Cameroon (July, 1998): Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = 18''' ''Governed by:'' Law o. 98-13 of 14 July 1998 relating to competition (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) <ref>Available at http://www.spm.gov.cm/showtexte.php?idtex...
 
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Revision as of 04:13, 16 July 2007

Score = 18

Governed by: Law o. 98-13 of 14 July 1998 relating to competition (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 §2 extends the law to anything having an effect on the domestic market
Remedies Fines 1 §24 allows fines for violations of the Act.
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 1 §26 allows an improperly merged corporation to be dissolved.
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 §35 allows any natural person or corporation to initiate an investigation by the National Competition Committee
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 §18 requires mandatory pre-merger notification.
Pre-merger 2 §18 requires mandatory pre-merger notification.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 0
Restriction of Competition 1 §4 prohibits mergers that distort competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 §17 allows otherwise impermissible mergers when they improve the performance of the national economy.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 1 Article 16 lists business failure as a consideration in merger assessment
Efficiency 1 §17 provides an efficiency defense for mergers that have some negative effects on competition.
Dominance Limits Access 1 §11 prohibits limiting access.
Abusive Acts 1 §4 prohibits abuses by dominant firms.
Price Setting 0
Discriminatory Pricing 0
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 1 §11 prohibits restricting market entry.
Efficiency Defense 1 §12 creates an efficiency defense for §11 violations.
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 §5 prohibits price fixing.
Tying 0
Market Division 0
Output Restraint 1 §5 prohibits output restraint.
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 1 §4 prohibits any agreement between firms that distorts competition.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 1 §5 prohibits collusive tendering.
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 1 §6 provides an efficiency defense for §5 violations.

References