investigation or challenge decisions of the court and have no access to evidence.
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| |-
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| | Merger Notification
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| | Voluntary
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Mandatory
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| | 3
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| | § 42a(1) says if the companies made a certain combined income in the previous year, they must apply to the cartel court.
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| |-
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| | Pre-merger
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Post-merger
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| | 1
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| | §42a(5) says that the Cartel Court shall determine whether the concentration WAS implemented in a prohibited manner (sounds like post…)
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| |-
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| | Merger Assessment
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| | Dominance
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| | 1
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| | §42b(2)(2) The Cartel Court shall prohibit the concentration if it will strengthen the market dominating position.
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| |-
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| | Restriction of competition
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Public interest (ProD)
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| | 1
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| | The effect on the national economy and public interest is investigated when deciding whether to grant an exception (see §42b(3)).
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| |-
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| | Public Interest (ProAuthority)
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Other
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Efficiency
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Dominance
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| | Limits access
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| | 1
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| | § 35(1)(2) prohibits the restriction of production, sales, or development to the detriment of the consumer.
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|
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| |-
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| | Abusive acts
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| | 1
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| | § 35(1) lists several punishable abusive acts.
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| |-
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| | Price Setting
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| | 1
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| | § 35(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of unreasonable prices.
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| |-
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| | Discriminatory pricing
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| | 1
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| | § 35(1)(3) identifies as abuse the placing of contractual partners at a competitive disadvantage by applying different terms for the provision of equivalent services.
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| |-
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| | Resale price maintenance
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Obstacles to entry
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Efficiency Defense
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Restrictive Trade Practices
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| | Price fixing
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| | 1
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| | § 10(3) identifying a restraint of competition with respect to prices (not per se illegal)
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| |-
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| | Tying
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Market Division
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| | 1
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| | § 23(1) per se prohibits arrangements under which the parties agree that they shall only market certain products.
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| |-
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| | Output restraint
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| | 1
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| | § 23 (1)(b) does not cartels that require companies to sell products in specifically restricted quantities.
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| |-
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| | Market sharing
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| | 0
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| |-
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| | Eliminating competitors
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| | 1
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| | Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1).
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|
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| |-
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| | Collusive tendering/bid-rigging
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| | 0
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|
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| |-
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| | Supply refusal
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| | 1
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| | § 30 prohibits supply boycotts when they cause damage. Collective boycotting is prohibited per se by § 23(1)(c).
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| |-
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| | Efficiency Defense
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| | 1
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| | §23(3) allows cartels when they are justified with respect to the national economy.
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| |}
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| == References ==
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| <references />
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