Saudi Arabia 2004: Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 21''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Competition Law (Royal Decree No. M/25) of 2004 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). <ref>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html</ref> | ''Governed by:'' Competition Law (Royal Decree No. M/25) of 2004 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). <ref>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTCOMPLEGALDB/0,,contentMDK:21040081~pagePK:2137398~piPK:64581526~theSitePK:2137348,00.html</ref> | ||
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Revision as of 00:13, 2 August 2007
Score = 21
Governed by: Competition Law (Royal Decree No. M/25) of 2004 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | Article 3 extends the Act's reach to any firm working withing Saudi Arabia's borders. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to impose fines. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Article 15 grants the competition council the power to imprison offenders. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | Article 16 allows the council to force a firm to "dispose of some of the assets, shares or proprietary rights, or to undertake any other action to remove the violation’s effects." | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | Article 18 states that "Any natural or corporate person harmed by practices prohibited under the provisions of this Law may apply for compensation before the competent judicial body." |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | Article 18 | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 15 allows anyone to file a grievance with the council's decision. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 6 requires notification at least 60 days prior to completion of the merger. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 0 | |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 0 | ||
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | Article 5(2) |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 5 | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 4(1) | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | ||
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | Article 5(4) prohibits "refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market." | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense for both cartels and dominant firms. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 4(1) |
| Tying | 0 | ||
| Market Division | 1 | Article 4(6) | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 4(8) | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Article 4(7) | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 4 has a broad efficiency defense. |