Spain (December 28, 1999): Difference between revisions

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New page: '''Score = 29''' ''Governed by:'' Law no. 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 as last amended on 28 December 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).<ref>Competition Law in the EU, a...
 
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'''Score = 29'''
'''Score = 24'''


''Governed by:''  Law no. 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 as last amended on 28 December 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).<ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 673-707</ref>
''Governed by:''  Law no. 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 as last amended on 28 December 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”).  
<ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 673-707.</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
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|  
|  
| Divestitures
| Divestitures
| 1
| 0
| Article 7 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 allows for structural remedies
|  


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings
| 1
| 1
| Any interested party can contribute to the case.</ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 265.</ref>
| Any interested party can contribute to the case.<ref>Competition Law in the EU, at 265.</ref>


|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Mandatory
| Mandatory
| 3
| 3
| Article 7(1) of CR 139/2004 requires notification<ref>The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give undertakings the ability to request exemption from notification requirements.  However, because a formal request must be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption, the new notification guidelines are encoded as requiring mandatory pre-merger notification.</ref>
| Article 15 requires notification by the parties.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Pre-merger
| Pre-merger
| 2
| 0
| Article 7(1) of 139/2004 requires pre-clearance
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Post-merger
| Post-merger
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 15 requires that the notification occur either before the merger or within 1 month after the merger is completed.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Dominance
| Dominance
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers dominance
| Article 16(1) considers the market position as a relevant assessment factor.
|-
|-
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| Restriction of Competition
| Restriction of Competition
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1)(a) of CR 139/2004 considers effect on competition in the market
| Article 16(2) considers the possible restrictive effects on competition.
|-
|-
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| Public Interest (Pro D)
| Public Interest (Pro D)
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the development of technical and economic progress
| Article 16(1) considers the possible benefits to the public when deciding whether to allow an otherwise impermissible merger.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| Public Interest (Pro Authority)
| 1
| 0
| Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Other
| Other
| 0
| 1
|  
| Article 16 considers the effects on the international community when evaluating mergers.
|-
|-
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| Efficiency
| Efficiency
| 1
| 1
| Article 2(4) of CR 139/2004 allows an efficiency defense
| Article 16(1) considers the effects on economic progress.
|- class="categorydivision"
|- class="categorydivision"
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| Limits Access
| Limits Access
| 1
| 1
| Article 82(b) prohibits limiting access
| Article 6(2)(c) prohibits refusing to supply demand.
|-
|-
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| Abusive Acts
| Abusive Acts
| 1
| 1
| Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position
| Article 6(2) lists several abusive acts which fit under the prohibition.


|-
|-
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| Price Setting
| Price Setting
| 1
| 1
| Article 82(a) prohibits price setting
| Article 6(2)(a) prohibits price setting.


|-
|-
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| Discriminatory Pricing
| Discriminatory Pricing
| 1
| 1
| Articles 81(1)(d), 82(c) prohibit discriminatory conditions
| Article 6(2)(d) prohibits applying unequal prices and conditions to equivalent transactions.
|-
|-
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| Resale Price Maintenance
| Resale Price Maintenance
| 1
| 1
| Article 81 prohibits minimum resale price restrictions<ref>EC Competition Law, at 97.</ref>
| Courts have interpreted Article 7 (Distorting Free Competition by means of Unfair Act) as including RPM.<ref>See Fina Ibérica, TDC Dec. 9/90, of 25 June 1990 and Ibercarretillas, TDC Dec. 6/90, of 6 June 1990.</ref>
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Obstacles to Entry
| Obstacles to Entry
| 1
| 0
| Article 82 prohibits anti-competitive pricing schemes<ref>Id, at 283.</ref>
|  
|-
|-
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| Price Fixing
| Price Fixing
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(a) prohibits price fixing
| Article 1(1)(a) prohibits price fixing.
|-
|-
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| Tying
| Tying
| 1
| 1
| Articles 81(1)(e), 82(d) prohibit tying
| Article 1(1)(e) prohibits tying.
|-
|-
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| Market Division
| Market Division
| 1
| 1
| Article 81 prohibits customer allocation clauses<ref>Id, at 97.</ref>
| Case law has interpreted Article 1(1) as including market division (customer allocation) in its list of prohibitions.<ref>See Servicios Funerarios de Madrid, TDC Dec. 404/97, of 23 December 1997.</ref>
|-
|-
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| Output Restraint
| Output Restraint
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits limiting production
| Article 1(1)(b) prohibits limiting or controlling production and distribution.
|-
|-
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| Market Sharing
| Market Sharing
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(c) prohibits market sharing
| Article 1(1)(c) prohibits market sharing.
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Eliminating Competitors
| Eliminating Competitors
| 1
| 0
| Article 81(1) prohibits agreements that have the purpose or effect of eliminating competition
|  
|-
|-
|  
|  
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging
| 1
| 0
| Article 81 prohibits bid-rigging
|  
|-
|-
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| Supply Refusal
| Supply Refusal
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(1)(b) prohibits supply refusal
| Case law has interpreted Article 1(1)(d) as prohibiting group boycotts.<ref>See Veterinarios Ambulantes, TDC Dec. 368/95, of 9 February 1998.</ref>
|-
|-
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| Efficiency Defense
| Efficiency Defense
| 1
| 1
| Article 81(3) allows an efficiency defense
| Article 3 gives an exemption to the Article 1 prohibitions for agreements that contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress.
|}
|}

