Canada (August 23, 2000): Difference between revisions
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'''Score = | '''Score = 24''' | ||
''Governed by:'' Competition Act of 23 August 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ''Governed by:'' Competition Act of 23 August 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). | ||
Revision as of 14:01, 12 October 2007
Score = 24
Governed by: Competition Act of 23 August 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”). [1]
| Category | Subcategory | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | Extraterritoriality | 1 | §92 gives the Tribunal power over any merger (domestic or foreign) that has an effect in Canada. |
| Remedies | Fines | 1 | §100 allows fines for failing to notify of a transaction. |
| Prison Sentences | 1 | §100 allows the Tribunal to impose imprisonment for failing to notify. | |
| Divestitures | 1 | §92 allows the Tribunal to dissolve companies formed by impermissible mergers. | |
| Private Enforcement | 3rd Party Initiation | 1 | §36(1)(a) states that any person who suffered loss due to a violation of §45-§62 can initiate a private suit in any “competent jurisdiction.” |
| Remedies Available to 3rd Parties | 1 | §36(1) provides for monetary remedies to third party initiators. | |
| 3rd Party Rights in Proceedings | 0 | ||
| Merger Notification | Voluntary | 0 | |
| Mandatory | 3 | §114 requires pre-merger notification for large mergers. | |
| Pre-merger | 2 | §114 requires pre-merger notification for large mergers. | |
| Post-merger | 0 | ||
| Merger Assessment | Dominance | 1 | §92 makes market share part of the merger assessment, though not sufficient in itself. |
| Restriction of Competition | 1 | §92 allows Tribunal to issue a remedial order to any merger that is likely to prevent competition. | |
| Public Interest (Pro D) | 1 | §93 allows Tribunal to allow otherwise impermissible merger due to international competitiveness considerations. | |
| Public Interest (Pro Authority) | 0 | ||
| Other | 1 | §93 allows Tribunal to consider business failure in merger calculus. | |
| Efficiency | 1 | §96 contains an exception for mergers that are likely to bring about gains in efficiency. | |
| Dominance | Limits Access | 1 | §78(e) prohibits “pre-emption of scarce facilities or resources . . . with the object of withholding the facilities or resources from a market.” |
| Abusive Acts | 1 | §78 and 79 prohibit abuse of a dominant position. | |
| Price Setting | 1 | §50(1)(b) makes price setting (too low) a criminal offense. | |
| Discriminatory Pricing | 1 | §50(1)(a) makes discriminatory pricing a criminal offense. | |
| Resale Price Maintenance | 1 | §61(1) prohibits resale price maintenance. | |
| Obstacles to Entry | 1 | §78 prohibits anti-competitive acts that prevent market entry. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §85-90 allow the Commissioner to take into account gains in efficiency when evaluating the prohibited practices. | |
| Restrictive Trade Practices | Price Fixing | 1 | §45 makes price setting to lessen competition a criminal offense. |
| Tying | 1 | §77 prohibits tying arrangements. | |
| Market Division | 0 | ||
| Output Restraint | 1 | §45 makes output restraint to lessen competition a criminal offense. | |
| Market Sharing | 0 | ||
| Eliminating Competitors | 1 | §50(1)(c) makes practices with the effect of eliminating a competitor a criminal offense. | |
| Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging | 1 | §47 makes bid rigging a criminal offense. | |
| Supply Refusal | 1 | §61(6) makes inducing a supply refusal a criminal offense. | |
| Efficiency Defense | 1 | §85-90 allow the Commissioner to take into account gains in efficiency when evaluating the prohibited practices. |