Belgium 1999: Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 18''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991, amended by Royal Decree of 14 June 1999 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). | ''Governed by:'' Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991, amended by Royal Decree of 14 June 1999 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). | ||
Revision as of 12:08, 12 October 2007
Score = 18
Governed by: Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991, amended by Royal Decree of 14 June 1999 (herein after referred to as Competition Act). [1][2]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | The Competition Act can be applied to anything that has an effect on the Belgian market. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | Articles 36, 37, 38, and 40 allow levying fines for certain violations. |
| Prison Sentences | 0 | ||
| Divestitures | 0 | ||
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 0 | |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 0 | Nothing saying that damaged 3rd parties cannot file a private tort claim but it is not provided for | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 1 | Article 32(2) says that 3rd parties have the right to be heard by the Council if they can demonstrate a sufficient interest. | |
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | Article 10(1) says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | Article 10(1) says the concentrations shall be subject to the prior consent of the Competition Council. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | Article 10(2)(b) says that the council must take into account, the market position of the companies. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | Article 10(2)(a) says that the council is to take into consideration the necessity of maintaining effective competition.
| |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | Article 10(6) says that if the public interest justifies it, the Council may permit a concentration which would be otherwise impermissible. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 0 | ||
| Efficiency | 1 | Article 10(2)(b) requires looking at the effects such a merger would have on economic and technological progress. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 0 | |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | Article 2(1) lists several abusive acts which are prohibited. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | Article 3(a) prohibits dominant companies from imposing unfair prices. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | Article 3(c) prohibits applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 0 | ||
| Obstacles to Entry | 0 | ||
| Efficiency Defense | 0 | ||
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | Article 2(1)(a) of the Competition Act prohibits directly or indirectly fixing prices by individual companies or cartels. |
| Tying | 1 | Article 2(1)(e) and Article 3(d) prohibit tying. | |
| Market Division | 1 | Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting or controlling production, markets or investment. | |
| Output Restraint | 1 | Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting production, markets, development, and investment by individual companies or cartels. | |
| Market Sharing | 1 | Article 2(1)(c) prohibits market sharing. | |
| Eliminating Competitors | 0 | ||
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 0 | ||
| Supply Refusal | 1 | Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting production, markets, development, and investment by individual companies or cartels. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | Article 2(3) exempts agreements from the Article 2(1) prohibitions if they contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress. |
References
- ↑ Competition Law in the EU at 795.
- ↑ Statute can be found at, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Belgium/leg1.pdf