Revision as of 00:52, 6 August 2007

Score = 24

Governed by: Law no. 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 as last amended on 28 December 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 The Competition Act does not expressly provide for extraterritoriality but the court has interpreted it to apply to anything that has an economic impact in Spain and this is implied by Article 1 which discusses effects.[2]
Remedies Fines 1 Article 10 says that the TDC can issue fines for any breaches of Articles 1, 6, and 7.
Prison Sentences 1 Article 46(6) allows management to be imprisoned for certain violations of the criminal law.
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 SDC investigations to enforce Articles 1, 6, or 7 can be initiated by 3rd parties.[3]
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 Article 13 says that 3rd parties can file actions for damages after the Commission has reached a decision.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 Any interested party can contribute to the case.[4]
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 Article 15 requires notification by the parties.
Pre-merger 0
Post-merger 1 Article 15 requires that the notification occur either before the merger or within 1 month after the merger is completed.
Merger Assessment Dominance 1 Article 16(1) considers the market position as a relevant assessment factor.
Restriction of Competition 1 Article 16(2) considers the possible restrictive effects on competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 1 Article 16(1) considers the possible benefits to the public when deciding whether to allow an otherwise impermissible merger.
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 0
Other 1 Article 16 considers the effects on the international community when evaluating mergers.
Efficiency 1 Article 16(1) considers the effects on economic progress.
Dominance Limits Access 1 Article 6(2)(c) prohibits refusing to supply demand.
Abusive Acts 1 Article 6(2) lists several abusive acts which fit under the prohibition.
Price Setting 1 Article 6(2)(a) prohibits price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 Article 6(2)(d) prohibits applying unequal prices and conditions to equivalent transactions.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 Courts have interpreted Article 7 (Distorting Free Competition by means of Unfair Act) as including RPM.[5]
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 Article 1(1)(a) prohibits price fixing.
Tying 1 Article 1(1)(e) prohibits tying.
Market Division 1 Case law has interpreted Article 1(1) as including market division (customer allocation) in its list of prohibitions.[6]
Output Restraint 1 Article 1(1)(b) prohibits limiting or controlling production and distribution.
Market Sharing 1 Article 1(1)(c) prohibits market sharing.
Eliminating Competitors 0
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 1 Case law has interpreted Article 1(1)(d) as prohibiting group boycotts.[7]
Efficiency Defense 1 Article 3 gives an exemption to the Article 1 prohibitions for agreements that contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress.

References

  1. Competition Law in the EU, at 673-707.
  2. Id. at 228.
  3. See Iberasistencia v. Gremi Regional d’Empreses de Pompes Funebres de Catalunya, TDC Dec. 308/91, of 14 July 1992.
  4. Competition Law in the EU, at 265.
  5. See Fina Ibérica, TDC Dec. 9/90, of 25 June 1990 and Ibercarretillas, TDC Dec. 6/90, of 6 June 1990.
  6. See Servicios Funerarios de Madrid, TDC Dec. 404/97, of 23 December 1997.
  7. See Veterinarios Ambulantes, TDC Dec. 368/95, of 9 February 1998.