Austria (January 1, 2006): Difference between revisions

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| §9(1) requires merger notification in certain instances.


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| §5(1)(3) A dominant firm may not disadvantage contracting parties by the application of different conditions with equivalent achievements.


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| Price Setting
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| §5(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of inadequate purchase or selling prices.  Moreover, §5(1)(5) prohibits predatory pricing.


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Revision as of 19:31, 24 July 2007

Score = 0

Governed by: TitleOfAct of DateOfAct, amended by TitleOfAmendment DateOfAmendment (herein referred to as "ShortTitle").[1][2]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 0
Remedies Fines 0
Prison Sentences 0
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 0
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 0
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 0
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 §9(1) requires merger notification in certain instances.
Pre-merger 0
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 0
Restriction of Competition 0
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 0
Efficiency 0
Dominance Limits Access 0
Abusive Acts 1 §5(1)(3) A dominant firm may not disadvantage contracting parties by the application of different conditions with equivalent achievements.
Price Setting 1 §5(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of inadequate purchase or selling prices. Moreover, §5(1)(5) prohibits predatory pricing.
Discriminatory Pricing 0
Resale Price Maintenance 0
Obstacles to Entry 1 §4(1)(2) prohibits a dominant firm from limiting other firms from admission into the market.
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 §1(2)(1) prohibits agreements against setting prices directly or indirectly.
Tying 1 §1(2)(5) prohibits conditions attached to the conclusion of contracts that the contracting parties accept additional achievements which are not related to the contractual item.
Market Division 1 §1(2)(3) prohibit agreements that allocate markets or sources of supply.
Output Restraint 1 §1(2)(2) prohibits agreements restricting or controlling production.
Market Sharing 0
Eliminating Competitors 1 §1(2)(4) prohibits the application of different conditions with equivalent trade partners, whereby these are disadvantaged in competition.
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 0
Efficiency Defense 1 §2(1) provides an exception for agreements that contribute to the promotion of technical or economic progress.

References