Austria (January 1, 2006): Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
|- class="categorydivision" | |- class="categorydivision" | ||
| Scope | | [[Index_Definitions#Scope|Scope]] | ||
| Extraterritoriality | | [[Index_Definitions#Extraterritoriality|Extraterritoriality]] | ||
| 0 | | 0 | ||
| | | | ||
Revision as of 10:53, 9 August 2007
Score = 0
Governed by: The New Act (Kartellgesetz 2005) (herein referred to as "Competition Act").[1][2][3]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 0 | |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Prohibited undertakings involved may be subject to fines.[4] |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | Collusive tendering constitutes a criminal offence under section 168b Criminal Code and is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. | |
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | ||
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §9(1) requires merger notification in certain instances. | |
| Pre-merger | 0 | ||
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Cartel Court will assess whether the proposed concentration will create or strengthen a dominant position in the relevant market. |
| Restriction of Competition | 0 | ||
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration is indispensable to the international competitiveness of the undertakings concerned and justifiable on macroeconomic grounds. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Clearance on special grounds will be granted if it can be established that the concentration will improve competition in the market in such a way that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | §5(1) prohibits limiting markets to the detriment of consumers. |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §5(1)(3) A dominant firm may not disadvantage contracting parties by the application of different conditions with equivalent achievements. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §5(1)(1) prohibits the direct or indirect enforcement of inadequate purchase or selling prices. Moreover, §5(1)(5) prohibits predatory pricing. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | 5(1) prohibits discrimination by way of imposing different contractual conditions to similar transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | §4(1)(2) prohibits a dominant firm from limiting other firms from admission into the market. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §1(2)(1) prohibits agreements against setting prices directly or indirectly. |
| Tying | 1 | §1(2)(5) prohibits conditions attached to the conclusion of contracts that the contracting parties accept additional achievements which are not related to the contractual item. | |
| Market Division | 1 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §1(2)(2) prohibits agreements restricting or controlling production. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | §1(2)(3) prohibit agreements that share markets or sources of supply. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | §1(2)(4) prohibits the application of different conditions with equivalent trade partners, whereby these are disadvantaged in competition. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | Bid-rigging is prohibited. | |
| Supply Refusal | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §2(1) provides an exception for agreements that contribute to the promotion of technical or economic progress. |